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Abstract
The Dirichlet series of ζ(s) was long ago proven to be divergent throughout
half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1. If also Riemann’s proposition is true, that there exists an
"expression" of ζ(s) that is convergent at all s (except at s = 1), then ζ(s) is both
divergent and convergent throughout half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 (except at s = 1).
This result violates all three of Aristotle’s "Laws of Thought": the Law of
Identity (LOI), the Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM), and the Law of Non-
Contradition (LNC). In classical and intuitionistic logics, the violation of LNC
also triggers the "Principle of Explosion" / Ex Contradictione Quodlibet (ECQ).
In addition, the Hankel contour used in Riemann’s analytic continuation of
ζ(s) violates Cauchy’s integral theorem, providing another proof of the invalidity
of Riemann’s ζ(s). Riemann’s ζ(s) is one of the L-functions, which are all in-
valid due to analytic continuation. This result renders unsound all theorems (e.g.
Modularity, Fermat’s last) and conjectures (e.g. BSD, Tate, Hodge, Yang-Mills)
that assume that an L-function (e.g. Riemann’s ζ(s)) is valid.
We also show that the Riemann Hypothesis (RH) is not "non-trivially true"
in classical logic, intuitionistic logic, or three-valued logics (3VLs) that assign a
third truth-value to paradoxes (Bochvar’s 3VL, Priest’s LP ).
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Tutte le verità sono facili da capire
una volta che sono state rivelate. Il
difficile è scoprirle.
Galileo Galilei
1 Introduction
1.1 The Crux of the Problem
Riemann [241] states the following on the first page of his famous paper, "On the
Number of Prime Numbers less than a Given Quantity": 1
For this investigation my point of departure is provided by the observa-
tion of Euler that the product
∏ 1
1− 1/ps =
∑ 1
ns
(1.1)
if one substitutes for p all prime numbers, and for n all whole numbers.
The function of the complex variable s which is represented by these two
expressions, wherever they converge, I denote by ζ(s). Both expressions
converge only when the real part of s is greater than 1; at the same time an
expression for the [zeta] function can easily be found which always remains
valid.
Riemann’s proposition is that there exists an "expression" for ζ(s) which is conver-
gent for all values of s, in addition to the Dirichlet series of ζ(s), which is proven to
be divergent throughout half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 (as admitted by Riemann in the cited
text). Riemann’s proposition violates all three of Aristotle’s "Laws of Thought": the
Law of Identity (LOI), the Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM), and the Law of Non-
Contradition (LNC). 2 In classical and intuitionistic logics, this violation of LNC triggers
the "Principle of Explosion" (Ex Contradictione Quodlibet, or "ECQ").
Unfortunately, Riemann confused the mathematical concept of "convergence" with
the logical concept of "validity." The Dirichlet series of ζ(s) is proven to be divergent
(i.e. not convergent), throughout half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1, and this proof is logically
valid. Riemann’s alternative "expression" for ζ(s) claims to be convergent throughout
1In the original German: "Ueber die Anzahl der Primzahlen unter einer gegebenen Grösse".
2The one-to-two mapping from domain to range also violates the set theory definition of "a func-
tion".
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that same half-plane. 3 If true, ζ(s) would be both convergent and not convergent
throughout half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1. 4 So Riemann’s "analytic continuation" of ζ(s)
violates the LOI, LEM, and LNC; and is not valid in logics that have any of these as
axioms. 5
The remainder of this paper provides commentary on this fact, including a discussion
of the errors in the derivation of Riemann’s ζ(s), and a discussion of the resulting
implications for the Riemann Hypothesis and other conjectures that assume that the
"analytic continuation" of ζ(s) is valid.
Riemann’s ζ(s) is one of the L-functions, and all L-functions invalid, for the same
reason: Riemann’s version of analytic continuation results in a contradiction. The inva-
lidity of L-functions renders unsound all theorems (e.g. Modularity theorem, Fermat’s
last theorem) and conjectures (e.g. BSD, Tate, Hodge, Yang-Mills) that falsely assume
that an L-function (e.g. Riemann’s ζ(s)) or "zeta function regularization" is valid.
1.2 Attacking the Most Specific Problem with the Oldest Ideas
In "Problems of the Millennium: the Riemann Hypothesis", Bombieri [35] states:
Not a single example of validity or failure of a Riemann hypothesis for an
L-function is known up to this date. The Riemann hypothesis for ζ(s) does
not seem to be any easier than for Dirichlet L-functions (except possibly
for non-trivial Real zeros), leading to the view that its solution may require
attacking much more general problems, by means of entirely new ideas. 6
The present paper takes the opposite approach: attacking the most specific problem
by means of the oldest possible ideas. More specifically, the present paper attacks
the Riemann hypothesis (RH) by proving the invalidity of the most famous of the L-
functions: Riemann’s ζ(s). This is done by means of logics of the early 20th century (i.e.
"classical logic", intuitionistic logic, and three-valued logics (3VLs)), using concepts
inherited from Aristotelian and medieval logic. These inherited concepts are certainly
not new. For example, the three "Laws of Thought" 7 and syllogism are discussed in
3Except for a solitary pole at s = 1.
4Again, except for a solitary pole at s = 1.
5And as stated above, the one-to-two mapping of domain-to-range also violates the set theory
definition of a "function".
6See Bombieri [35], p.5.
7The three "Laws of Thought" are: the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), Law of the Excluded
Middle (LEM), and Law of Identity (LOI).
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Aristotle’s Organon [13]. 8 9 10 11 The Square of Opposition "shows up already in the
second century CE", and "Boethius incorporated it into his writing". 12 The "Principle
of Explosion" (Ex Contradictione Quodlibet, or "ECQ") is a theorem that dates back
to the 12th century. 13
The focus in this paper is on the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) and the "Prin-
ciple of Explosion" (Ex Contradictione Quodlibet, or "ECQ"). LNC is an axiom, and
ECQ is a theorem, in the "classical logic" of Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathe-
matica [306], and also in Intuitionistic logics (e.g. Brouwer’s and Heyting’s). However,
LNC and ECQ both fail in the three-valued logics (3VLs) discussed in this paper (e.g.
Bochvar’s 3VL, and Priest’s "Logic of Paradox", which itself is a version of Kleene’s
3VL), due to these logics having more than two truth-values.
Łukasiewicz’s Three-Valued Logic (3VL) (c. 1920), 14 Brouwer’s intuitionistic logic
(c. 1921), 15 and Whitehead and Russell’s "classical logic" (c. 1925), 16 are all approx-
imately hundred years old. Heyting’s intuitionistic logic (c. 1930); 17 and Bochvar’s
3VL (c. 1938), 18 are slightly more recent. Kleene’s 3VL (c. 1952), 19 is over 65 years
old. Priest’s "Logic of Paradox" (LP ) (c. 1979) 20 is by far the youngest logic of this
group, at "only" 40 years old.
But in spite of the ages of these logics, the author has not found any discussion of
the RH in the context of any of these logics. It appears that logicians do not apply logic
to specific examples, and that mathematicians lost interest in foundational questions
8Aristotle’s life is dated as 384–322 BCE. See Wikipedia [308], citing Boeckh [33], vol.VI, p.195,
Jacoby [149], FGrHist 244 F 38, and Düring [87], p.253.
9The LNC pre-dates Aristotle. See, e.g. Plato’s Socratic dialogue Euthyphro at Plato [220], p. 264-
265, §8: "Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and
dear to them? ... And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious?"
10See also Cohen [62], p.328: "Actually, the laws go back well before Aristotle, who was essentially
summarizing the views of the pre-Socratic philosophers, most notably Parmenides. It was he, in the
5th century BCE, who had formulated the [LNC] as ’Never will this prevail, that what is not, is.’"
11See also Boole’s [36] discussion of the LOI in Chapter II, pp.34-36, Para.12-13; the LNC in Chapter
III, p.49, Prop. IV; and the LEM in Chapter III, p.48, Prop. II, and also in pp.8 and 99-100.
12See Parsons [210], §2.1: "The diagram accompanying and illustrating the doctrine shows up already
in the second century CE; Boethius incorporated it into his writing, and it passed down through the
dark ages to the high medieval period, and from thence to today. Diagrams of this sort were popular
among late classical and medieval authors, who used them for a variety of purposes."
13The first proof of this principle is attributed to 12th century French philosopher William of Sois-
sons. See Wikipedia [328], citing Priest [232], p.25, which in turn cites Priest [228], vol.6, ch.4.
14See e.g. Łukasiewicz [347].
15See Brouwer [47].
16See Whitehead et al. [306].
17See Heyting [138] (in German) and [140] (in English).
18See Bochvar [32].
19See Kleene [159], first published in 1952.
20See Priest [226] and Priest [227].
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after the development of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. 21
1.3 RH is a Problem in Logic, Regardless of Logic’s Relation-
ship to Math
On a related note, Oort et al. [206] states:
Historically as well as mathematically, the real conundrum is: where do
the Riemann Hypothesis and its avatars belong in the vast and changing
landscape of mathematics? The day we will see a proof of the Riemann
Hypothesis, this will root and place the statement for the first time. 22
The present paper asserts that Turing [289] erred when he classified the RH as a
"number-theoretic" problem. 23 Instead, RH is a problem in logic (a.k.a. "foundations
of mathematics", or "meta-mathematics").
In the logics discussed in this paper, the Riemann hypothesis is false, or a paradox,
or "trivially true" (depending on the logic, and whether the analytic continuation of
ζ(s) is true or false). In none of the evaluated scenarios is RH "non-trivially true". So
even in the unlikely event that the RH is "non-trivially true" in some other logic, the
RH cannot be a "logical truth", because it is not "necessarily true". 24 25
Moreover, classifying RH as a problem in logic does not definitively place it within
Oort et al.’s [206] "landscape of mathematics". The relationship between logic and
mathematics is a matter of dispute between the classical school and the intuitionistic
21See Wikipedia [336]:" Today, Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, with the historically controversial axiom
of choice (AC) included, is the standard form of axiomatic set theory and as such is the most common
foundation of mathematics."
22See Oort et al. [206], p.596.
23See Turing [289], p.165: "It is easy to show that a number of unsolved problems, such as the
problem of the truth of Fermat’s last theorem, are number-theoretic. There are, however, also problems
of analysis which are number-theoretic. The Riemann hypothesis gives us an example of this."
24See Wikipedia [322]: "Logical truths (including tautologies) are truths which are considered to be
necessarily true. This is to say that they are considered to be such that they could not be untrue and
no situation could arise which would cause us to reject a logical truth. It must be true in every sense
of intuition, practices, and bodies of beliefs. However, it is not universally agreed that there are any
statements which are necessarily true."
25See also Gómez-Torrente [117]:"It is typical to hold that, in some sense or senses of ’could’, a logical
truth could not be false or, alternatively, that in some sense or senses of ’must’, a logical truth must
be true. But there is little if any agreement about how the relevant modality should be understood."
9
school. 26 27 This debate is discussed in greater detail in Section 17.2 of this paper.
1.4 Other Important Results Discussed in This Paper
Also discussed in this paper is the invalidity in logics with LNC of the derivation of
Riemann’s ζ(s). Riemann used Cauchy’s integral theorem to find the limit of the Hankel
contour as the Hankel contour approaches the branch cut of f(s) = log(−s) on half-axis
s ≥ 0. But log(−s) has no defined value (and so is non-holomorphic) on the branch
cut. The Hankel contour is either an open path, or closed at s = +∞ and encloses
non-holomorphic points. Either way, prerequisites of Cauchy’s integral theorem are
violated.
Also, the analytic continuation of ζ(s) violates the LNC and triggers ECQ, so all
conjectures in classical or intuitionistic logic that falsely assume that AC of ζ(s) is
true are rendered unsound. All generalizations of Riemann’s ζ(s), such as Dirichlet
L-functions, are unsound, because they falsely assume that Riemann’s analytic con-
tinuation of ζ(s) is valid. So the BSD conjecture is unsound, because it assumes that
Dirichlet L-functions are valid. Also, it is thereby proven that ζ(1) 6= 0, because ζ(s) is
exclusively defined by the Dirichlet series. At s = 1, ζ(s) is the famous "harmonic se-
ries" which is proven to be divergent. (Coincidentally, also Riemann’s ζ(s) is divergent
at s = 1). So ζ(1) 6= 0.
This result also resolves other conjectures that are directly or indirectly equivalent
to the BSD Conjecture (e.g. Tate’s and Hodge’s, as discussed in works by B. Totaro
[284] and [285], and J.S. Milne [193]). In addition, it also invalidates the Modularity
Theorem, and thus also Fermat’s last theorem.
Several physics theories (including Yang-Mills theory) falsely assume that the an-
alytic continuation of ζ(s) (a.k.a. "Riemann zeta function regularization") is true.
This false assumption renders these theories unsound. We also apply Venn’s "Modern"
Square of Opposition to prove that P 6= NP .
26See Haack [120], pp.216-217: "[T]he Intuitionists think of logic as secondary to mathematics,
as a collection of principles which are discovered, a posteriori, to govern mathematical reasoning.
This obviously challenges the ’classical’ conception of logic as the study of principles applicable to all
reasoning regardless of subject-matter, as the most fundamental and general of theories, to which even
mathematics is secondary."
27See Vafeiadou et al. [294], p.2, citing Brouwer [46], p.61: "In direct opposition to Russell and
Whitehead’s logicism, Brouwer asserted in 1907 that mathematics cannot be considered a part of logic.
’Strictly speaking the construction of intuitive mathematics in itself is an action and not a science; it
only becomes a science, i.e. a totality of causal sequences, repeatable in time, in a mathematics of the
second order [metamathematics], which consists of the mathematical consideration of mathematics or
of the language of mathematics ... But there, as in the case of theoretical logic, we are concerned with
an application of mathematics, that is, with an experimental science."
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Also included is discussion of Aristotelian logic, Classical logic, and Non-Classical
logics, and a detailed discussion of the invalid derivation of Riemann’s ζ(s).
2 Convergence and Divergence are the Two Values of
a Bivalent System
When discussing the RH, and the LNC, it is important to note that the terms "con-
vergent" and "divergent" are defined as the two values of a bivalent logic. Therefore, a
series cannot be both simultaneously:
[A] series
∞∑
n=0
an = a0 + a1 + a2 + . . . (2.1)
is said to be convergent, to the sum s, if the ’partial sum’
sn = a0 + a1 + . . .+ an (2.2)
tends to a finite limit s when n→∞; and a series which is not convergent
is said to be divergent. 28
Therefore, by definition, an infinite series is either convergent or divergent. The
series either converges to a value, or it does not. For example, an oscillating series such
as 1 − 1 + 1 − 1 + . . . does not converge to any value, and therefore by definition is
divergent. 29
Moreover, if proposition (P ) states that a given series is convergent, then the nega-
tion of that proposition, (¬P ), states that the given series is divergent. The converse
is also true: if the proposition (P ) states that the series is divergent, then the negation
of that proposition, (¬P ), states that the series is convergent.
According to the LNC, (P ) and (¬P ) cannot both be true simultaneously. So the
infinite series ζ(s) cannot be both convergent and divergent at any value of s.
28See Hardy [126], p.1.
29See Hardy [126], p.1.
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3 The Dirichlet Series ζ(s) is Proven Divergent Through-
out Half-Plane Re(s)<=1
Riemann [241] concedes the divergence of Dirichlet series ζ(s) in the half-plane Re(s) ≤
1 as a given fact. 30 Euler was the first to prove the first to prove that the Dirichlet
series ζ(s) equals the Euler product. 31 32 Euler also proved that both the Euler
product of ζ(s) and the Dirichlet series of ζ(s) are divergent along the half-line s ≤ 1,
for s ∈ R. 33 This is easily confirmed by use of the "Integral test for convergence", 34
which is simplified in the "p-series" test for convergence. 35
Moreover, the Dirichlet series ζ(s) is proven to be divergent at all values of s in
half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1. 36 There exist proofs that the Dirichlet series ζ(s) is divergent in
a portion of that half-plane, and there also exist proofs that it is divergent throughout
the entire half-plane:
3.1 Dirichlet Series ζ(s) is Divergent at Real Half-Axis {Re(s) ≤
1, Im(s) = 0}
Dirichlet series ζ(s) is divergent for all values of s on the Real half-axis {Re(s) ≤
1, Im(s) = 0}. See the "Integral Test for convergence" (a.k.a. the Maclaurin–Cauchy
30See Riemann [241], p.1 (emphasis added): "The function of the complex variable s which is repre-
sented by these two expressions [the Euler product and the Dirichlet series], wherever they converge,
I denote by ζ(s). Both expressions converge only when the Real part of s is greater than 1".
31See Wikipedia [329] (citing Derbyshire [79], ch.7): "Leonhard Euler proved the Euler product
formula for the Riemann zeta function in his thesis Variae observationes circa series infinitas (Various
Observations about Infinite Series), published by St Petersburg Academy in 1737."
32See the Euler Archive [94] for the original publication (in Latin) of Euler’s Variae observationes
circa series infinitas, and also English and German translations.
33See also Calinger [51], ch.4, p.136: "His ’Variae observationes’ also introduces his famous product
decomposition formula also introduces his famous product decomposition formula p for the set of
primes, ∏
p∈P
(1− p)−1 =
∞∑
n=1
n−s (3.1)
Multiplying the right side of the equation yields
∑∞
n=1 n
−s = ζ(s). When s = 1, ζ(1) is the harmonic
series, which diverges to ∞. By applying the divergence of the harmonic series to the occurrence
of primes, Euler proved indirectly their infinitude, a fact known since antiquity. The corresponding
product must have infinitely many factors."
34See, e.g., Guichard et al.’s [116], discussion of the Integral test for convergence, at Theorems 13.3.3
and 13.3.4 and their proofs.
35See, e.g. Department of Mathematics Website, Oregon State University [78], and Birdsong [31].
36See Hardy et al. [127], p.4, Theorem 3: "The series may be convergent for all values of s, or
for none, or for some only. In the last case there is a number σs such that the series is convergent
for σ > σs, and divergent or oscillatory for σ < σs. In other words the region of convergence is a
half-plane." (Citing Jensen [153] for the proof).
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test for convergence). This is commonly taught in introductory calculus textbooks. For
example: 37 38
Theorem 13.3.3 : Suppose that f(x) > 0 and is decreasing on the infinite
interval [k,∞) (for some k ≥ 1) and that an = f(n). Then the series∑∞
n=1 a
n converges if and only if the improper integral
∫∞
1
f(x) dx converges.
[A] p-series is any series of the form
∑
1/np. If p ≤ 0, [and p ∈ R, then]
limn→∞ 1/np 6= 0, so the series diverges. For positive values of p we can
determine precisely which series converge.
Theorem 13.3.4 : A p-series with p > 0 converges if and only if p > 1.
Proof. We use the integral test; we have already done p = 1, so assume
that p 6= 1. ∫ ∞
1
1
xp
dx = lim
D→∞
x1−p
1− p
∣∣∣∣D
1
= lim
D→∞
D1−p
1− p −
1
1− p
If p > 1 then 1− p < 0 and limD→∞D1−p = 0, so the integral converges. If
0 < p < 1, then 1− p > 0 and limD→∞D1−p =∞, so the integral diverges.
3.2 Dirichlet Series ζ(s) is Divergent at "Line of Convergence"
{Re(s) = 1}
Dirichlet series ζ(s) is divergent for all values of s on the misleadingly-named "line of
convergence" Re(s) = 1, which is parallel to the Imaginary axis Re(s) = 0, and which
is the border between the Dirichlet ζ(s) half-plane of convergence and its half-plane of
divergence. At the point s = 1, where ζ(s) is the famous "harmonic series", the function
ζ(s) is divergent. At all other values of s on the "line of convergence", s = 1 + ti, the
function ζ(s) is "oscillating", which by definition is divergent. 39
37See, e.g., Guichard et al. [116], the Integral test for convergence, discussed at Theorems 13.3.3 and
13.3.4 and their proofs.
38See also the P-series test for convergence at the Oregon State Univ. Dept. of Mathematics website
[78], and at Birdsong [31]. The P-series test for convergence is the same as Guichard’s [116] Thm.
13.3.4.
39See Hardy et al. [127], p.5, Example (iii), citing Bromwich [42]: "The series
∑
n−s has σ = 1 as
its line of convergence. It is not convergent at any point of the line of convergence, diverging to +∞
for s = 1, and oscillating finitely at all other points of the line." (Hardy [126], p.1. defines "oscillating"
as "divergent". But note that Dirichlet series ζ(s) is "Cesàro summable" at all points on the "line of
convergence" (except at s = 1, where ζ(s) is the harmonic series, which is divergent).
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3.3 Dirichlet Series ζ(s) is Divergent Throughout Half-Plane
{Re(s) ≤ 1}
Dirichlet series ζ(s) is divergent for all values of s in the half-plane {Re(s) ≤ 1, Im(s)}.
Hildebrand [143] states: 40 41 42
For every Dirichlet series there exists a number σc ∈ R ∪ {±∞}, called
the abscissa of convergence, such that the series converges in the half-plane
σ > σc (the “half-plane of convergence”), and diverges in the half-plane
σ < σc.
Hildebrand [143] also states: 43 44 45 46 47
For example, the Dirichlet series representation (4.11) of the zeta func-
tion diverges at every point in the half-plane σ < σc = 1 (and even at every
point on the line σ = 1, as one can show by Euler’s summation).
Moreover, another method to prove that Dirichlet series ζ(s) is divergent throughout
40See Hildebrand [143], pp.117-118, Theorem 4.6 (Convergence of Dirichlet series). See also Clark
[60], p.11, Theorem 11, regarding the half-plane of divergence.
41See Hardy et al. [127], p.3, fn. ‡, citing Jensen [153] and Cahen [50] for proofs of Hardy et
al. [127], Theorems 1 and 2, respectively. Theorem 1 is: "If the [Dirichlet] series is convergent for
s = σ+ ti, then it is convergent for any value of s whose Real part is greater than σ." (In other words,
for Re(s) > σ.)
42See also Conrad [65], p.1, Example 1: "If an = 1 for all n then f(s) = ζ(s), which converges for
σ > 1. It does not converge at s = 1". See also Conrad [65], pp.2-3, Theorems 8 and 9, and: "The
contribution of Jensen [153] to Theorem 9 was a proof that convergence at s0 implies convergence on
the half-plane to the right of s0."
43See Hildebrand [143], p.126, Remark regarding Theorem 4.11.
44See also Overholt [207], pp. 65: "Hence every Dirichlet series has an abscissa of convergence σc
such that it converges to the right of the line σ = σc and diverges to the left of this line, which is
called the line of convergence for the series." (Overholt’s [207] analytic continuation in pp.157-158,
162, including Proposition 5.1, violates the LNC.)
45See e.g. the discussion regarding the "abscissa of convergence" at Wikipedia [312] citing Hardy
et al. [127]: "In general the abscissa of convergence of a Dirichlet series is the intercept on the Real
axis of the vertical line in the complex plane such that there is convergence to the right of it, and
divergence to the left" and "Hence, for every s such that
∑∞
n=1 ann
−s diverges, we have σ ≥ Re(s),
and this finishes the proof."
46The author’s proof (not peer reviewed) substitutes Euler’s formula into the Dirichlet series, and
then performs integration by parts (based on the assumption that
∫
for n ∈ R is an acceptable
approximation of Σ for n ∈ Z). See Sharon [256], Version 4, Appendices A-F, pp.19-34.
47Note: The partial sums of f(t) =
∑∞
n=1 sin(t · ln(n)) are not bounded, nor are they for f(t) =∑∞
n=1 cos(t · ln(n)). Therefore, Sharon [256], Version 4, Appendices G and H are wrong. However, this
means that Dirichlet series test for convergence and Abel’s lemma contradict the claim of convergence
for Riemann’s ζ(s) throughout the "critical strip" (except for the Imaginary axis Re(s) = 0, where
f(σ, n) = nσ is not monotonically decreasing as n → ∞ for constant σ = 0). (This is more evidence
that Riemann’s ζ(s) violates the LNC.)
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the half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 is to rewrite the Dirichlet series into its trigonometric form, 48
and then performing integration by parts. 49
4 Riemann’s ζ(s) Claims to be Convergent Through-
out Half-Plane Re(s)<=1 (Except at s=1)
Directly contradicting these proofs of the divergence of Dirichlet series ζ(s) throughout
half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 is Riemann’s [241] famous claim to have derived an alternative
"expression" of ζ(s) that is convergent at all values of s, 50 except at the point s = 1
(where, coincidentally, the Dirichlet series ζ(s) is the divergent "harmonic series"). 51
52 Regarding this analytic continuation of ζ(s) to half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1, Hildebrand
[143] states:
Strictly speaking, we should use a different symbol, say ζ(s), for the an-
alytic continuation ... However, to avoid awkward notations, it has become
standard practice to denote the analytic continuation of a Dirichlet series by
48Because s = σ + it, the Dirichlet series ζ(s) can be written as:
ζ(s) =
∑
n−s =
∑
n−σ−it =
∑
n−σn−it (3.2)
and
n−it = exp(−it · ln(n))
= cos(−it · ln(n)) + i · sin(−it · ln(n)) (3.3)
and therefore ζ(s) can be written as:
Re
[
ζ(s)
]
=
∑[
n−σ · cos(−it · ln(n))
]
(3.4)
Im
[
ζ(s)
]
= i ·
∑[
n−σ · sin(−it · ln(n))
]
(3.5)
49See, e.g., Sharon [256], Appendix E, pp.26-32. (Note: not peer reviewed).
50See Riemann [241], p.1: "The function of the complex variable s which is represented by these two
expressions [the Euler product and the Dirichlet series], wherever they converge, I denote by ζ(s). Both
expressions converge only when the Real part of s is greater than 1; at the same time an expression
for the function can easily be found which always remains valid." This is Riemann’s ζ(s).
51See also Edwards [90], pp.10-11: "Thus, formula
ζ(s) =
Π(−s)
2pii
∫ +∞
+∞
(−x)s
ex − 1 ·
dx
x
(4.1)
defines a function ζ(s) which is analytic at all points of the complex s-plane except for a simple pole at
s = 1. This function coincides with
∑
n−s for real values of s > 1 and in fact, by analytic continuation,
throughout the half-plane Re((s) > 1. The function ζ(s) is known as the Riemann zeta function."
52In Riemann’s definition of ζ(s), the Euler product is superfluous.
15
the same symbol as the series itself, and we will usually follow this practice.
53
However, if the analytic continuation ζ(s) were indeed true at any value of s in the
half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1, then it would contradict the proven divergence of Dirichlet series
ζ(s) at that value of s. The "standard practice" of using the same symbol ζ(s) for the
two contradictory "expressions" of the Zeta function (in the half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1) is
merely an explicit confirmation of the violation of of the LOI and the LNC. In logics
that have both LNC and ECQ, the assumption that ζ(s) is true violates the LNC, and
triggers ECQ.
Included in Riemann’s claim, that his "expression" of ζ(s) is convergent throughout
half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1, is a claim that Riemann’s "expression" of ζ(s) is convergent
throughout the Real half-axis {Re(s) < 1, Im(s) = 0}. 54 This directly contradicts
the results of the "Integral test for convergence" (a.k.a. the Maclaurin-Cauchy test for
convergence) for all values of s on this Real half-axis.
Also included in Riemann’s claim, that his "expression" of ζ(s) is convergent in
half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1, is a claim that his "expression" of ζ(s) is convergent throughout
the Dirichlet ζ(s) "line of convergence" at Re(s) = 1 (except at the point s = 1). This
directly contradicts Hardy et al.’s [127] theorem (citing Bromwich [42]) that:
The series
∑
n−s has Re(s) = 1 as its line of convergence. It is not
convergent at any point of the line of convergence, diverging to +∞ for
s = 1, and oscillating finitely at all other points of the line. 55 56
As stated in the preceding section, at all values of s on the "line of convergence" (except
at s = 1), the Dirichlet series ζ(s) is a finitely oscillating series, that does not converge
to any value, and therefore by definition is divergent. 57 58
53See Hildebrand [143], p.126, Remark to Theorem 4.11.
54Riemann’s functional equation of ζ(s) even claims that ζ(s) has "trivial zeros" on this Real half-
axis.
55See Hardy et al. [127], p.5, Example (iii). According to Hardy, the Dirichlet series is not convergent
at any point on the "line of convergence", instead diverging to +∞ at s = 1, and oscillating finitely
at all other points of the line [citing Bromwich [42]].
56See also Sharon [256], Version 4, Equation E.42 in Appendix E, p.31, which confirms Hardy’s
comment that Dirichlet series ζ(s) oscillates at all points on the line of convergence Re(s) = 1, except
at (Re(s) = 1, Im(s) = 0) where it diverges to infinity. (However, the discussion in Sharon [256],
Version 4, p.32 overlooks this fact.)
57See Hardy [126], p.1.
58Riemann concedes that his "expression" of ζ(s) is divergent at s = 1, where Dirichlet series ζ(s)
is the "harmonic series".
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5 A Third Version of ζ(s)
Ash [14] discloses a third version of ζ(s), that contradicts both Dirichlet’s version of
ζ(s) and Riemann’s version of ζ(s):
We start with a trick. Multiply the sum for ζ(s) by 1/2s, and we get:
1
2s
· ζ(s) = 1
2s
+
1
4s
+
1
6s
+
1
8s
+ · · · . (5.1)
Let’s line this up - the trick is to do it twice - underneath the sum for ζ(s),
and subtract:
ζ(s) = 1 + 1/2s + 1/3s + 1/4s + 1/5s + 1/6s + · · ·
1/2s · ζ(s) = + 1/2s + 1/4s + 1/6s + · · ·
1/2s · ζ(s) = + 1/2s + 1/4s + 1/6s + · · ·
(1− 1/2s − 1/2s) · ζ(s) = 1 - 1/2s + 1/3s - 1/4s + 1/5s - 1/6s + · · ·
The result is:(
1− 1
2s−1
)
·ζ(s) = 1− 1
2s
+
1
3s
− 1
4s
+
1
5s
− 1
6s
+
1
7s
− 1
8s
+
1
9s
− 1
10s
+· · · (5.2)
In equation Eq. 5.2, the right-hand side is a Dirichlet series in which the
coefficients are 1,−1, 1,−1, 1,−1, · · · . Notice that |a1 + a2 + · · · + an| < 2
for any value of n. Theorem 11.7 now tells us that the right-hand side of
equation Eq. 5.2 can be summed provided that σ < 0. The formula
ζ(s) =
(
1− 1
2s−1
)−1
·
(
1− 1
2s
+
1
3s
− 1
4s
+
1
5s
− 1
6s
+
1
7s
− 1
8s
+
1
9s
− 1
10s
+ · · ·
)
(5.3)
therefore can be evaluated provided that σ > 0, with the sole exception of
the value at s = 1 59
Moreover, Ash’s [14] cited "Theorem 11.7" states the following: 60
THEOREM 11.7 Suppose that there is some constant K so that |a1 +
· · · + an| < K for all n. Then the Dirichlet series
∑
ann
−s converges if
σ > 0.
This third version of ζ(s) is convergent in half-plane Re(s) > 0, and divergent in
half-plane Re(s) ≤ 0. Therefore, this third version contradicts the Dirichlet series
59See Ash [14], pp.170-171.
60See Ash [14], p.169.
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version of ζ(s) throughout the “critical strip” 0 < Re(s) ≤ 1, by being convergent
there, and also contradicts Riemann’s version of ζ(s) throughout half-plane Re(s) ≤ 0,
by being divergent there.
Clearly, in a logic with LNC, only one of these three versions of ζ(s) can be true.
It is impossible for all three versions of ζ(s) to be true, or even for two of the three to
be true. The "Riemann series theorem" provides an explanation as to why this third
version of ζ(s) is invalid as an indicator of convergence/divergence. According to the
Riemann series theorem:
By a suitable rearrangement of terms, a conditionally convergent series
may be made to converge to any desired value, or to diverge. 61
So any conditionally convergent series can be rearranged to be convergent to any finite
number, and also can be rearranged to be divergent. This is not the case for an
absolutely convergent series, which is one of convergent or divergent, regardless of how
the terms are rearranged.
The third version of ζ(s) is created by transforming the Dirichlet series ζ(s), which
is an unconditionally convergent series throughout half-plane Re(s) > 1, to a series
which is conditionally convergent throughout half-plane Re(s) > 0. Therefore, it is due
to the conditional convergence of the third version of ζ(s) that the third version can be
manipulated to have a different zone of convergence than the original Dirichlet series
version. According to the Riemann series theorem, the region of convergence of the
Dirichlet series version remains constant when the series is rearranged, but the region
of convergence of the third version changes when rearranged (thus violating the LNC).
Ash [14] concludes the description of the third version of ζ(s) by stating that it can
be analytically continued even further:
However, we need to do still more, and find a way to evaluate ζ(s) for all
values of s except s = 1. That requires a discussion of functional equations.
62
This proposition violates the LNC, because contrary to the LNC, it holds that the third
version of ζ(s) can be convergent for every value of s in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 0 (except
s = 1), even though the Dirichlet series of ζ(s) is proven to be divergent throughout
said half-plane.
61See Weisstein [300], citing: Bromwich et al. [43], p.74; Gardner [106], p.171; and Havil [128],
p.102.
62See Ash [14], p.171.
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6 One-to-Two "Functions" Violate the Definition of a
Function
As discussed above, the Dirichlet series "expression" of ζ(s) is proven to be divergent
throughout this half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1. Riemann claims to have derived an additional
"expression" of ζ(s), that is convergent throughout half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 (except at
s = 1). However, this violates the definition of a "function" in set theory:
A function is a relation that uniquely associates members of one set with
members of another set. More formally, a function from A to B is an object
f such that every a ∈ A is uniquely associated with an object f(a) ∈ B. A
function is therefore a many-to-one (or sometimes one-to-one) relation. 63
Therefore, if both "expressions" of ζ(s) were true in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1, they would
violate this definition of a mathematical function, due to the one-to-two mapping from
s to the two different values of ζ(s), throughout the half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 (except at
s = 1). Each s value would map to two ζ(s) values: convergent and divergent.
7 The Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC)
The central thread of this paper is that Riemann-style "analytic continuation" of the
Zeta function violates the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). LNC holds that a propo-
sition p cannot be simultaneously both true and false. In logic notation: ` ¬(p ∧ ¬p).
The LNC is one of Aristotle’s three "Laws of Thought". It is included in classical logic
and intuitionistic logic, either as an axiom or as a theorem. In contrast, 3VL rejects
the LNC, either implicitly or explicitly. 64 65 66
In regards to the RH, in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 there are two conflicting definitions
of ζ(s): the Dirichlet series ζ(s), and Riemann’s ζ(s). The LNC holds that a
convergent "expression" of ζ(s) and a divergent "expression" of ζ(s) cannot
both be true, at any value of s.
63See Stover et al. [268].
64See Haack [122], p.5: "In Łukasiewicz’s 3-valued logic (motivated by the idea, already suggested
by Aristotle in De interpretatione §9, in Organon), that future contingent sentences are neither true
nor false but ’indeterminate’) both the Law of the Excluded Middle (’LEM;’ ’p or not p’) and the Law
of Non-Contradiction (’LNC;’ ’not both p and not-p’) fail."
65But see Decker [76], p.69, §3.3 Precursors of Paraconsistent Logic: "the introduction of more
than two truth -values opens up the possibility that some formulas which are classically interpreted as
contradictions no longer evaluate to false."
66By definition, there is no third category other than convergent and divergent. For example, Cesàro
summable sequences are classified as "divergent" (e.g. range-bound sine and cosine functions).
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In Riemann’s famous paper, he refers to the Dirichlet series ζ(s) as an "expression"
of ζ(s) that "converge[s] only when the Real part of s is greater than 1", and then
claims that there is another "expression" that "always remains valid". 67 This latter
proposition is where Riemann violates the LNC in his paper.
8 Ex Contradictione Quodlibet (ECQ)
Classical and intuitionistic logics also contain the "Principle of Explosion" Ex Contra-
dictione Quodlibet (ECQ). 68 ECQ states that a violation of LNC materially implies that
every other statement is "trivially true". 69 In classical logic notation: ` (p∧¬p)→ q.
In regards to the RH, ECQ holds that if both the Riemann ζ(s) and
the Dirichlet series ζ(s) are both true in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1, or are falsely
assumed to both be true, then the contradiction "trivially" implies the truth
of any other statement.
ECQ is a direct result of the definition of "material implication" in classical logic,
which holds that a false statement implies any statement. (In logic notation: ` (p →
q) = (¬p ∨ q)). 70 71 72 The proof of "material implication" in classical logic relies
upon the Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM), 73 and therefore is not valid in logics
that do not have the LEM as an axiom, such as intuitionistic logic and 3VL. Heyting’s
intuitionism has an alternative version of ECQ, 74 75 but minimal logic (a version of
67See Riemann [241], p.1: "The function of the complex variable s which is represented by these two
expressions [the Euler product and the Dirichlet series], wherever they converge, I denote by ζ(s). Both
expressions converge only when the Real part of s is greater than 1; at the same time an expression
for the function can easily be found which always remains valid."
68In MVL, paradoxes can be assigned a 3rd truth-value, thereby avoiding both LNC and ECQ.
69See, e.g. Kleene [159], p.101. according to which ECQ (A,¬A ` B) is valid in both classical and
intuitionistic logics.
70See Wikipedia [323], citing Hurley [145], pp.364–5; Copi et al. [67], p.371; and Math StackExchange
[9].
71See also Priest [233], p.45: "Recall that a conditional is a sentence of the form ’if a then c’, which
we are writing as a → c", "If you know that a → c, it would seem that you can infer that ¬(a&¬c)
(it is not the case that a and not c)", and "Conversely, if you know that ¬(a&¬c), it would seem that
you can infer a→ c from this."
72But see Priest [233], p.46, alternative name and notation: "¬(a&¬c) is often written as a ⊃ c, and
called the material conditional."
73See Wikipedia [323], citing Math StackExchange [9]: "Suppose we are given that P → Q. Then,
since we have ¬P ∨ P by the law of excluded middle, it follows that ¬P ∨Q. Suppose, conversely, we
are given ¬P ∨Q. Then if P is true that rules out the first disjunct, so we have Q. In short, P → Q."
74See Decker [76], pp.67-68, §3.2.3 Intuitionism: "As opposed to logicists and formalists, Brouwer ...
rejected the use of LEM and the law of double negation (LDN, formally: p⇔ ¬¬p, one half of which
is axiom 10 above). It was Kolmogorov [161] (English version: [162]) and Heyting [138] [140] who
proposed axiomatic systems for making intuitionism accessible to formal treatment (at the expense of
some of Brouwer’s basic philosophical beliefs)."
75Also, at Decker [76], pp.67-68: "Replacing ¬¬p → p (axiom 10) by ¬p → (p → q) (ECQ) in fig.1
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intuitionistic logic) does not have ECQ as a theorem. 76
Three-Valued Logic (3VL) has ECQ, 77 but "the introduction of more than two truth
-values opens up the possibility that some formulas which are classically interpreted as
contradictions no longer evaluate to false." 78 Both Bochvar’s 3VL 79 and Priest’s "Logic
of Paradox" (LP) (which uses the truth tables of Kleene’s "strong" 3-valued logic) 80
expressly assign the third truth-vale to paradoxes, so paradoxes do not evaluate to
"false". 81 82 83 84
yields Heyting’s system. In the resulting schema, neither LDN nor LEM are derivable any more. The
non-validity of LDN and LEM also invalidates the law of material implication (LMI) and effectively
coerces proofs to be constructive. ... However, LoC [Law of (Non-)Contradiction] continues to hold."
76See Decker [76], p.68, §3.2.3 Intuitionism: "The axiom ¬p → (p → q) (i.e., ECQ) in Heyting’s
system is abandoned in Johansson’s minimal logic [154]. The latter consists of MP and axioms 1-9
(fig. 1) and thus essentially is the same as Kolmogorov’s system. In minimal logic, only each negated
sentence can be deduced in the presence of contradiction, but not necessarily each sentence whatsoever.
In particular, ¬p→ (p→ ¬q) can be deduced from axioms 1 - 9, but ¬p→ (p→ q) (ECQ) cannot."
77See Decker [76], p.69, §3.3 Precursors of Paraconsistent Logic: "[T]he derivability of a contradiction
still entails trivialization." (Citing Urquhart [292].)
78See Decker [76], p.69, §3.3 Precursors of Paraconsistent Logic.
79See Urquhart [293], pp.252-253, §1.6: "The work of the Russian logician Bochvar [32] represents a
new philosophical motivation for many-valued logic; its use as a means of avoiding the logical paradoxes.
His system introduces the intermediate value I in addition to the classical values T and F. His idea is
to avoid logical paradoxes such as Russell’s and Grelling’s by declaring the crucial sentences involving
them to be meaningless (having the value I )."
80See Priest [226] and [227]. See also Hazen et al. [133], p.2: "Truth values of compound formulas
are derived from those of their subformulas by the familiar “truth tables” of Kleene’s (strong) 3-valued
logic [[159], §64], but whereas for Kleene (thinking of the “middle value” as truth-valuelessness) only
the top value (True) is designated, for Priest the top two values are both designated."
81See Urquhart [293], pp.252: "[Bochvar’s] idea is to avoid logical paradoxes such as Russell’s and
Grelling’s by declaring the crucial sentences involving them to be meaningless (having the value I )."
82See also Panti [209], p.48, §2.5.1 Bochvar’s and Kleene’s systems: "In addition to 0 and 1 for false
and true, they have a third value 2. While for Łukasiewicz the third value stands for possible, or not
yet detennined, from Bochvar’s point of view it stands for paradoxical, or meaningless. Any compound
proposition that includes a meaningless part is meaningless itself, and hence the [following] truth tables
...", and "Bochvar’s systems was proposed in [Bochvar [32]] as a way for avoiding the logical paradoxes,
notably Russell’s paradox. We refer to [Rescher, [238], §2.4] and [Urquhart, [292], §1.6] for a deeper
analysis and further references."
83See also Smith [262], pp.17-18: "Consideration of the paradoxes — set-theoretic (e.g. Russell’s)
and/or semantic (e.g. the Liar, where it seems impossible to assign either truth value 1 or 0 to ‘This
sentence is false’) — was a motivation for Bochvar, Moh Shaw-Kwei and others (see Rescher [238], pp.
13, 29, and 207 for additional references) ... Kleene [[159], 335] also considers a different interpretation
of his three values: “t, f, u must be susceptible of another meaning besides (i) ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘undefined’,
namely (ii) ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘unknown (or value immaterial)’."
84See also Visser [297], p.181: "This paper interweaves various themes. Two main themes are four-
value logic and the Liar Paradox."
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9 The LNC and Analytic Continuation of ζ(s) Cannot
Both be True
9.1 If Both are True, in Logics with LNC and ECQ, this Trig-
gers ECQ
If we assume that analytic continuation of ζ(s) is true, then there exist two true, but
contradictory, definitions of ζ(s) throughout the half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1. One definition
says that ζ(s) is divergent throughout that half-plane. The other definition says that
ζ(s) is convergent there. This situation violates the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC)
at all values of s in the half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 (except at s = 1). Even if we limit
ourselves to the so-called "line of convergence" at Re(s) = 1, or to half of the Real-
axis {Re(s) < 1, Im(s) = 0}, analytic continuation of ζ(s) still violates the Law of
Non-Contradiction (LNC).
In any other logic that contains both the LNC and the "principle of explosion"
(ECQ), such as classical logic, or intuitionistic logic, any "proof" with a contradiction
is "trivially true" due to ECQ. 85 So if we assume such a logic to be the foundation for
our mathematics (and thereby assume LNC and ECQ to be true), and if we assume that
Riemann’s "expression" of ζ(s) is true (and thereby assume that ζ(s) is both divergent
and convergent in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1), then any "proof" in such mathematics that
relies upon ζ(s) in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 is "trivially true" due to ECQ.
9.2 If AC of Zeta is False, Then in Logics with LNC, Falsely
Assuming it is True Renders a Proof Unsound
So analytic continuation of ζ(s) is false in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1, due to the proven
divergence of the Dirichlet series ζ(s) there. All other alleged "proofs" of analytic
continuation of ζ(s) to that half-plane must also be false, if the logical foundation of
analytic number theory is a logic that includes LNC and ECQ (e.g. classical logic or
intuitionistic logic). 86 Any "proof" that assumes that Riemann’s ζ(s) is true in half-
plane Re(s) ≤ 1 is "trivially true" in classical and intuitionistic logics, due to ECQ.
Moreover, if analytic continuation of ζ(s) to that half-plane is false, due to LNC
and ECQ, then ζ(s) is exclusively defined by its Dirichlet series definition, which is
85See, e.g. Whitehead and Russell [306], Th. *2.21 on p.99 is their version of ECQ: "`:∼ p. ⊃ .p ⊃ q",
which is described as: "I.e. a false proposition implies any proposition."
86See e.g. Titchmarsh et al. [280], §2.1 to §2.10, pp.13-27, which lists seven additional alleged
"proofs".
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divergent throughout half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1. So ζ(s) has no zeros, because the Dirichlet
series ζ(s) has no zeros. 87 Euler proved that ζ(s) has no zeros in the "other" half-
plane, Re(s) > 1, 88 and in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1, the Dirichlet series ζ(s) is divergent
(and non-zero) throughout.
Therefore, according to classical logic, 89 in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 (except s = 1),
analytic continuation of ζ(s) violates all three of the "laws of thought" that are in-
herited from Aristotelian logic: the Law of Identity (LOI), the Law of the Excluded
Middle (LEM), and the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). 90 The most serious of these
"violations" is the violation of the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) in that half-plane,
because it triggers ECQ.
10 Riemann’s Analytic Continuation of ζ(s) is Invalid
Riemann’s analytic continuation of Dirichlet series ζ(s) is violates the LNC. So in logics
with the LNC, Riemann’s ζ(s) is false where it contradicts Dirichlet series ζ(s). 91
In deriving his expression for ζ(s), Riemann uses the Hankel contour, 92 which is
taken directly from Hankel’s derivation of the Gamma function Γ(s). 93 Riemann then
uses Cauchy’s integral theorem to find the limit of the Hankel contour as the Hankel
contour approaches the branch cut of f(s) = log(−s) for s ∈ C. But by definition,
log(−s) has no value on half-axis s ≥ 0 (and thus is also non-holomorphic on this
half-axis). 94
87As discussed in Hardy et al. [127], p.5, Example (iii), the Dirichlet series ζ(s) is divergent through-
out half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1.
88In half-plane Re(s) > 1, the Dirichlet series ζ(s) equals the Euler product of the primes. Each
factor of the Euler product is a fraction having "1" as the numerator. So the Euler product cannot
equal zero, because at least one numerator of "0" is necessary for the product to equal zero. Therefore,
the Dirichlet series cannot equal zero either (in this half-plane). So neither the Dirichlet series nor the
Euler product have any zeros in that half-plane.
89I.e. The logic of Principia Mathematica.
90In addition, analytic continuation of ζ(s) also violates the definition of a function, according to
set theory, because a function cannot have a one-to-two mapping from domain to range.
91See Edwards [90], pp.10-11: "Thus, formula
ζ(s) =
Π(−s)
2pii
∫ +∞
+∞
(−x)s
ex − 1 ·
dx
x
(10.1)
defines a function ζ(s) which is analytic at all points of the complex s-plane except for a simple pole at
s = 1. This function coincides with
∑
n−s for real values of s > 1 and in fact, by analytic continuation,
throughout the half-plane Re((s) > 1. The function ζ(s) is known as the Riemann zeta function."
92See Riemann’s use of the Hankel contour in Equation 20.16 of this paper.
93See Whittaker et al. [307], pp.244-245 and 266.
94The geometric proof that log(−s) is non-holomorphic on half-axis s ≥ 0: In the Cartesian plane,
the 1st derivative of f(x) = log(−x), for x ∈ R at a value of x, is represented by the slope of the line
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The Hankel contour is either open, or closed. In both cases, the Hankel contour
violates prerequisites of Cauchy’s integral theorem. A first prerequisite is that all points
inside a closed contour must be holomorphic. If the Hankel contour is closed (for
example, at s = +∞, which is assumed in the derivation of Riemann’s ζ(s)), 95 the
contour encloses the non-holomorphic points of the branch cut, which violates this first
prerequisite. A second prerequisite of the Cauchy integral theorem is that there be two
different paths connecting two points. If the Hankel contour is open at s = +∞, it
violates this second prerequisite, which requires that the contour be closed.
So the Hankel contour contradicts prerequisites of Cauchy’s integral theorem. Thus,
the derivation of Riemann’s ζ(s) violates the LNC. (This is described in greater detail
in Chapter 20 of this paper).
Moreover, given that the Dirichlet series ζ(s) is proven to be divergent throughout
half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1, classical and intuitionistic logics (both of which have both the
LNC and ECQ) hold that every so-called analytic continuation of ζ(s) into this half-
plane must be false , because it violates LNC and triggers ECQ. Accordingly, in logics
with LNC and ECQ, ζ(s) is exclusively defined by the Dirichlet series ζ(s), which has
no zeros and no poles. 96
11 Weierstrass’s Analytic Continuation is Valid, but
Riemann’s is Not
11.1 Weierstrass’s Chain of Disks
As Edwards [90] states (emphasis added):
It is interesting to note that Riemann does not speak of the ’analytic
continuation’ of the function
∑
n−s beyond the halfplane Re(s) > 1, but
speaks rather of finding a formula for it which ’remains valid for all s.’ 97
Furthermore, Edwards [90] compares Weierstrass’s and Riemann’s versions of analytic
continuation, as follows:
tangent to f(x) at x. However, f(x) has no values at x ≥ 0, so it has no 1st derivative values at x ≥ 0.
95See Whittaker et al. [307], p.245: "We shall write
∫ (0+)
∞ for
∫
C
, meaning thereby that the path
of integration starts at ’infinity’ on the Real axis, encircles the origin in the positive direction, and
returns to the starting point."
96Throughout half-plane s ≤ 1, Dirichlet series ζ(s) is divergent, and throughout half-plane s > 1 it
is equal to the Euler product, whose factors all have non-zero numerators. See e.g. Hildebrand [143],
pp.147, Theorem 5.2(iv): "ζ(s) has no zeros in the half-plane σ > 1."
97See also Edwards [90], p.9
24
The view of analytic continuation in terms of chains of disks and power
series convergent in each disk descends from Weierstrass and is quite an-
tithetical to Riemann’s basic philosophy that analytic functions should be
dealt with globally, not locally in terms of power series. 98
For example, Weierstrass’s "chains of disks" analytic continuation of f(s) = 1/(1−s)
does not make the contradictory claim that f(s) is both convergent and divergent at s =
1. In fact, Weierstrass’s analytic continuation method avoids all directly contradictory
propositions, by forbidding disks from encircling any pole. Each of Weierstrass’s disks
represents a proposition distinct from all of the other disks, and distinct from the poles.
99
This methodology ensures that no two propositions (i.e. disks, poles) are directly
contradictory. It also ensures that no disk violates Cauchy’s integral theorem (i.e. each
disk exclusively has holomorphic points). Regarding this method, Weyl [303] states:
In its convergence disc ..., such a function represents a regular analytic
function in the sense of Cauchy, 100 [and]
It is not claimed that each of these continuations can be extended to an
analytic chain reaching the end (λ = 1); in general that is false. The fact
that each analytic chain contains only a finite number of irregular elements
makes it possible to avoid these irregular elements. 101
In summary, Weierstrass’s method avoids direct contradictions. Riemann’s does not.
11.2 Poincaré’s "l’Analysis Situs" (1895) Uses Weierstrass’s Chain
of Disks
According to Morgan [54], page 10:
2.2. l’Analysis Situs (1895). 102 This is a long (121 pages), foun-
dational paper. Poincaré begins by defending the study he is about to
undertake by saying
“Geometry in n-dimensions has a real goal; no one doubts this
today. Objects in hyperspace are susceptible to precise definition
98See Edwards [90], p.9.
99See, e.g., Weyl [303], pp.1-4, and Coleman [64], pp.1-2.
100See, e.g., Weyl [303], p.1
101See, e.g., Weyl [303], p.13
102Citing Poincaré [225]. See also the English translation at Poincaré [224]. See also Wikipedia [338].
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like those in ordinary space, and even if we can’t represent them
to ourselves we can conceive of them and study them.”
There then follows a discursive introduction to the study of the topology of
manifolds. Many of the approaches and techniques that came to dominate
20th century topology are introduced in this paper. It truly is the beginning
of Topology as an independent branch of mathematics.
Morgan [54], further discloses at page 10 (emphasis added):
[Poincaré] also considers manifolds defined by locally closed, one-one
immersions from open subsets of Euclidean n − p-space. He goes on to
consider manifolds covered by overlapping subsets of either type (though he
is considering the real analytic situation where the extensions are given by
analytic continuation). Having defined manifolds, he considers orientability,
orientations, and homology.
Poincaré [224], pp. 24-25 clarifies that the anaylytic continuation used is an analogue
of Weierstrass’s chain of disks, not of Riemann’s version of anaylytic continuation:
It can happen that the two manifolds have a common part V ′′ also of
m dimensions. In that case, in the interior of V ′′, the y will be analytic
functions of the y′ and conversely. We then say that the two manifolds V
and V ′ are analytic continuations of each other. In this way we can form a
chain of manifolds
V1, V2, . . . Vn (11.1)
such that each is an analytic continuation of its predecessor, and there is a
common part between any two consecutive manifolds of the chain. I shall
call this a connected chain.
12 The "Calculated Zeros" of Riemann’s ζ(s) are of
Other Formulas (That Assume AC of ζ(s) is True)
12.1 The Euler-Maclaurin Formula
The so-called "calculated zeros of Riemann’s ζ(s)" are actually zeros of approximations.
For example, Odlyzko et al. [205] assumes the following before attempting to calculate
the "zeros" of Riemann’s ζ(s):
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The Riemann zeta function is defined for s = σ + it by
ζ(s) =
∞∑
n=1
n−s (12.1)
for σ > 1, and by analytic continuation can be extended to an analytic
function of s for all s 6= 1 [citing Edwards [90], Ivić [147], and Titchmarsh
[280]].
However, as discussed above, assuming that the analytic continuation of ζ(s) is true
generates a paradox. In classical and intuitionistic logics, this violation of the LNC
triggers ECQ, and thus renders "trivially true" (and de facto invalidates) everything
that is built on the assumption (that uses the Euler-Maclaurin Formula).
Odlyzko et al. [205] then discloses the following in regards to calculating the "zeros"
of Riemann’s ζ(s), not by use of Riemann’s ζ(s), but by use of the Euler-Maclaurin
formula: 103
The [Equation] (12.1) suggests the idea of using the Euler-Maclaurin
summation formula [citing Abramowitz et al.’s [1] Equation 23.1.30] to eval-
uate ζ(s), and one easily obtains, for any positive integers m and n,
ζ(s) =
n−1∑
j=1
j−s +
1
2
n−s +
n1−s
s− 1 +
m∑
k=1
Tk,n(s) + Em,n(s) (12.2)
where
Tk,n(s) =
B2k
(2k)!
n1−s−2k
2k−2∏
j=0
(s+ j) (12.3)
B2 = 1/6, B4 = −1/30, . . . , are the Bernoulli numbers, and
|Em,n(s)| <
∣∣∣ s+ 2m+ 1
σ + 2m+ 1
Tm+1,n(s)
∣∣∣ (12.4)
The formula (12.2) with the estimate (12.4) can easily be shown to hold for
any σ > −(2m+ 1). By taking m and n large enough (and using sufficient
accuracy in basic arithmetic routines), any value of ζ(s) can be computed
to any desired accuracy by this formula. All calculations of zeros of the
zeta function that were published before 1930 relied on this method. Its
advantages include the ease of estimating the error term. (This is the main
103See Odlyzko et al. [205], p.798
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reason this formula is still used for very accurate computations of ζ(s) for
s small, cf. [19].)
However, the use of the Euler-Maclaurin summation formula fails at Odlyzko et al.’s
[205] first sentence: "[The Dirichlet series definition of ζ(s)] suggests the idea of using
the Euler-Maclaurin summation formula ... to evaluate ζ(s)". Apostol [11] indicates
104 why the Euler-Maclaurin summation formula cannot be used to calculate "zeros" of
the Dirichlet series of ζ(s) in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1:
The integral test for convergence of infinite series compares a finite sum∑n
k=1 f(k) and an integral
∫ n
1
f(x) dx where f is positive and strictly de-
creasing. The difference between a sum and an integral can be represented
geometrically, as indicated in Figure 1. In 1736, Euler [92] used a diagram
like this to obtain the simplest case of what came to be known as Euler’s
summation formula, a powerful tool for estimating sums by integrals, and
also for evaluating integrals in terms of sums. Later Euler [93] derived a
more general version by an analytic method that is very clearly described
in [Hairer et al. [123], pp. 159-161]. Colin Maclaurin [178] discovered the
formula independently and used it in his Treatise of Fluxions, published in
1742, and some authors refer to the result as the Euler-Maclaurin summa-
tion formula.
As Apostol [11] indicates, "[t]he integral test for convergence of infinite series com-
pares a finite sum
∑n
k=1 f(k) and an integral
∫ n
1
f(x) dx where f is positive and strictly
decreasing", and "[t]he difference between a sum and an integral can be represented
geometrically". As discussed in the present paper, the Dirichlet series of ζ(s) fails the
integral test for convergence of infinite series at all values of s in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1.
This is sufficient reason to disqualify the use of the Euler-Maclaurin summation formula
to calculate "zeros" of ζ(s) in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1.
12.2 Riemann-Siegel formula
Odlyzko et al. [205] also discusses the use of Riemann-Siegel formula for calculating
the "zeros" of Riemann’s ζ(s): 105
A method for computing ζ(s) that is much more efficient than the Euler-
Maclaurin formula (1.2) was discovered around 1932 in Riemann’s unpub-
lished papers by C. L. Siegel [258]. This formula [[258], Equation (32)], now
104See Apostol [11], p.409, "Introduction".
105See Odlyzko et al. [205], p.798.
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universally referred to as the Riemann-Siegel formula, is presented in §2.
Roughly speaking, it enables one to compute ζ(σ + it) for t large and σ
bounded to within ±t c for any constant c in about t1/2 steps. (Since ζ(s)
= ζ(s), we will always assume that t > 0.) The Riemann-Siegel formula is
the fastest method for computing the zeta function to moderate accuracy
that is currently known, and has been used for all large scale computations
since the 1930s.
However, the Riemann–Siegel formula is:
an asymptotic formula for the error of the approximate functional equa-
tion of the Riemann zeta function, an approximation of the zeta function
by a sum of two finite Dirichlet series. 106
Edwards [90] confirms that the functional equation of ζ(s) is used in the derivation of
the Riemann-Siegel formula. 107
Unfortunately, the functional equation of Riemann’s ζ(s) is not valid in logics with
LNC, because the analytic continuation of ζ(s) is not valid in those logics. The Dirichlet
series ζ(s) is proven to be divergent throughout half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1, so the analytic
continuation of ζ(s) violates the LNC. Also, the sum of two finite series cannot approx-
imate a divergent infinite series. So in logics with LNC, the Riemann–Siegel formula is
an approximation of an invalidity.
Moreover, the Riemann-Siegel formula is "an approximation of the [Riemann] zeta
function by a sum of two finite Dirichlet series." 108 But summing two finite series,
in order to obtain a finite value, is not a logically valid method of "approximating" a
divergent infinite series (Dirichlet series ζ(s)).
12.3 Other Methods
Odlyzko et al. [205] also discloses other methods for calculating the "zeros" of Rie-
mann’s ζ(s), including a method by Turing [288], a method using Fast Fourier Trans-
forms, 109 etc. See also Gourdon et al. [111] for additional discussion.
However, these other methods share the same problems as the Euler-Maclaurin and
Riemann-Siegel formulas. All of these formulas are approximations of Riemann’s ζ(s),
106See Wikipedia [331].
107See Edwards [90], §7.2 at pp.137-138, citing Edward’s §1.5 at pp.12-15.
108See Wikipedia [331].
109See Odlyzko et al. [205], p.800, Eq.1.7; and pp.803-804, §3 "Application of the fast Fourier
transform."
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which is invalid in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 in logics with LNC. Therefore, the functional
equation of Riemann’s ζ(s) must also be invalid in logics with LNC. All zeros calculated
by these "approximations" are neither zeros of Riemann’s ζ(s) nor zeros of the Dirichlet
series ζ(s).
13 If AC of ζ(s) is False, RH is a Paradox, Due to
Lack of Zeros
13.1 Material Implication
Material implication, is the definition of the conditional "if p then q" in both classical
and intuitionistic logics. It states that the conditional "if p then q", (p→ q) is logically
equivalent to ¬(p∧¬q). 110 So in classical and intuitionistic logics, material implication
is counter-intuitively always "true" when p is "false". 111 112 113
This counter-intuitive aspect of "material implication" does not exist in the more
narrowly defined "formal implication". In "formal implication", if the statement p⇒ q
is true, then the statement ¬p⇒ ¬q is false (a.k.a "Denying the Antecedent"). 114
110By De Morgan’s Laws (which are accepted in classical logic but not in intuitionistic logic) ¬(p∧¬q)
is further equivalent to (¬p ∨ q).
111See Tarski [275], pp.25-26: "The logicians ... adopted the same procedure with respect to the
phrase "if ..., then ..." as they had done in the caso of the word "or". For this purpose, they extended
the usage of this phrase, considering an implication as a meaningful sentence even if no connection
whatsoever exists between its two members, and they made the truth or falsity of an implication
dependent exclusively upon the truth or falsity of the antecedent and consequent.
To characterize this situation briefly, we say that contemporary logic uses IMPLICATIONS IN
MATERIAL MEANING, or simply, MATERIAL IMPLICATIONS; this is opposed to the usage of
IMPLICATIONS IN FORMAL MEANING, or simply, FORMAL IMPLICATION, in which case the
presence of a certain formal connection between antecedent and consequent is an indispensable con-
dition of the meaningfulness and truth of the implication. The concept of formal implication ... is
narrower than that of material implication[.]"
112See also Tarski [275], p.26: "In order to illustrate the foregoing remarks, let us consider the
following four sentences:
if 2 · 2 = 4, then New York is a large city;
if 2 · 2 = 5, then New York is a large city;
if 2 · 2 = 4, then New York is a small city;
if 2 · 2 = 5, then New York is a small city.
In everyday language, these sentences would hardly be considered as meaningful, and even less true.
From the point of view of mathematical logic, on the other hand, they are all meaningful, the third
sentence being false, while the remaining three are true."
113See also Grattan-Guinness [113], p.329, describing Hardy’s review, in the Times Literary Supple-
ment, of Russell’s [243] Principles of Mathematics (emphasis added): "On the logical aspects, [Hardy]
stressed the unintuitive character of [material] implication, that ’every false proposition implies every
other proposition, true or false’." Did Hardy fail to consider applying Russell’s work to the Riemann
Hypothesis?
114See Davis et al. [75]. p.301: "Denying the Antecedent (Invalid): p⇒ q,¬p ∴ ¬q.
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When the material conditional is applied to the RH, it holds that the RH is true,
because RH states:
If ζ(s) = 0, then all ζ(s) = 0 are on the critical line Re(s) = 0.5.
and because ζ(s), as defined by Dirichlet series ζ(s), has no zeros. So RH is true.
However, according to material implication, a statement we call "anti-RH" (ARH)
is true too. It states:
If ζ(s) = 0, then all ζ(s) = 0 are off the critical line Re(s) = 0.5.
So if ζ(s) has no zeros, then this "anti-RH" is true. Yet it is paradoxical for both RH
and this "anti-RH" to be true.
13.2 The Vacuous Subjects of the Riemann Hypothesis
The Riemann Hypothesis (RH) states that "all non-trivial zeros of ζ(s) are on the
critical line Re(s) = 0.5".
The Dirichlet series ζ(s) is proven to be divergent in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1. So
analytic continuation of ζ(s) to that half-plane violates the LNC (and therefore must
false), and thus in classical and intuitionistic logics, triggers ECQ. So ζ(s) is exclusively
defined by the Dirichlet series ζ(s), which has no zeros and no poles. Therefore, none
of the zeros assumed by the RH exist. 115 These non-existent zeros of ζ(s) constitute
vacuous subjects of a proposition, just like Russell’s [244] famous example of "the present
King of France" in the proposition "the present King of France is bald".
So given that the RH is a proposition with vacuous subjects, what is its truth -value?
The answer: it depends on the system of logic that is applied. 116
[D]enying the antecedent [is] easily refuted by finding counterinstances, such as:
If whales are fish, then they are aquatic.
Whales are not fish.
∴ Whales are not aquatic."
115Also, Riemann’s functional equation of ζ(s) is invalidated in logics with LNC by the Dirichlet series
ζ(s), which is proven to be divergent throughout half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1. Thus ζ(1 − s) is divergent at
Re(s) ≥ 0. This contradicts Gelbart et al. [108] at p.60, "our emphasis will be on explaining how
we know that ζ(s) extends meromorphically to the entire complex plane and satisfies the functional
equation."
116RH’s truth-value also depends upon the formulation of RH. See, e.g. Gelbart et al. [108], p.60:
"The Riemann Hypothesis: ζ(s) 6= 0 for Re(s) > 1/2." According to Dirichlet series ζ(s), this version
of RH is true. However, Dirichlet series ζ(s) has no poles and no zeros. In contrast, Gelbart et al.
[108], p.60 falsely assumes that ζ(s) has both poles and zeros: "Our role here is not so much to focus
on the zeroes of ζ(s), but in some sense rather on its poles."
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13.3 "Vacuous Subjects" Generate Paradoxes
Turing [289] argues that the Riemann Hypothesis ("RH") is a "number-theoretic" prob-
lem. 117 This classification is incorrect, and is the reason why the problem has remained
unsolved for so long. The fact of the matter is that the RH is a logic problem 118 In
classical logic, the RH is an undecidable paradox. Riemann’s ζ(s) is not valid in the
half-plane where it contradicts the Dirichlet ζ(s). So ζ(s) is exclusively defined by the
Dirichlet ζ(s), which has no zeros. So the zeros of the RH form an empty set. There-
fore, RH is a proposition that suffers from "reference failure". 119 RH has "vacuous
subjects", due to ζ(s) having no zeros. According to classical logic’s "material implica-
tion", all propositions pertaining to "vacuous subjects" are true, including contradictory
propositions.
In regards to the Riemann Hypothesis ("RH"), its traditional phrasing is "all zeros
of ζ(s) are on the critical line Re(s) = 0.5". 120 121 The traditional phrasing of the
negation of RH ("¬RH") is "not all zeros of ζ(s) are on the critical line Re(s) = 0.5".
However, RH falsely assumes that Riemann’s ζ(s) is valid and has zeros. 122
If ζ(s) has no zeros, then according to classical logic, both RH and ¬RH are "vac-
uously true" according to material implication. So in classical logic, RH is a paradox,
because it is simultaneously true and false. 123 124 This contradiction violates LNC
and LEM. and the violation of LNC triggers ECQ.
117See Turing [289], p.165: "It is easy to show that a number of unsolved problems, such as the
problem of the truth of Fermat’s last theorem, are number-theoretic. There are, however, also problems
of analysis which are number-theoretic. The Riemann hypothesis gives us an example of this."
118Turing’s error is in falsely assuming that Riemann’s analytic continuation of the Dirichlet series
ζ(s) is valid. See Turing [289], p.165: "We denote by ζ(s) the function defined for Re(s) = σ > 1
by the series
∑
n−s and over the rest of the complex plane with the exception of the point s = 1 by
analytic continuation."
119See Haack [122], pp.14-15: "Another challenge to classical logic derives from the phenomenon of
reference failure, i.e., of sentences containing proper names (such as "Mr. Pickwick" or "Odysseus")
or definite descriptions (such as "the present king of France" or "the greatest prime number" which
have no referent."
120See Edwards [90], §1.9, p.19: "Riemann’s next statement is even more baffling. He states that the
number of roots [ρ of ξ(ρ) = 0] on the line Re(s) = 0.2 is also "about" [T/2pi · log T/2pi− T/2pi] ... He
gives no indication of a proof at all, and no one since Riemann has been able to prove (or disprove)
this statement ... He says he considers it ’very likely’ that the roots all do lie on [the critical line]
Re(s) = 0.5, but says that he was not able to prove it". See also Edwards [90], §7.8, pp.164-166; and
chapter 9, pp.182-202.
121Riemann’s statement in [241], p.4, as translated by Wilkins, is: "One now finds indeed approxi-
mately this number of Real roots [of ξ(t) = 0] within these limits, and it is very probable that all roots
are Real. Certainly one would wish for a stricter proof here ...".
122The Dirichlet series "expression" of ζ(s) has no zeros, the Euler product "expression" of ζ(s) has
no zeros, and the Riemann "expression" of ζ(s) is not valid in logics with LNC.
123See Gardner [107] for many other examples of paradoxes.
124See also Scruton [253], Chapter 27 "Paradox", pp.397-412, and 575.
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The results in classical logic are identical to the results in set theory. Because ζ(s)
has no zeros, both RH and ¬RH are propositions with "vacuous subjects", of the type
discussed by Frege, 125 Russell, 126 Strawson, 127 and others. (The most famous example
being "The present King of France is bald"). According to Frege, 128 neither RH nor
¬RH have any truth-value (i.e. a "truth-value gap"). But according to Russell, both
RH and ¬RH are both true and false (i.e. a "truth-value glut").
Moreover, the same paradoxical results are obtained by rephrasing RH and ¬RH to
expressly state the assumption that ζ(s) has zeros. This can be done in two ways: (1)
as conditional propositions, or (2) as conjunctions. It turns out that the conditional
propositions are negations of the conjunctions (and vice versa). 129
If RH is rewritten as a conditional proposition, it becomes RH1: "if ζ(s) has zeros,
then all zeros of ζ(s) are on the critical line Re(s) = 0.5". Its sequent is (A ⊃ B).
Likewise, ¬RH becomes RH1: "if ζ(s) has zeros, then not all zeros of ζ(s) are on
the critical line Re(s) = 0.5". In classical logic, if ζ(s) actually had zeros, one of RH1
and RH1 would be true, and the other would be false, because according to material
implication, (A ⊃ B)⇔ (¬A ∨B).
However, ζ(s) has no zeros, so material implication holds that the RH1 and RH1
are both true, because each has an antecedent portion ("ζ(s) has zeros") that is false.
130 Therefore, regardless of the truth or falsity of the consequent portion ("all zeros of
ζ(s) are on the critical line Re(s) = 0.5", or "not all zeros of ζ(s) are on the critical
line Re(s) = 0.5"), the proposition as a whole is true.
If RH is rewritten as a conjunction (RH2), it becomes: "ζ(s) has zeros, and all zeros
of ζ(s) are on the critical line Re(s) = 0.5". Its sequent ia (A ∧ B). The negation of
RH (¬RH) becomes RH2: "ζ(s) has zeros, and not all zeros of ζ(s) are on the critical
line Re(s) = 0.5". In classical logic, if ζ(s) actually had zeros, then by conjuction, one
of RH2 and RH2 would be true, and the other would be false.
125See Frege’s Über Sinn und Bedeutung ("On Sense and Denotation") [99].
126See Russell’s On Denoting, [244].
127See Strawson’s On Referring, [269].
128See Frege’s Über Sinn und Bedeutung ("On Sense and Denotation") [99].
129 The negation of the conditional proposition is determined as follows: The sequent for conditional
propositions (material implication) is: (A ⊃ B) ⇔ (¬A ∨ B). The negation of both sides of this
equivalence results in: ¬(A ⊃ B)⇔ ¬(¬A∨B), which according to De Morgan’s laws and the Law of
Double Negation is equivalent to: ¬(¬A∨B)⇔ (A∧¬B). So in regards toRH1, its negation is "ζ(s) has
zeros, and not all zeros of ζ(s) are on the critical line Re(s) = 0.5", which is RH2. When performed on
RH1, the result is RH2. Negation of the conditional is as follows: ¬(A∧¬B)⇔ (¬A∨B)⇔ (A ⊃ B).
So ¬RH1 ⇔ RH2 and ¬RH2 ⇔ RH1
130See Carnap [55], p.8: "The sentence ’(A) ⊃ (B)’ is an abbreviation for ’[∼ (A)]∨ (B)’", and "Also,
in connection with the conditional ’(A) ⊃ (B)’ we find it convenient to retain the name ’antecedent ’
for the first component ’(A)’ and the name ’consequent ’ for the second component ’(B)’." So, given
that the antecedent of RH is false (ζ(s) has no zeros), then any consequent is true.
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However, ζ(s) has no zeros, so conjuction holds that the RH2 and RH2 are both
false, because each has an antecedent portion ("ζ(s) has zeros") that is false. Therefore,
regardless of the truth or falsity of the consequent portion ("all zeros of ζ(s) are on the
critical line Re(s) = 0.5", or "not all zeros of ζ(s) are on the critical line Re(s) = 0.5"),
according to conjunction, the proposition as a whole is always false.
So RH and its negation ¬RH are paradoxes, and have either a truth-value glut, or
a truth-value gap. These results are impermissible in classical logic, due to the LNC
and LEM.
13.4 The Riemann Hypothesis and Venn’s "Modern" Square of
Opposition
Lande [170], p.268:
It was once thought that what is known as the [Aristotelian] Square of
Opposition captured all logically significant sentences, as well as their mu-
tual relations. Although the [Aristotelian] Square of Opposition fails to do
justice to the complexity of the sentences that you will soon be encountering,
it provides you with a structure that is actually quite helpful for translating
increasingly complex sorts of English sentences into logical notation.
"A" Propositions (Universal Affirmatives): "All S are P". "All zeros of
ζ(s) are on the critical line." "The Riemann Hypothesis (RH)." (∀s){(ζ(s) = 0) →
(Re(s) = 0.5)}
"E" Propositions (Universal Negations): "No S are P". "No zeros of ζ(s)
are on the critical line." "All zeros of ζ(s) are off the critical line." "The Anti-Riemann
Hypothesis (ARH)." (∀s){(ζ(s) = 0)→ (Re(s) 6= 0.5)}
"I" Propositions (Particular/Existential Affirmatives): "Some S are P".
"Some zeros of ζ(s) are on the critical line." "There exists a zero of ζ(s) on the critical
line." "Negation of the Anti-Riemann Hypothesis (¬ARH)." (∃s){(ζ(s) = 0)∧(Re(s) =
0.5))}
"O" Propositions (Particular/Existential Negations): "Some S are not
P". "Some zeros of ζ(s) are off the critical line." "There exists a zero of ζ(s) off the
critical line." "Negation of the Riemann Hypothesis (¬RH)." (∃s){(ζ(s) = 0)∧(Re(s) 6=
0.5)}
The Traditional Square of Opposition 131 is shown in Figure 1. In the Traditional
131See Parsons [210].
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Figure 1: The Traditional Square of Opposition
Square of Opposition, RH’s contrary is "anti-RH" (ARH). ARH’s subaltern is ¬RH.
RH’s subaltern is ¬ARH. RH and ¬RH are contradictories, as are ARH and ¬ARH.
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP) article discloses the following about
the Traditional Square of Opposition [10]:
Given the assumption made within [Aristotelian] categorical logic, that
every category contains at least one member, the following relationships,
depicted on the [Aristotelian] square, hold:
Firstly, A and O propositions are contradictory, as are E and I propo-
sitions. Propositions are contradictory when the truth of one implies the
falsity of the other, and conversely.
Secondly, A and E propositions are contrary. Propositions are contrary
when they cannot both be true.
Next, I and O propositions are subcontrary. Propositions are subcon-
trary when it is impossible for both to be false.
Lastly, two propositions are said to stand in the relation of subalternation
when the truth of the first ("the superaltern") implies the truth of the second
("the subaltern"), but not conversely.
The presupposition, mentioned above, that all categories have at least
one member, has been abandoned by most later logicians.
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But ζ(s) = 0 is an empty set. According to the truth table of the material impli-
cation operator, both F → T and F → F are true, SO both ζ(s) = 0 → RH and
ζ(s) = 0 → ¬RH are true, So in classical logic, both of the contrary A proposition
and E proposition (a.k.a. RH and ARH) are "vacuously true", thereby violating the re-
quirement that they cannot both be true, and forming an undecidable semantic paradox
that triggers ECQ.
According to Davis et al. [75], p.240: "Aristotelian categoricals and their Venn
transforms have the same truth values as long as there is something to which their
subjects apply."
Figure 2: Venn’s "Modern" Square of Opposition
According to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP) website’s entry on the
Square of Opposition [10], Venn’s "Modern" Square of Opposition (see Figure 2) differs
from the Traditional version as follows:
The presupposition [in Aristotelian logic], mentioned above, that all cate-
gories have at least one member, has been abandoned by most later logicians.
Modern logic deals with uninstantiated terms such as "unicorn" and "ether
flow" the same as it does other terms such as "apple" and "orangutan".
When dealing with "empty categories", the relations of being contrary,
being subcontrary and of subalternation no longer hold. Consider, e.g., "all
unicorns have horns" and "no unicorns have horns." Within contemporary
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logic, these are both regarded as true, so strictly speaking, they cannot be
contrary, despite the former’s status as an A proposition and the latter’s
status as an E proposition. Similarly, "some unicorns have horns" (I) and
"some unicorns do not have horns" (O) are both regarded as false, and so
they are not subcontrary.
Obviously then, the truth of "all unicorns have horns" does not imply
the truth of "some unicorns have horns," and the subalternation relation
fails to hold as well. Without the traditional presuppositions of "existential
import", i.e., the supposition that all categories have at least one member,
then only the contradictory relation holds.
On what is sometimes called the "modern square of opposition" (as
opposed to the traditional square of opposition sketched above) the lines
for contraries, subcontraries and subalternation are erased, leaving only the
diagonal lines for the contradictory relation.
14 The Truth-Value of RH (a Paradox) Depends on
the Logic
14.1 In Intuitionistic Logic: RH is False (and Thus Decidable)
So if Riemann’s version of ζ(s) is false. what about the RH? In intuitionistic logic, the
truth-value "true" applies only to proven propositions pertaining to objects that have
been proven to exist. 132 133 The truth-value "false" applies to objects that have been
proven to not exist, and the truth-value "neither true nor false" (a violation of the
LEM) applies to objects whose existence has yet to be proven or disproven. 134 135
132See Vafeiadou et al. [294], p.2, citing Brouwer [46], p.79: "Moreover, the ’... existence of a
mathematical system satisfying a set of axioms can never be proved from the consistency of the logical
system based on those axioms,’ but only by construction."
133See also Bridges et al. [41], §2 "The Constructive Interpretation of Logic": "∃ (there exists):
to prove ∃xP (x) we must construct an object x and prove that P (x) holds", and "These BHK-
interpretations (the name reflects their origin in the work of Brouwer, Heyting, and Kolmogorov) can
be made more precise using Kleene’s notion of realizability", citing (Dummett [83], pp.222–234 and
Beeson [23], Chapter VII).
134See Moschovakis [199]: "Intuitionistic propositional logic is effectively decidable, in the sense that
a finite constructive process applies uniformly to every propositional formula, either producing an
intuitionistic proof of the formula or demonstrating that no such proof can exist."
135See also Haack [121], p.92: "[In Intuitionism,] only constructible mathematical entities are admitted
... and only constructive proofs of mathematical statements are admitted, so that, for instance, a
statement to the effect that there is a number with such-and-such property is provable only if a
number with that property is constructible."
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As discussed above, the derivation of Riemann’s ζ(s) is invalid in logics with LNC,
and so ζ(s) is exclusively defined by Dirichlet series ζ(s), which has no zeros. This
means that the RH is directed to non-existent objects. Brouwer’s intuitionistic logic
refuses to admit propositions regarding mathematical objects, unless the objects have
existence proofs. Regarding propositions about objects that have been proven to not
exist, such propositions are "false". 136 So in Brouwer’s intuitionistic logic, RH is
"false" (and decidable). 137
For intuitionistic logic, the RH’s reference to non-existent zeros constitutes a perfect
example of its criticisms of classical logic.
14.2 In Classical Logic, RH is an Undecidable Paradox
In classical logic, RH is an undecidable paradox resulting from material implication,
because the Dirichlet series ζ(s) has no zeros, and these non-existent zeros are "vacuous
subjects" of the RH. This can be seen most clearly in Venn’s "Modern" Square of
Opposition.
The Riemann Hypothesis (RH) is: "All zeros of ζ(s) are on the critical line Re(s) =
0.5." According to the original Aristotelian Square of Opposition, RH’s contrary (anti-
RH or "ARH") is: "All zeros of ζ(s) are off the critical line". The RH’s subaltern
(¬ARH) is: "There exists a zero of ζ(s) on the critical line", and the ARH’s subaltern
(¬RH) is: "There exists a zero of ζ(s) off the critical line".
When written in first-order logic notation, Aristotle’s Square of Opposition is as
follows: RH is (∀s){(ζ(s) = 0) → (Re(s) = 0.5)}. RH’s contrary is anti-RH (ARH):
(∀s){(ζ(s) = 0) → (Re(s) 6= 0.5)}. ARH’s subaltern (¬RH) is (∃s){(ζ(s) = 0) ∧
(Re(s) 6= 0.5)}. RH’s subaltern (¬ARH) is (∃s){(ζ(s) = 0) ∧ (Re(s) = 0.5))}.
But in the case of "vacuous subjects" (for RH, the absence of ζ(s) = 0), the original
Aristotelian Square of Opposition fails, because it assumes non-vacuous subjects. 138 In
contrast, Venn’s "Modern" Square of Opposition is valid even in the case of "vacuous
subjects". 139 But Venn’s version differs from Aristotle’s in that there are no subaltern
136See also Bridges et al. [41], §2 "The Constructive Interpretation of Logic": "∃ (there exists): to
prove ∃xP (x) we must construct an object x and prove that P (x) holds", and "∀ (for each/all): a
proof of ∀x ∈ SP (x) is an algorithm that, applied to any object x and to the data proving that x ∈ S,
proves that P (x) holds."
137By applying the definitions of §2 "The Constructive Interpretation of Logic" in Bridges et al. [41],
the absence of zeros turns the RH into a "decision problem" that "can be posed as a yes-no question
of the input values". See Wikipedia [310]. The decision question is "Given that there are no zeros of
ζ(s), are they all on the critical line?" The intuitionist answer is "no".
138See Davis et al. [75], p.239: "Aristotelian categoricals presuppose that their subjects apply to
something."
139See Davis et al. [75], p.240: "The A* and E* propositions here are true: since nothing is a 2006
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or contrary relationships - only the contradictory relationships of Aristotle’s version.
When written in first-order logic notation, Venn’s "Modern" Square of Opposition is
as follows: RH is (∀s){(ζ(s) = 0)→ (Re(s) = 0.5)}. RH’s contrary is anti-RH (ARH):
(∀s){(ζ(s) = 0)→ (Re(s) 6= 0.5)}. ¬RH is (∃s){(ζ(s) = 0) ∧ (Re(s) 6= 0.5)}. ¬ARH is
(∃s){(ζ(s) = 0) ∧ (Re(s) = 0.5))}.
RH contradicts ¬RH, and ARH contradicts ¬ARH. But ζ(s) has no zeros. So in
Venn’s "Modern" Square of Opposition, as in classical logic, both ¬RH and ¬ARH are
false. More importantly, their respective contradictory statements (RH and ARH) are
both "vacuously true", due to classical logic’s material implication (which holds that
a false proposition implies any proposition). But according to both classical logic, if
RH is true, then ARH should be false, and vice versa. Yet both are true, due to their
"vacuous subjects" (the non-existent zeros of the zeta function). Therefore, in classical
logic, RH is a semantic paradox, is undecidable, violates the LNC, and triggers ECQ.
140
14.3 In 3VL, RH has the Third Truth-Value, and is Decidable
In some three-valued logics (3VL) such as Bochvar’s, and Priest’s LP , paradoxes are
the original intended use of the third truth-value. In other 3VLs, such as Łukasiewicz’s,
paradoxes are not the original intended use. But when applied to paradoxes, they
assign the third truth-value to paradoxes, and thus the LNC is avoided.
Moreover, in Łukasiewicz’s and Kleene’s 3VLs (unlike classical and intuitionist log-
ics), the truth table of material implication shows the 3rd truth-value as not resulting
in ECQ. 141 Also, this third truth-value can be assigned the label "indefinite", "unde-
cidable", "unknown", "partially true", or even "paradox". 142
Edsel, nothing is both a 2006 Edsel and either a four-door or a nonfour-door."
140For another example of an undecidable paradox in classical logic, see the "Liar Paradox" in Gödel’s
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems [118] (in Ger-
man) and [119] (in English).
141See Urquhart [293], p.260: "The Kleene system does not contain the paradox of material implica-
tion p ` q∨¬q; however it contains p,¬p ` q, so it is not free of the paradoxes of material implication.
The relationship between the two systems can be briefly indicated by noting that while Kleene allows
for the possibility "neither true nor false", Anderson and Belnap allow for the possibility ’both true
and false’." See e.g. Belnap [26] for discussion of a 4VL.
142See Stewart [266], p.242: "We generally assume that an unsolved conjecture, like the Riemann
Hypothesis, is either true or false, so either there’s a proof or a disproof. ... Classical logic, with its sharp
distinction between truth and falsity, with no middle ground, is two-valued. Gödel’s discovery suggests
that for mathematics, a three-valued logic would be more appropriate: true, false, or undecidable."
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14.4 Truth-Value and Decidability of RH Depends Upon the
Logic Applied
So, depending on the logic applied to the RH, (or alternatively, the "foundational logic"
underlying the RH): 143
1. In Intuitionistic logic: the RH is decidable, and false.
2. In Classical logic: the RH is undecidable: a paradox that violates LNC and
triggers ECQ.
3. In 3VL (Bochvar’s, Priest’s): the RH is decidable: a paradox that has the 3rd of
the three truth-values, does not violate LNC, and thus does not cause ECQ.
Each of these results is inconsistent with the other results, just as the respective logics
are inconsistent with one another.
14.5 There Exist Many Logics, So What Constitutes Proof?
These conflicting results for RH, that vary depending on the logic applied, provide sup-
port for the criticism against Aristotle’s concept of deductive proof. Bertrand Russell
attributed this criticism to Timon of Phlius, the Pyrrhonist philosopher: 144
The only logic admitted by the Greeks was deductive, and all deduction
had to start, like Euclid, from general principles regarded as self-evident.
Timon denied the possibility of finding such principles. Everything, there-
fore, will have to be proved by means of something else, and all argument
will be either circular or an endless chain hanging from nothing. In either
case nothing can be proved.
Aristotle believed that his "Three Laws of Thought" - The Law of Identity (LOI),
Law of Non-Contraction (LNC), and the Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM) - were
143See Moschovakis [199]: "Philosophically, intuitionism differs from logicism by treating logic as a
part of mathematics rather than as the foundation of mathematics;" and "Hilbert’s formalist pro-
gram, to justify classical mathematics by reducing it to a formal system whose consistency should
be established by finitistic (hence constructive) means, was the most powerful contemporary rival to
Brouwer’s developing intuitionism. In ([44]) Brouwer correctly predicted that any attempt to prove
the consistency of complete induction on the natural numbers would lead to a vicious circle."
144See Russell [247], p.234. Russell does not cite any reference for this attribution to Timon. The
present author has not found any reference that either supports or contradicts Russell’s attribution.
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"self-evident" general principles. 145 146 But given that intuitionistic logic selectively
rejects the LEM, and given that the LEM and LNC fail in 3VL, 147 148 Aristotle’s
general principles are clearly not "self-evident" general principles. 149 150
Do any "self-evident" general principles exist? LNC, LEM, and LOI were historically
accepted as "self-evident" from Aristotle’s time, up until Brouwer’s intuitionistic logic
rejected LEM (for propositions that cannot be either proved or disproved). 151 Heyting’s
version rejected the LEM entirely, and Łukasiewicz’s 3VL rejected LEM by creating a
third truth-value (intended to be used for future contingents, so as to keep LNC). Other
3VLs (e.g. Priest’s LP ) reject LNC. If there are no generally accepted principles, then
Timon’s argument is correct.
However, even if there are no "self-evident" general principles, Timon’s argument is
wrong in the following situation: if a proposition is found to be "exclusively true" (to
distinguish it from having "true" as one value in a truth-value glut) in every logic, then it
must be "exclusively true" ("logically true"), despite the absence of any "self-evident"
general principles. Therefore, the most restrictive logic is the logic that determines
"logical truth". A candidate for such a logic would be the most restrictive of the
145See Russell [247], p.234: "The only logic admitted by the Greeks was deductive, and all deduction
had to start, like Euclid, from general principles regarded as self evident."
146See Cohen [62], p.75: "Aristotle’s greatest achievement is supposed to have been his ’Laws of
Thought,’ part of his attempt to put everyday language on a logical footing. His Prior Analytics is the
first attempt to create a system of formal deductive logic, whereas the Posterior Analytics attempts
to use this to systematize scientific knowledge."
147See Haack [122], p.5: "In Łukasiewicz’s 3-valued logic (motivated by the idea, already suggested
by Aristotle in De interpretatione §9, in Organon), that future contingent sentences are neither true
nor false but ’indeterminate’) both the Law of the Excluded Middle (’LEM;’ ’p or not p’) and the Law
of Non-Contradiction (’LNC;’ ’not both p and not-p’) fail."
148Note also that there is disagreement regarding "future contingents" in Aristotle’s [13] De interpre-
tatione §9, in Organon. See also Haack’s [121] ch.4 for arguments for and against LEM, due to future
contingents.
149See also Kuznetsov [167], in the 1974 Proc. of the ICM, p.244: "One might also criticize the laws of
intuitionistic logic—either from the standpoint of refusing from the so-called ’paradoxes of implication’,
which lead to different logics of rigorous implication; or from the point of view of accounting for the
peculiarities of quantum-mechanical problems (in this case one axiom is doubtful, for the calculus
without it see Tolstova [281]); or in the light of immersion not in S4, but in weaker modal logic.
150Kuznetsov also argues for what Haack [120], ch.12, §1, calls "local pluralism" of logics. See
Kuznetsov [167], p.244: "Moreover, I am keeping to the view that none of fixed logic may be suitable
in all the situations, for all cases of life; therefore a general investigation of different large classes of non-
classical logics is useful. However, being unable to embrace the nonembraceable, I shall here restrict
myself only to the consideration of propositional logics, and from them only the superintuitionistic
logics, i.e., classical, intuitionistic, intermediate (between them) and absolutely contradictory."
151See Davis [74], p.95.
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intuitionistic logics. 152 153
Conversely, if a proposition is found to be "exclusively false" (to distinguish it from
having "false" as one value in a truth-value glut) in every logic, then it must be "ex-
clusively false", despite the absence of any "self-evident" general principles. Therefore,
the least restrictive logic is the logic that determines logical falsehoods.
A candidate for such a logic would be an MVL with an infinite number of truth-
values.
15 Aristotle, the Axiomatic Method, and the LNC
15.1 The Different Types of Logic (Including Deductive Logic)
Logic is the study of the methods and principles used to distinguish between valid
and invalid arguments. 154 A sound argument is valid argument, whose premises are
all true. 155 Unfortunately, logic cannot determine if the premises assumed in an
argument are true. Therefore, logic can only identify unsound arguments if they are
invalid (regardless of whether or not all premises are true). Logic cannot determine
if a valid argument is sound or unsound, because it is unable to determine whether
premises are true or false. 156 157
Logic is a normative discipline, in that it describes how we should argue (i.e. "rea-
son"), not how we actually "reason". 158 There are four main types of arguments:
152See Wikipedia [322]: "Logical truths (including tautologies) are truths which are considered to be
necessarily true. This is to say that they are considered to be such that they could not be untrue and
no situation could arise which would cause us to reject a logical truth. It must be true in every sense
of intuition, practices, and bodies of beliefs. However, it is not universally agreed that there are any
statements which are necessarily true."
153See also Gómez-Torrente [117]: "As we said above, it seems to be universally accepted that, if there
are any logical truths at all, a logical truth ought to be such that it could not be false, or equivalently,
it ought to be such that it must be true."
154See Lee [172], p.2
155See Lee [172], p.19.
156See Wikipedia [327], citing Church [58]: "Logic is the systematic study of the structure of propo-
sitions and of the general conditions of valid inference by a method, which abstracts from the content
or matter of the propositions and deals only with their logical form. This distinction between form
and matter is made whenever we distinguish between the logical soundness or validity of a piece of
reasoning and the truth of the premises from which it proceeds[,] and in this sense is familiar from
everyday usage."
157Therefore, truth cannot be determined by logic alone. Premises can only be determined by the
senses. This undercuts Plato’s argument that because the senses are misleading, truth must be deter-
mined by logic alone. See Kline [160], p.48: "Plato stressed the unreliability of sensory perceptions.
Empirical knowledge, as Plato put it, yields opinion only."
158See Lee [172], p.19. "[This] is the job of the psychologist."
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inductive, deductive, abductive, and analogical. 159
Deductive reasoning "moves from the general to the particular, producing a nec-
essary conclusion whose truth follows from that of premises." 160 (The premises are
assumed to be true). An example of deductive reasoning is: "Mythical animals do not
really exist. Werewolves are mythical animals. Therefore Werewolves do not really
exist." 161
According to Russell [247]: "The only logic admitted by the [ancient] Greeks was
deductive, and all deduction had to start, like Euclid, from general principles regarded
as self-evident." 162 In contrast, Timon of Phlius denied the possibility of finding such
self-evident general principles. According to Timon: 163
Everything, therefore, will have to be proved by means of something else,
and all argument will be either circular 164 165 or an endless chain hanging
from nothing. 166 In either case nothing can be proved. This argument, as
we can see, cut at the root of the Aristotelian philosophy which dominated
the Middle Ages.
The argument is that it is impossible to prove that a proof is sound, 167 As discussed
above, a sound argument is both valid and its premises are true. Timon’s argument
is, paradoxically, a proof by deductive reasoning that there is no proof by deductive
reasoning. 168
This result, in turn. makes deductive reasoning consistent with the philosophy of the
ancient Skeptics, and also with other methods of reasoning, by proving that conclusions
159See Fontainelle [97], pp.182-183.
160See Fontainelle [97], p.182.
161See Fontainelle [97], p.182.
162See Russell [247], p.234.
163See Russell [247], p.234.
164Otherwise known as "begging the question" or petitio principii (assuming the principal): the
logical fallacy of assuming that the statement under examination is true. In other words, using a
premise to support itself.
165See e.g. Cameron [52], citing Cardano [53], p.246: "Mathematics, however, is, as it were, its own
explanation; this, although it may seem hard to accept, is nevertheless true, for the recognition that a
fact is so is the cause upon which we base the proof."
166Informally referred to as "turtles all the way down".
167These arguments have also been called the "Münchhausen-Trilemma" (Dogmatismus – unendlicher
Regreß – Psychologismus) attributed to German philosopher Hans Albert. See Wikipedia [325], citing
Westermann [302], p. 15, in turn citing Albert [3], p. 11.
168Modern day proponents of Pyrrhonist philosophy are called "Fallibilists". Notable proponents
of this school of philosophy include Charles Sanders Peirce, Karl Popper, W.V.O. Quine, and Susan
Haack.
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obtained by deductive reasoning are not necessarily true. 169 Even mathematicians have
(inadvertantly) conceded this point, Manin et al. [180] stated: "A proof only becomes
a proof after the social act of ’accepting it as a proof’." 170 Borovik [37] reaffirms this
sentiment, stating: "Manin describes the act of acceptance as a social act; however, the
importance of its personal, psychological component can hardly be overestimated." 171
But as Bertrand Russell [246] perceptively points out: "The fact that an opinion has
been widely held is no evidence whatever that it is not utterly absurd; indeed in view
of the silliness of the majority of mankind, a widely spread belief is more likely to be
foolish than sensible." 172
In contrast to deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning "begins with the particular
and proceeds to the general. Things are observed, [and] then a rule or cause is proposed
to account for them." 173 If the premises are true, then the conclusion islikely to be true.
The truth of the premises does not completely determine the truth of the conclusion.
The argument indicates some sort of probability. 174 "[This] is why, strictly speaking,
no scientific theory is regarded as being true." 175 An example of an inductive argument
is: "It has been raining for a month now. So it is likely to rain again tomorrow." 176
The third main type of reasoning, abductive reasoning, "infers the truth of the
best explanation [out of many,] for a set of facts[,] even if that explanation includes
unobserved elements ... Diagnoticians and detectives commonly employ abductive rea-
soning." 177 An example of an abductive argument is: "If it rains, the grass becomes
wet. The grass is wet. So it is most likely that it rained." 178 However, "the conclusion
is probable but not exclusive; someone might have watered the lawn." 179
The fourth main type of reasoning, analogical reasoning, "transfers information
from a particular source to a particular target ... [and] is always preceded by inductive
reasoning". 180 An example of an analogical argument is:
1. Many objects have been observed to share certain characteristics.
169Paradoxically, this consistency with the other main methods of reasoning (regarding the production
of uncertain conclusions) addresses the central concern of Aristotelian and classical deductive logic:
that of consistency (the LNC).
170See Cameron [52], citing Manin et al. [180].
171See Cameron [52], citing Borovik [37], p.35.
172See Cameron [52], citing Russell [246], p.58.
173See Fontainelle [97], p.182.
174See Lee [172], p.12.
175See Fontainelle [97], p.182.
176See Lee [172], pp.6 and 12.
177See Fontainelle [97], p.183.
178See Fontainelle [97], p.183.
179See Fontainelle [97], p.183.
180See Fontainelle [97], p.183.
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2. We induce a class of these objects by their common characteristics,
and name it ’apples’.
3. We observe a target [object] which shares characteristics we have
found to be typical of [the class named] ’apples’.
4. [Therefore, we] reason analogically that this [target object] is also an
apple. 181
However, "the conclusion is only probable; it could be a plastic apple." 182 Moreover,
analogical reasoning is subject to the logical fallacy called "the analogical fallacy", which
is the false assumption that "because two or more things are similar in one way, they
must be similar in other ways [too]". 183 An example of the analogical fallacy is:
1. The universe is like a watch.
2. A watch can give you an itchy wrist.
3. Therefore the universe can give you an itchy wrist. 184
15.2 The Axiomatic Method is Deductive Logic
Courant et al.’s [68] definition of "the axiomatic method" (written in 1941) is identical
to that of deductive logic:
In general terms the axiomatic point of view can be described as follows:
To prove a theorem in a deductive system is to show that the theorem is a
necessary logical consequence of some previously proved propositions; these,
in turn, must themselves be proved; and so on. The process of mathematical
proof would therefore be the impossible task of an infinite regression unless,
in going back, one is permitted to stop at some point. Hence there must be
number of statements, called postulates or axioms, which are accepted as
true, and for which proof is not required. 185
Courant’s "impossible task of an infinite regression" hints at (but fails to clearly
state) Russell’s key insight (emphasis added): "all argument will be either circular or
an endless chain hanging from nothing. In either case nothing can be proved."
Moreover, Courant adds the following criteria for the axioms:
181See Fontainelle [97], p.183.
182See Fontainelle [97], p.183.
183See Fontainelle [97]„ pp.183 and 210.
184See Fontainelle [97], p.210.
185See Courant et al. [68], pp.214-215.
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The choice of the propositions selected as axioms is to a large extent
arbitrary. But little is gained by the axiomatic method unless the postulates
are simple and not too great in number. Moreover, the postulates must be
consistent, in the sense that no two theorems deductible from them can be
mutually contradictory, and complete, so that every theorem of the system
is deductible from them. 186
Courant’s consistency requirement is itself an axiom. (We can refer to it either as a
meta-axiom, or as a default axiom), This specific axiom is the Law of Non-Contradiction
(LNC), which is discussed in greater detail later in this paper. Courant requires this
axiom due to yet another axiom, "explosion" / ECQ, which also is discussed in greater
detail later in this paper. Inherent to the LNC is another axiom: that there are only
two truth-values (true and false).
Moreover, Courant’s requirement that "the postulates must be consistent, in the
sense that no two theorems deductible from them can be mutually contradictory" can
be satisfied only in an intuitionistic logic (because it requires an existence proof for
every mathematic object). As discussed in this paper, postulates applied to "vacuous
subjects" produce contradictory theorems.
Furthermore, Courant’s completeness requirement ("that every theorem of the sys-
tem is deductible from [the axioms]") requires clarification. Davis [74] defined com-
pleteness as follows (emphasis in the original):
Hilbert asked for a proof that [Peano arithmetic (PA)] is complete, mean-
ing that for any proposition that can be expressed in PA, either it can be
proved in PA that the proposition is true or it can be proved in PA that the
proposition is false.
According to Davis’s more detailed definition, the completeness requirement is ren-
dered impossible by the consistency requirement. This is because, as shown by Gödel in
his second incompleteness theorem, there exist propositions that cannot be proven ei-
ther true or false. Some propositions have have both truth-values (e.g. the liar paradox,
or a proposition with a vacuous subject).
15.3 LNC as the First Axiom of Aristotelian and Classical Logic
Boole states that the LNC is (emphasis added): "... that ’principle of contradiction’
which Aristotle has described as the fundamental axiom of all philosophy." 187
186See Courant et al. [68], pp.214-215.
187See Davis [74], p.33, citing Boole [36], p.49.
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Boole quotes Aristotle’s Metaphysics as follows (emphasis added): 188
It is impossible that the same quality should both belong and not belong
to the same thing ... This is the most certain of all principles ... Wherefore
they who demonstrate refer to this as an ultimate opinion. For it is by
nature the source of all the other axioms.
Moreover, as further discussed in Cohen [63] (emphasis added): 189
... Aristotle goes on in Book Γ to argue that first philosophy, the most
general of the sciences, must also address the most fundamental principles —
the common axioms — that are used in all reasoning. Thus, first philosophy
must also concern itself with the principle of non-contradiction (PNC): the
principle that “the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not
belong to the same subject and in the same respect”. 190 This, Aristotle
says, is the most certain of all principles, and it is not just a
hypothesis. It cannot, however, be proved, since it is employed,
implicitly, in all proofs, no matter what the subject matter. It
is a first principle, and hence is not derived from anything more
basic.
The LNC is one of Aristotle’s three "Laws of Thought", 191 and is an axiom or the-
orem in classical logic 192 (e.g. Principia Mathematica), and is an axiom or theorem in
many non-classical logics (e.g. in intuitionism, but not in multi-valued logics). 193 The
LNC in sequent form 194 is: ` ¬(A∧¬A). Its verbal characterizations include “opposite
188See Aristotle [12], Book IV, Part 3: "For what a man says, he does not necessarily believe; and if
it is impossible that contrary attributes should belong at the same time to the same subject (the usual
qualifications must be presupposed in this premise too), and if an opinion which contradicts another is
contrary to it, obviously it is impossible for the same man at the same time to believe the same thing
to be and not to be; for if a man were mistaken on this point he would have contrary opinions at the
same time. It is for this reason that all who are carrying out a demonstration reduce it to this as an
ultimate belief; for this is naturally the starting-point even for all the other axioms."
189See Cohen [63], Part 4: "The Fundamental Principles: Axioms".
190See Aristotle [12], Book IV, Part 3, 1005b19–20.
191See Gottlieb [110], and Boole’s [36], pp. 48-49, Proposition IV. See also Stillwell [267], p.99: "In
fact, if p + q is taken to mean ’p or q but not both,’ then the algebraic rules of propositional logic
become exactly the same as those of mod 2 arithmetic."
192See Gabbay, [105], Chapter 2.6.
193But see Priest et al. [234]: "dialetheism amounts to the claim that there are true contradictions."
194See Horn [144], Gottlieb [110]; Grishin [115]; and Smith [263], §11.
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assertions cannot both be true simultaneously”, and "no unambiguous statement can
be both true and false". 195 196
According to LNC, a function f(s) of variable s cannot be both convergent and
divergent at any value of s. Therefore, Riemann’s ζ(s) violates the LNC, because it
claims that ζ(s) is convergent at all values of s ∈ C in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 (except
s = 1), while also the Dirichlet series "expression" of ζ(s) is proven to be divergent at
the same values of s. Therefore, in all logics that have LNC as an axiom or theorem,
Riemann’s ζ(s) must be false.
Furthermore, in logics that assume the principle of "explosion" (ECQ) (e.g. classical
and intuitionistic logics), violation of LNC causes any proposition to be "trivially true".
197 In contrast, paraconsistent bivalent logics reject "explosion" (ECQ), by rejecting the
axioms (e.g. disjunctive syllogism and/or disjunction introduction) that lead to ECQ.
198 In paraconsistent logics, unrelated propositions are no longer "trivially true", but
propositions that are directly related to the contradictory proposition remain invalid.
(In a paraconsistent bivalent logic, any proposition is false if it assumes that Riemann’s
analytic continuation of ζ(s) is true).
The Riemann Hypothesis (RH) states that "all the zeros of ζ(s) are on the critical
line Re(s) = 0.5." Because ζ(s) has no zeros, RH is a proposition with non-existent
subjects ("vacuous subjects"). When RH is rephrased as "if ζ(s) has zeros, then all
zeros are on the critical line Re(s) = 0.5", the RH is both true and false in classical logic,
according to material implication. This result, of being both true and false, violates
the LNC. 199
Russell’s On Denoting (which is not a formal logic, but is still relevant to this
situation) states that a sentence with a non-existent subject (e.g. the RH) can be
195See Perzanowski [215] p.22, para.4: "The Principle of Non-Contradiction occurs in at least four
versions: METAPHYSICAL — no object can, at the same time be and not be such-and-such; LOGI-
CAL — no unambiguous statement can be both true and false; PSYCHOLOGICAL — nobody really
and seriously has contradictory experiences, i.e., nobody really sees and does not see (hears and does
not hear) simultaneously, etc.; ETHICAL — no one in his right mind would simultaneously demand
(or perform) A and not-A."
196An example use of LNC in the context of the RH is found in Edwards [90], chapter 9, p.202, citing
Landau [169], which uses the LNC to prove the theorem that "if there are only a finite number of
exceptions to the Riemann hypothesis, then S(t) cannot be bounded below".
197See, e.g. Kleene [159], p.101. according to which ECQ (A,¬A ` B) is valid in both classical and
intuitionistic logics.
198See Mortansen [198] and Priest et al. [235].
199This result of RH being both true and false (a "paradox") is inconsistent with other results, such
as Hasse’s proof of the RH analogue for elliptic curves of genus 1 (see e.g. Milne [194], p.3), and
Deligne’s proof of Weil’s conjecture III (see e.g. Milne [194], p.49). All of these alleged proofs include
a violation of the LNC, caused by the analytic continuation of the Zeta function, and the consequently
false determinations that the Zeta function has a pole and zeros, that its functional equation is valid,
etc.
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interpreted as either a true statement or as a false one. If the RH is interpreted as
"there exist zeros of ζ(s), and it is not the case that any of them are located off of the
critical line Re(s) = 0.5", then the RH is false, because ζ(s) has no zeros. However,
the alternative interpretation is "it is not the case that there exist zeros of ζ(s) and
any of them are located off of the critical line Re(s) = 0.5". This version of RH is true,
because it indeed is not the case that there exist zeros of ζ(s). So according to Russell,
the ambiguity of RH means that it can be interpreted as either true or false (and thus
is both). 200
In contrast, some non-classical logics (e.g. multi-valued logics) and philosophical
texts (Frege’s Über Sinn und Bedeutung, Strawson’s On Referring) reject the LEM,
thereby enabling a third state in addition to "true" and "false". For example, Frege’s
Über Sinn und Bedeutung holds that propositions with vacuous subjects (e.g. the RH)
lack any truth-value, so they are neither true nor false. Strawson’s reasoning in On
Referring states that questions with "vacuous subjects" (such as the RH) are "absurd"
and therefore not asked, thereby inherently creating three truth-values (true, false,
absurd), thereby rejecting the LEM. 201
15.4 LNC is the Test for Consistency of an Axiomatic System
Langer [171] further defines the "axiomatic method" as follows (emphasis added in bold
font): 202
All we ask of a postulate [axiom] is (1) that it shall belong to the system,
i.e. be expressible entirely in the language of the system ["coherence"]; (2)
that it shall imply further propositions of the system ["contributiveness"];
(3) that it shall not contradict any other accepted postulate, or any
proposition implied by such another postulate ["consistency"]; and
(4) that it itself shall not be implied by other accepted postulates, jointly
or singly taken ["independence"].
Langer [171] also states that "Contradictory theorems cannot follow from consistent
postulates." 203 Therefore, the LNC is the test for consistency of a axiom system.
200 Note that Russell’s On Denoting assumes that the LEM is true, so it differs from intuitionistic
logic.
201Note: the 160 year history of the RH should be sufficient evidence to refute this argument.
202See Langer [171], pp.185-186.
203See Langer [171], p.202.
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According to Carnap [55], the LNC is a "sentential formula" that is a tautology. 204 205
Further according to Carnap (emphasis added in bold font)[55]: 206
An [Axiomatic System] AS is said to be inconsistent provided that
among its theorems is one of the form Si and another of the form ∼ Si.
An AS is said to be consistent provided that is not inconsistent. In view
of T6-15, 207 any sentence of the language is derivable from Si and ∼ Si
together; the theorems of an inconsistent AS therefore include all the sen-
tences of the language L’, and the AS in consequence is trivial and useless
for practical purposes. Consistency is thus an obvious requisite of
any non-trivial AS.
Tarski [275] affirms these comments (emphasis added in bold font): 208
A deductive theory is called CONSISTENT or NON-CONTRADICTORY
if no two asserted statements of this theory contradict each other, or, in
other words, if of any two contradictory statements (cf. §7) at least one
cannot be proved. A theory is called COMPLETE, on the other hand, if
of any two contradictory sentences formulated exclusively in the terms of
the theory under consideration (and the theories preceding it) at least one
sentence can be proved in this theory. Of a sentence which has the property
that its negation can be proved in a given theory, it is usually said that it
can be DISPROVED in that theory. In this terminology we can say
that a deductive theory is consistent if no sentence can be both
proved and disproved in it[.]
Also Langer [171] reaffirms these comments (emphasis added in bold font. Italic
font is in the original): 209
204See Carnap [55] p.26: "T8-1. The following formulas are tautologies and hence L-true", followed
by two alternate expression of the LEM, and the LNC: (a) p∨ ∼ p, (b)∼ p ∨ p, and (c) ∼ (p. ∼ p).
205See also Carnap [55] p.42: "For suppose it is not raining here now ... E.g. the modal sentence "it
is impossible that it is raining and it is not raining" is true, whereas the sentence "it is impossible that
it is raining" (produced therefrom by the indicated replacement) is false - for while it is not the case
that it is raining here now, this case is nevertheless logically possible. Thus symbolic languages with
modality symbols are generally not extensional.
206See Carnap [55] p.173.
207See Carnap [55] p.23: "The class comprising the sentential formulas Si and ∼ Si L-implies every
sentential formula; and likewise the conjunction Si. ∼ Si" L-implies every sentential formula." This
corresponds to "explosion" / ex contradictione (sequitur) quodlibet (ECQ).
208See Tarski [275] p.135.
209See Langer [171] p.135.
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The same theorem may follow from more than one possible selection
of premises ... But contradictory theorems can never follow from
consistent postulates . No matter how widely developed the system, how
far removed a theorem may be from the original assumptions, they and they
only are its ultimate premises; if two theorems in a system are incompatible,
and there has been no error in the process of deduction, then the postulates,
no matter how obvious and simple they appear, are inconsistent[.]
However, contradictory theorems ocassionally do arise from consistent postulates.
These are "paradoxes". They arise, for example, from propositions that have "vac-
uous subjects". 210 They also arise from contradictory self-referential statements (e.g.
the Liar Paradox). 211
Furthermore, the above quotations stress the importance of the LNC, according to
majority opinion. Therefore they are derived from a logic that assumes bivalence (most
likely a classical logic), and thus ignore multi-valued logics (which tolerate contradic-
tions). This is discussed in greater detail later in this paper.
Morever, Hilbert’s "formalist" program was "to justify classical mathematics by
reducing it to a formal system whose consistency should be established by finitistic
(hence constructive) means." 212 213 At the beginning of the 20th century, Hilbert’s
210See, e.g. Grattan-Guinness [113], p.338: "Questions of form should be distinguished from those
concerning the existence assumptions that have to be abandoned in each case (citing Grattan-Guinness
[112]). For example, there is no barber who shaves those and only those who do not shave themselves,
thus there is no barber (seemingly Russell’s reaction in (citing Russell, equivalent to [248], p.101)); by
contrast, eliminating Russell’s paradoxical class affects set theory and logic quite fundamentally, as he
was to find for several years to come."
211 See, e.g. Grattan-Guinness [113], p.338: "Russell also did not much consider the logical forms
of the paradoxes. In Cantor’s and Burali-Forti’s results [paradoxes of set theory], given the premise
p that there exists a greatest cardinal or ordinal respectively, opposing conclusions (c and ∼ c) are
deduced about it:
p ⊃ c and p ⊃∼ c;∴∼ p. (15.1)
Reductio ad absurdum proofs can have this logical structure, sometimes in the condensed form given
by c = p:
p ⊃∼ p;∴∼ p. (15.2)
(This is the version called ’reductio’ in PM, ?2 · 01, although without distinction of ’⊃’ from ’∴’ - or of
reductio from the method of indirect proof, which is effected by deducing contradictory consequences
from ∼ p). But with Russell’s paradox, from the premise r that his class exists, we deduce the following
about the proposition b that it belongs to itself:
r ⊃ .b ⊃∼ b and r ⊃ . ∼ b ⊃ b;∴ r ⊃ .b ≡∼ b. (15.3)
The differences may be reconciled via reductio, so no basic issue arises; in its terms, the paradoxes of
the greatest numbers and of naming exemplify the first form while Russell’s, the liar and Grelling’s
take the second."
212See Moschovakis [199], 2nd para.
213See also Brouwer [44], p.88: "In the domain of finite sets in which the formalistic axioms have an
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"formalist" program "was the most powerful contemporary rival to L.E.J. Brouwer’s
developing Intuitionism." 214 According to Brouwer, "Hilbert was mistaken in claiming
that consistency is all that is needed for mathematical existence", 215 216 and further-
more,
to exist [Brouwer’s italics] in mathematics means: to be constructed by
intuition; and the question whether a certain language is consistent, is not
only unimportant in itself, it is also not a test for mathematical existence.
217
Brouwer also "correctly predicted [Gödel’s proof] that any attempt to prove the
consistency of complete induction on the natural numbers would lead to a vicious
circle." 218
16 Aristotelian Logic - Axiomatic Method, and Three
Laws of Thought
If Riemann’s analytic continuation of Dirichlet series ζ(s) to half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 is
true, then the two contradictory definitions of ζ(s) in that half-plane (divergent and
convergent) violate all three of Aristotle’s "Laws of Thought", 219 for all values of s in
half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 (except at s = 1). This is because in Aristotelian classical logic,
the connectives →, ∧, ∨, and ¬, are all definable in terms of the others. 220
interpretation perfectly clear to the Intuitionists, unreservedly agreed to by them, the two tendencies
differ solely in their method, not in their results; this becomes quite different however in the domain
of infinite or transfinite sets, where, mainly by the application of the axiom of inclusion, quoted above,
the formalist introduces various concepts, entirely meaningless to the Intuitionist ..."
214See Moschovakis [199], 2nd para.
215See Davis [74], p.95.
216See also Brouwer [44], p.90: "Although the formalists must admit contradictory results as mathe-
matical if they want to be consistent, there is something disagreeable for them in a paradox like that
of Burali-Forti because at the same time the progress of their arguments is guided by the principium
contradictionis, i.e., by the rejection of the simultaneous validity of two contradictory properties. For
this reason the axiom of inclusion has been modified ..."
217See Davis [74], p.95, fn. 19, citing Brouwer’s dissertation On the Foundations of Mathematics, in
[46], p.96.
218See Moschovakis [199], 2nd para., citing Brouwer’s 1912 essay Intuitionism and Formalism
Brouwer.
219The LOI, LEM, and LNC.
220See Bezhanishvili et al. [27] p.3: "Heyting proved that the axioms in Figure 1.1 are indepen-
dent—none is derivable from the others—and stated that, in contrast to classical logic, in intuitionis-
tic logic none of the connectives →, ∧, ∨, or ¬ is definable in terms of the others (as was proved in
Wajsberg [298], McKinsey [187])."
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Aristotle’s "Laws of Thought" are an ancient minimalistic axiomatic system, con-
sisting of three axioms. It is the foundation of traditional logic. 221 As stated by Russell
[245] at Chapter VII, "On Our Knowledge of General Principles": 222 223 224 225
Aristotle’s "Laws of Thought" are:
(1) The law of identity [LOI]: ’Whatever is, is.’
(2) The law of contradiction [LNC]: ’Nothing can both be and not be.’
(3) The law of excluded middle [LEM]: ’Everything must either be or
not be.’
All three axioms are inherited into classical logic, either as axioms or as theorems
(e.g. the LNC and LEM are theorems in Russell’s Principia Mathematica, 226 and LOI
is also referred to as "Material Equivalence" 227 or "Leibniz’s Law" 228). In regards to
predicate calculus, Lemmon [173] states that:
Other theorems, corresponding at the predicate calculus level to the laws
of non-contradiction (37), 229 identity (38), 230 and excluded middle (44),
231 all of whose proofs are easy, are:
221See Fontainelle [97], p.216: "[LEM] does not hold true for multi-valued logics (see page 229) and
[LNC] does not hold true when we encounter a paradox (see page 218)."
222See also Boole, [36], which discusses the LOI in Chapter II, pp.34-36, Para.12-13; the LNC in
proposition IV, Chapter III, p.49; and the LEM in pp.8 and 99-100, and in proposition II, Chapter
III, p.48
223See also Brittanica [88], citing Dorbolo [82]
224According to Priest [229] p.139, both LNC and LEM as defined in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book
4, "are not logical principles for Aristotle, but metaphysical principles, governing the nature of beings
qua beings. By the time one gets to Leibniz, however, the Laws have been absorbed into the logical
canon."
225See also Grattan-Guinness [113], p.148: "After stating the identity law as ’x ≺ x’ for proposition
x, Pierce stated ... that the ’principle of contradiction’ and of ’excluded middle’ were written on p.177
respectively as ’x ≺ x’ and ’x ≺ x’."
226See Grattan-Guiness [113], p.390: "This theorem [?2 · 11] was ’the law of excluded middle’, a
metalaw to us; others of this status included the laws of contradiction and of double negation (?3 · 24
and ?4 · 13 respectively)."
227See Lee [172], pp.193-194, 251
228See e.g., Grattan-Guinness [113], p.447: "[Ramsey] called his new primitive notion a ’function in
extension’, symbolized ’φe’; under it and the interpretation of quantification the Leibnizian form of
identity
x = y := .′(φe).φex ≡ φey′ (16.1)
was acceptable, for it covered all possible associations of proposition and individual and so would be
a tautology if x were identical with y and a contradiction otherwise (citing Ramsey [237]."
229See Lemmon [173], p.50, wherein the LNC is proven based on Reductio ad Absurdum (RAA) that
is discussed in Lemmon [173], pp.26-27 and 39-40.
230See Lemmon [173], p.51, wherein the LOI is proven based on the Rule of Conditional Proof (CP)
that is discussed in Lemmon [173], pp.14-18 and 39-40.
231See Lemmon [173], p.52, wherein the LEM is proven based on the rules (including the RAA) that
are discussed in Lemmon [173], pp.39-40.
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129. ` (x)¬(Fx&¬Fx);
130. ` (x)(Fx→ Fx);
131. ` (x)(Fx ∨ ¬Fx).
As in the propositional calculus, theorems here may be thought of as
conveying logical truths, propositions true simply on logical grounds.
Some non-classical logics, such as intuitionistic logics (including minimal logic), have
the LOI and LNC, but reject the LEM when a proposition has neither been proved or
disproved. The LNC is also the test for simple consistency of a propositional calculus.
232
The three "Laws of Thought" originate in Aristotle’s De interpretatione, the second
of the six texts in Aristotle’s Organon. 233 However, the Law of Non-Contradiction
(LNC), which is also discussed elsewhere in Aristotle’s works, 234 is older. The LNC
is discussed elsewhere, such as in Euclid (which is approximately contemporaneous
with Aristotle), 235 in Plato’s Socratic dialogues 236 237 (all of which predate Aristotle),
including the Socratic dialogue Parmenides, 238 239 and is attributed to Parmenides and
232See Carnap [55] p.173: "Consistency is thus an obvious requisite of any non-trivial [Axiomatic
System]." See also Tarski et al. [276], p.28: "If [theorem] T is inconsistent, two sentences Φ and ¬Φ
are valid in T". See also Tarski et al.’s [276] example in pp.46-47.
233See Aristotle [13] De interpretatione.
234See Gottlieb [110], citing Aristotle’s Metaphysics IV (Gamma) 3–6, especially 4; De Interpreta-
tione; and Posterior Analytics I, chapter 11.
235See Hardy [125], p.19 : "The proof [of the existence of an infinity of prime numbers] is by reductio
ad absurdum, and reductio ad absurdum, which Euclid loved so much, is one of a mathematician’s
favourite weapons. It is a far finer gambit than any chess gambit: a chess player may offer the sacrifice
of a pawn or even a piece, but a mathematician offers the game."
236In the Socratic dialogue Republic, Plato Socrates states: "It is obvious that the same thing will
not do or suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time." See
Priest [229] pp.137-138, citing Hamilton [264], p.436b.
237In the Socratic dialogue Euthyphro, Socrates uses the LNC in an argument. See Smith [261], p.29:
"Socrates next contends that if Euthyphro’s definition of piety is right, then there must be objects
that are contemporaneously pious and impious, since they are loved and hated by the gods at the same
time. Euthyphro realizes the absurdity of the proposition and is forced to review his understanding of
what it is to be pious."
238But Priest [229] interprets the Socratic dialogue Parmenides as advocating against the LNC: "Even
if all things come to partake of both [the form of like and the form of unlike], and by having a share
of both are both like and unlike one another, what is there surprising in that? ... when things have a
share in both or are shown to have both characteristics, I see nothing strange in that, Zeno, nor yet
in a proof that all things are one by having a share in unity and at the same time many by sharing
in plurality. But if anyone can prove that what is simple unity itself is many or that plurality itself is
one, then shall I begin to be surprised." See Priest [229] p.138, citing Hamilton [264], p.129b,c.
239But Brownstein [48], pp.49-50, interprets the same section of Parmenides as agreeing with the
LNC. Brownstein assumes that a is a red circle, b is a red square, and c is a green circle.
Thus a and b are qualitatively similar to one another [in color] ... but dissimilar to c.
... Thus a and c are similar to each other [in shape] while both are not similar to b. We
might describe this situation as one in which objects a, b, and c are both alike and unlike
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other "pre-Socratics". 240
Bertrand Russell argued that these three "laws" are either axioms or theorems of
logic: 241
’[A]nything implied by a true proposition is true’ ... is one of a certain
number of self-evident logical principles. Some at least of these principles
must be granted before any argument or proof becomes possible. When
some of them have been granted, others can be proved, though these others,
so long as they are simple, are just as obvious as the principles taken for
granted. For no very good reason, three of these principles have been singled
out by tradition under the name of ’Laws of Thought.’
Lee [172] stated that these "are so general and intuitive that their general forms
are accepted as laws of logic." 242 Minto [196] added that "[i]t is even said that all the
doctrines of Deductive or Syllogistic Logic may be educed from them." 243 However,
none of these commentators envisioned the existence of non-classical logics, despite the
fact that Aristotle himself discussed the existence of future contingent propositions in
De interpretatione §9, in Organon. 244
(Note: In the "classical logic" of Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica
("PM "), Aristotle’s three "Laws of Thought" are theorems derived from other axioms.
245 246 247 248)
... Plato makes it clear that he does not regard the kind of situation I have described as
an absurdity at all.
However, we cannot describe this situation as one in which objects a, b, and c are both circles and
non-circles, or both red and non-red.
240See Cohen [62], pp.75: "It is Parmenides, (one of the pre-Socratic philosophers in the 5th century
BCE) who is credited with originally setting out ... the law of noncontradiction, put also as ’Never
will this prevail, that what is not is,’ by Plato in The Sophist."
241See Russell [245], Chapter VII: "On Our Knowledge of General Principles".
242See Lee [172], pp.3-4.
243See also Minto [196], p.29
244See Aristotle [13].
245See Langer [171], p.305, which states that the LNC is proved in Th. 3.24 of Principia Mathematica,
where the two famous authors state that "in spite of its fame, we have found few occasions for its use."
246See also Andrews [5], p.54, which states that all three of the Laws of Thoughts are theorems in
Principia Mathematica: The LNC in Th. *3.24, and the LEM in Th. *2.11. and the Principle of
Identity in Th. *2.08.
247See also Whitehead and Russell’s [306] discussion of equivalence and Th. *4.01 on p.115 ("It is
obvious that two propositions are equivalent when, and only when, both are true or both are false.").
248See also Whitehead and Russell’s [306] discussion of the ’Law of Identity’ on pp. 22-23, 39, and
92-93. In addition, see the discussion of Th. *2.08 on p.99: "I.e. any proposition implies itself. This
is called the ’principle of identity’ and referred to as ’Id.’ It is not the same as the ’law of identity’ (’x
is identical with x’), but the law of identity is inferred from it (cf. *13.15)."
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16.1 The Law of Identity (LOI)
The Law of Identity (LOI) is also known as the "Law of Equivalence", and as "Leibniz’s
Law". This law is also referred to as the "Identity of Indiscernibles". 249 It is the first of
Aristotle’s three "Laws of Thought", 250 and is an axiom of classical and intuitionistic
propositional logics.
The Law of Identity (LOI) states that a proposition (P ) "is the same with itself and
different from another". This can be written as P ≡ P . In the notation of Whitehead
and Russell’s Principia Mathematica 251, the corresponding propositional logic sequent
is: ` .p ≡ p. 252 Taski’s version of "Leibniz’s Law" is "x = x if, and only if, x has
every property which x has.". 253 254
Another definition of the LOI, in the context of logical discourse, is that the defini-
tion of a proposition must be consistent throughout a logical discourse (e.g., the proof
of a mathematical theorem). Changing the definition of a proposition in the course of a
logical discourse is "equivocation". Aristotle states that "[t]he identity of subject and
of predicate must not be ’equivocal’." 255
In the context of the RH, if the Dirichlet series ζ(s) and Riemann’s ζ(s) are both
true, then the LOI is violated in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 (except at s = 1), because the
two different definitions of ζ(s) produce two different values of ζ(s) at each value of s.
In that half-plane, a divergent ζ(s) is not equivalent to a convergent ζ(s). So if both
definitions are true, ζ(s) is not equivalent to itself.
Therefore, ζ(s) cannot have a plurality of definitions that produce more than one
values of ζ(s) at the same value of s. This would be "equivocation", and would mean
that ζ(s) is different from itself (ζ(s) 6= ζ(s)), thereby violating the LOI.
249See Forrest, [98], which formulates it as: "[I]f, for every property F , object x has F if and only if
object y has F , then x is identical to y. Or in the notation of symbolic logic: ∀(Fx↔ Fy)→ x = y."
250See, e.g. Russell [245], at Chapter VII: "On Our Knowledge of General Principles".
251See Langer [171], p.307, sequent (*4.2).
252See also Russell [245], Chapter VII: "The law of identity: ’Whatever is, is.’" In the context of the
RH, if ζ(s) is both convergent and divergent at any value of s, then it both ’is’ and ’is not’ divergent
there, violating the LOI.
253See also Tarski, [275], p.56: "Leibniz’s Law" can be simplified to "x = x if, and only if, x has
every property which x has." See also Tarski, [275], p.57: "y = x if, and only if, y has every property
which x has, and x has every property which y has." This is clearly not the case with the divergent
Dirichlet series ζ(s) and the convergent Riemann ζ(s) in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1.
254See also Sruton [253], pp.144-146: "But what is identity? Philosophers agree on the following four
characteristics: ... (ii) Identity is reflexive: everything is identical with itself: (x)(x = x)".
255See Aristotle [13] De interpretatione §6, in Organon.
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16.2 The Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM)
The Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM) is another of the three Aristotelian "Laws of
Thought". It states that every proposition is either true or false, and thus cannot be
both (hence the "excluded middle"). Another interpretation of the LEM that only one
of a proposition p, and its negation ¬p, is true (p ∨ ¬p). 256
According to Aristotle: 257
In the case of that which is or which has taken place, propositions,
whether positive or negative, must be true or false. Again, in the case
of a pair of contradictories, either when the subject is universal and the
propositions are of a universal character, or when it is individual, as has
been said, one of the two must be true and the other false[.]
The sequent of the LEM is written as: ∀P ` (P ∨ ¬P ). Counter-intuitively, the
truth table of the logical disjunction "∨" is that of the Boolean "Inclusive OR", not
that of the Boolean "Exclusive OR (XOR)". 258 (So only in logics that have both the
LEM and the LNC is the middle indeed excluded).
The LEM is rejected by some non-classical logics, such as intuitionistic logics, 259
by multi-valued logics (e.g. 3VL), and also by the informal logics described in Frege’s
Über Sinn und Bedeutung, Strawson’s On Referring, and Russell’s On Denoting.
In the context of the RH, if both the Dirichlet series ζ(s) and Riemann’s ζ(s) are
true, the LEM is violated throughout half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1, (except at s = 1"), be-
cause then both the proposition p ("ζ(s) is divergent") and its negation ¬p ("ζ(s) is
convergent") are true. Under one interpretation, the disjunction ("or") in the LEM is
non-exclusive. 260 So under this interpretation, the LEM merely states that proposi-
tions p and ¬p cannot both be false. However, even with this stricter interpretation of
LEM, Riemann’s ζ(s) still violates the LEM in classical logic, dueto its Law of Double
Negation Elimination (¬(¬p) = p).
If we assume both definitions of ζ(s) are true (p = divergent, and ¬p = convergent),
and then negate them both, then both q = ¬(p) = convergent, and ¬q = ¬(¬p) =
divergent. Also, both q and ¬q are false, because they are negations of true statements.
256See Aristotle [13] De interpretatione §9, in Organon.
257See Aristotle [13] De interpretatione §9, in Organon.
258See Aloni [4]; and Horn [144], §2: "LEM and LNC".
259See Moschovakis [199].
260See Aloni [4], 1st para.: "In logic, disjunction is a binary connective (∨) classically interpreted as
a truth function the output of which is true if at least one of the input sentences (disjuncts) is true,
and false otherwise."
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This result is undeniably a violation of the LEM. In classical logic, due to its Law of
Double Negation Elimination (¬(¬p) = p), we violate the LEM with the original two
propositions! 261
16.3 The Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC)
The Law of the Non-Contradiction (LNC) is the the third axiom of Aristotle’s "Laws of
Thought". The LNC states that a proposition (P ) and its negation (¬P ) cannot both
be true simultaneously. One expression of this law 262 is the sequent: ∀P ` ¬(P ∧¬P ).
Another expression of LNC is that "no unambiguous statement can be both true
and false." 263 Yet another version is that one of a proposition (P ), or its negation
(¬P ), is true. 264 According to Aristotle:
A simple proposition is a statement, with meaning, as to the presence
of something in a subject or its absence, in the present, past, or future,
according to the divisions of time. 265
An affirmation is a positive assertion of something about something, a
denial a negative assertion ... Those positive and negative propositions are
said to be contradictory which have the same subject and predicate. 266
We see that in a pair of this sort both propositions cannot be true[.] 267
In the context of the RH, the LNC is violated if the Dirichlet series ζ(s) and Rie-
mann’s ζ(s) are both true, because then ζ(s) has two contradictory values (divergence
and convergence) at all values of s in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 (except at s = 1). 268
261Because ¬q = ¬(¬p) and ¬(¬p) = p, therefore ¬q = p. So both q and ¬q being false is the same
as p and ¬p being false.
262See Horn [144], Gottlieb [110]; Grishin [115]; and Smith [263], §11.
263See Perzanowski [215] p.22, para.4: "The Principle of Non-Contradiction occurs in at least four
versions: METAPHYSICAL — no object can, at the same time be and not be such-and-such; LOGI-
CAL — no unambiguous statement can be both true and false; PSYCHOLOGICAL — nobody really
and seriously has contradictory experiences, i.e., nobody really sees and does not see (hears and does
not hear) simultaneously, etc.; ETHICAL — no one in his right mind would simultaneously demand
(or perform) A and not-A."
264See Langer [171], pp.262-283, and 300: "Any proposition is either true or false". This version is true
only in logics that assume the LEM. It is a major issue for the intuitionists, and fails in multi-valued
logics.
265See Aristotle [13] De interpretatione §5, in Organon.
266See Aristotle [13] De interpretatione §6, in Organon.
267See Aristotle [13] De interpretatione §7, in Organon.
268See Carnap [55] p.173: "Consistency is thus an obvious requisite of any non-trivial [Axiomatic
System]." See also Tarski et al. [276], p.28: "If [theorem] T is inconsistent, two sentences Φ and ¬Φ
are valid in T". See also Tarski et al.’s [276] example in pp.46-47.
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16.4 Aristotle’s Laws of Thought, Applied to the Zeta Function
When applied to the Zeta function ζ(s), the LOI holds that ζ(s) cannot have two
different values at any value of s, 269 because this would mean that the proposition
"ζ(s)" is not equal to itself (P 6≡ P ).
The LNC is more specific. It states that a proposition P and its contradiction ¬P
cannot both be true simultaneously. Using the function ζ(s) as an example, ζ(s) cannot
be both convergent and divergent at the same value of s, because this would mean that
proposition P and its negation ¬P were both true.
So given that the Dirichlet series ζ(s) is proven to be divergent throughout half-
plane Re(s) ≤ 1, the LOI and the LNC hold that Riemann’s ζ(s) cannot be valid at
any value of s in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 (except at s = 1), nor can any other analytic
continuation of ζ(s). 270
So, according to all classical and intuitionistic propositional logics that have LOI and
LNC as axioms or theorems, ζ(s) is defined exclusively by the Dirichlet series (which
has no zeros). This means that the zeros of the Riemann Hypothesis (RH) do not exist.
The non-existent zeros are "vacuous subjects" of a proposition, like "the present King
of France" in Bertrand Russell’s famous proposition: "The present King of France is
bald". 271
16.5 LNC and the Two Contradictory Zeta Functions
Riemann’s version of ζ(s) violates the LNC.
In logic, the law of identity is the first of the three classical laws of thought. It
states that "each thing is the same with itself and different from another". ... In logical
discourse, violations of the Law of Identity (LOI) result in the informal logical fallacy
known as equivocation.
If analytic continuation of ζ(s) is true, that the alternative version of ζ(s) is con-
vergent for all s ∈ C, s 6= 1, then ζ(s) is both convergent and divergent throughout
half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1, where Riemann’s ζ(s) and the Dirichlet series ζ(s) disagree. The
sole exception is the pole at s = 1, where both the Dirichlet series ζ(s) and Riemann’s
ζ(s) agree on divergence.
269Note: Also according to the formal definition of a function, ζ(s) cannot have two different values
at any value of s.
270See Carnap [55], p.18: "A sentential formula is said to be L-false (or logically false, or contradic-
tory) in case its range is the null range, i.e. it is false for every value-assignment. Every L-false sentence
is evidently false; moreover, its falsity resides entirely in the sense of the sentence and is independent
of the facts."
271See Russell [244], pp.483-485 and 490.
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In other words, analytic continuation of ζ(s) claims that throughout half-plane
Re(s) ≤ 1, for all s ∈ C (except s = 1), s 6= 1, both a proposition (P ) and its negation
(¬P ) are simultaneously true. So this claim contradicts the LNC, which states that a
proposition (P ) and its negation (¬P ) cannot both be true simultaneously (¬(A∧¬A)).
Thus the LNC and Riemann’s ζ(s) cannot both be true.
The Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) is "derivable in classical as well as in intu-
itionistic constructive propositional calculus", 272 so Riemann’s ζ(s) violates the LNC in
both the classical and the intuitionistic schools of propositional logic. So in both of these
logics, the LNC and proof of Dirichlet series ζ(s) divergence in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1
together are sufficient to falsify Riemann’s version of ζ(s).
16.6 ECQ is a Medieval Addition to Aristotelian Logic
In Aristotelian logic, if the LNC is violated, the result is ex contradictione (sequitur)
quodlibet ("ECQ"), which is also called the "principle of explosion". This is the law
that any proposition can be proven from a contradiction. So due to ECQ, any argument
containing a contradiction is "trivially true".
In the context of the RH, this means that analytic continuation of ζ(s) violates
the LNC and triggers ECQ, because the Dirichlet series ζ(s) is proven to be divergent
there. If assumed to be true, this so-called analytic continuation of ζ(s) triggers ECQ
("explosion"). 273 274 275
272See Grishin[115].
273See e.g. Gelbart et al. [108], Abstract: "we describe the two major methods for proving the
analytic continuation and functional equations of L-functions: the method of integral representations,
and the method of Fourier expansions of Eisenstein series."
274See also Gelbart et al. [108], p.78, which states:
To analytically continue ζ(s), basically ’the constant term’ is enough: reading through
the spectral proof of the analytic continuation of φ(s) for E(z, s), one demonstrates that
ξ(s) is holomorphic everywhere, save for simple poles at s = 0 and 1.
However, analytic continuation of ζ(s) violates the LNC and thus is false, and Dirichlet series ζ(s) has
neither poles nor zeros.
275Moreover, L-functions are generalizations of the Riemann ζ(s) function (whose analytic contin-
uation violates LNC). So, analytically-continued L-functions violate LNC, as do the arguments that
assume that analytically-continued L-functions are true, e.g. those described in Gelbart et al. [108],
p.65: "The Dirichlet L-functions L(s, χ) satisfy the properties E, BV, and FE analogous to those
of ζ(s) (which corresponds to the trivial character)", citing Davenport [73]. See also Gelbart et al.
[108], pp.60-61, for the definitions of properties Entirety (E), Vertical strips (BV), and Functional
Equation (FE).
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17 Classical Logics
17.1 Definition
Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica is referred to as "the" classical logic.
276 277 Other examples of classical logic include George Boole’s algebraic reformulation
of Aristotelian logic, 278 and the second-order logic found in Gottlob Frege’s Begriffss-
chrift (when applied to "judgable content"). 279 280
"Classical logics" are logics that assume the following as axioms or theorems: 281
276See F. E. Andrews [5], p.54, footnote 3: "In this century the logic of Principia Mathematica
[henceforth PM] has so succeeded that it is now called "Classical logic"".
277See also Priest [230], p.xvii, "Around the turn of the twentieth century, a major revolution occurred
in logic. Mathematical techniques of a quite novel kind were applied to the subject, and a new theory
of what is logically correct was developed by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and others. This theory
has now come to be called the ’classical logic’. The name is rather inappropriate, since the logic has
only a somewhat tenuous connection with logic as it was taught and understood in Ancient Greece or
the Roman Empire. But it is classical in another sense of that term, namely standard."
278See Boole [36], especially Propositions III and IV on pp. 48-49, that correspond to the LEM and
LNC, respectively.
279See Lotter [176], §3a: "Frege’s early semantics is based on the notion of a conceptual content, that
is, it is based on that part of meaning that is relevant for logical inferences. The class of conceptual
contents in turn is divided up into judgable and non-judgable ones, whereby the former are logically
composed of and can be decomposed into the latter. What Frege may have had in mind – although
he does not put it exactly this way – with his distinction between judgable and non-judgable contents
is the following consideration: a judgable content is such that we can reasonably either affirm or deny
it"
280Note: Riemann [241] was published in 1859. Riemann died in 1866. Sigwart’s work was published
in 1873, Frege [99] in 1892, Russell [244] in 1905, and Russell’s Principia Mathematica in 1910-1913.
So Riemann had no knowledge of any of these before his death. In contrast, Boole [36] discusses the
LOI in Chapter II, pp.34-36, Para.12-13; the LNC in proposition IV, Chapter III, p.49; and the LEM
in pp.8 and 99-100, and in proposition II, Chapter III, p.48. Boole [36] was published in 1854, a few
years before Riemann’s 1859 paper, but Riemann does not appear to have been aware of it or its
implications.
281See Wikipedia [309], citing Gabbay, [105], Chapter 2.6. See also Lee [172], p.251.
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Axioms of Classical Logic
Name Synonym Sequent Description
Law of Non-
Contradiction (LNC)
¬(p ∧ ¬p)
Principle of Explosion Ex Contradic-
tione Quodlibet
(ECQ)
∀p,∀q:
(p ∧ ¬p) ` q
Law of the Excluded
Middle (LEM)
p ∨ ¬p
Double Negation
(DN)
Double Negative
Elimination
p ≡ ¬¬p
Monotonicity of En-
tailment
Weakening p ` q Adding pre-
sumption a re-
sults in p, a ` q
Idempotency of En-
tailment
Contraction p, p, a ` q Deleting one of
presumptions p
results in p, a `
q
Commutativity
(Com) of Conjunction
(p ∧ q) ≡ (q ∧ p)
De Morgan’s Duality
(DeM)
¬(p∧ q) ≡ (¬p∨
¬q)
Every logical op-
erator is dual to
another
DeM continued ¬(p∨ q) ≡ (¬p∧
¬q)
Also, most semantics of classical logic are bivalent, meaning all of the possible deno-
tations of propositions can be categorised as either true or false. 282 Any higher-order
logic that is based on a "classical logic" inherits all of these properties, in addition to
the three "Laws of Thought". 283 284 285
In classical propositional logics, the three "Laws of Thought" can be either axioms
or theorems. For example, Kleene lists all three of the "Laws of Thought" as axioms
282See Wikipedia [309], citing Gabbay, [105], Chapter 2.6. See also Lee [172], p.251.
283See Sakharov [250]: "The set of axiom schemata of first-order predicate calculus is comprised of
the axiom schemata of propositional calculus together with the two following axiom schemata."
284See also Andrews [6] p.201: "So far we have been concerned with first-order logic, and its subsystem
propositional calculus, which we might regard as zeroth-order logic."
285See also Kleene [158], p.74: "The predicate calculus includes the propositional calculus."
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of a classical propositional calculus. 286 287 In contrast, in Principia Mathematica, the
three "Laws of Thought" are theorems. 288 289
17.2 Relationship Between Math and Logic
Russell hoped to prove that symbolic logic (and more specifically, his version of "classi-
cal" logic) is "practically identical" to mathematics. 290 291 But after the publications
of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, Russell’s "logicism" project had to be abandoned,
292 293 and Hilbert’s "formalism" project had to be abandoned too. 294 Gödel proved
that Russell’s classical logic is incomplete, by showing that it cannot decide paradoxes
such as the Liar’s paradox (which is undecidable in a bivalent logic). 295
However, Russell’s concept of "logic" was limited to his version of "classical" logic.
Over the course of the past century, a wide variety of non-classical logics have been
developed, that differ from classical logic. 296 So if mathematics is "merely logic in
another guise", 297 then which logic corresponds (or logics correspond) to mathematics?
Russell assumed that classical logic would be the logic equivalent to all mathematics.
286See Kleene [158], p.8: "Now we make one further assumption about the atoms, which is charac-
teristic of classical logical logic. We assume that each atom (or the proposition it expresses) is either
true or false but not both."
287See also Kleene [158], p.16, formulas *1, *50, and *51.
288See Langer [171], p.305, which states that the LNC is proved in Th. 3.24 of Principia Mathematica.
Whitehead and Russell: "[I]n spite of its fame, we have found few occasions for its use."
289See also Andrews [5], p.54, which states that all three of the Laws of Thoughts are theorems in
Principia Mathematica: The LNC in Th. 3.24, and the LEM in Th. 2.11. and the Principle of Identity
in Th. 2.08. (Russell states that the ’Law of Identity’ is inferred later in PM from the Principle of
Identity). See Principia Mathematica to *56, Cambridge, 1967, pp. 99, 101, 111.
290See Russell’s [243] definition of mathematics in p.157, para.106: "This definition brought Mathe-
matics into very close relation to Logic, and made it practically identical with Symbolic Logic."
291See also Scruton [253], p.77: "... as Russell believed, that mathematics is, in the last analysis,
merely logic in another guise."
292See Scruton, [253], p.395: "The final blow to the logicist programme was struck by Gödel, in his
famous meta-mathamatical proof that there can be no proof of the completeness of arithmetic which
permits a proof of its consistency, and vice versa."
293See also Wikipedia [320] (citing Crossley et al. [69], pp. 52–53): "Roughly speaking, in proving
the first incompleteness theorem, Gödel used a modified version of the liar paradox, replacing ’this
sentence is false’ with ’this sentence is not provable’, called the ’Gödel sentence G’."
294See Scruton [253], p.395: "It follows too that we cannot treat mathematics as Hilbert wished,
merely as strings of provable formulae: the theory of ’formalism’ is false."
295See Grattan-Guinness [113], p.512: "Both logicism and formalism now had to be set aside in their
current forms, although PM still provided a main source for many basic notions in mathematical logic.
However in assuming bivalency, the theorem did not affect intuitionism ... Further, it had no major
effect on mathematicians; apart from their general uninterest in foundations, it used a far more formal
notion of proof than even their most ’rigorous’ practitioners entertained, so that it would not have
seemed to bear upon their concerns."
296See e.g., Priest’s [230] book on non-classical logics.
297Scruton’s phrasing of Russell’s argument, in [253], p.77.
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This was disproved by Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems. But perhaps the entire body
of mathematics is equivalent to some other non-classical logic, for example a 3VL (such
as Priest’s "Logic of Paradox" LP ) which rejects LNC and thus the requirement for
consistency? Or perhaps the entire body of mathematics is equivalent to the entire
inconsistent body of logic? In regards to the last question, Brouwer [44] stated: 298
To the philosopher or to the anthropologist, but not to the mathemati-
cian, belongs the task of investigating why certain systems of symbolic logic
rather than others may be effectively projected upon nature. Not to the
mathematician, but to the psychologist, belongs the task of explaining why
we believe in certain systems of symbolic logic and not in others, in partic-
ular why we are averse to the so-called contradictory systems in which the
negative as well as the positive of certain propositions are valid.
Brouwer’s intuitionism "differs from [Russell’s] logicism by treating logic as a part
of mathematics rather than as the foundation of mathematics". 299
Brouwer’s intuitionism also differs from Russell’s logicism by treating language as
"having nothing to do with mathematics", 300 whereas logic has always treated mathe-
matical propositions as being a subset of all logical propositions, wherein propositions
are linguistic constructs.
Boole showed 301 that Aristotle’s "Laws of Thought" can be represented by an
algebra (which is a specific subset of mathematics). By extension, each non-classical
logic can have its own corresponding mathematical representation, and consequently,
the entire body of logic can be represented by a subset of mathematics. The following
was Brouwer’s opinion: "Far from mathematics being logic (as Frege and Russell had
maintained), logic itself is derived from mathematics." 302 303
However, historically logic did not originate from mathematics. It originated from
philosophy, as method for regulating all arguments, not only mathematical ones.
298See Brouwer [44], p.84, citing Mannoury [181].
299See Moschovakis [199], 2nd para.
300See Vafeiadou et al. [294], p.2, citing Brouwer [46], p.79: "Hilbert’s formalist program was doomed
to failure because ’language ... is a means ... for the communication of mathematics but ... has nothing
to do with mathematics’ and is not essential for it."
301See Boole [36].
302See Davis [74], p.95.
303See also Curry [70]. p.265: "Recent foundational studies (recursive arithmetic, combinatory logic
including the theories of lambda conversion, Post’s formalized syntax, etc.) show that important
theories can be constructed without the aid of any logical calculus, and that these are sufficient for
portions of mathematics; so that logic is founded on mathematics, as the intuitionists have long held,
rather than the reverse."
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If Brouwer is correct, and logic is derived from mathematics, and also mathematics
is inconsistent, then we are left with Timon’s argument regarding the impossibility
of proof. If the many conflicting logics (classical, intuitionistic, multi-valued logic)
are derived from the contradictory body of mathematics, are there any "self-evident"
general principles? If no, then deductive proof is impossible, because everything will
have to be proved by means of something else, and all argument will be either circular
or an endless chain hanging from nothing.
Finally, in contrast to Russell, Hilbert, and Brouwer, Wittgenstein defined philoso-
phy (which since Aristotle is defined as including logic) as "all those primitive proposi-
tions which are assumed as true without proof by the various sciences". 304 According
to this argument, the body of logic does not "correspond" to mathematics, and is not
derived from mathematics. Instead, the body of philosophy (which includes logic) is
the foundation of mathematics. The propositions of logic are underlying (and often
unstated) assumptions of mathematics.
According to this view, the laws of logic cannot be determined by mathematical
considerations. Instead, they are (and must be) determined according to philosophical
considerations. Given that even in ancient Greece there were rival schools of philosophy
(and even of logic: e.g. the differences between Aristotle and the Skeptics), it is follows
that differing schools of philosophy give birth to different logics, which in turn give
birth to different schools of thought in each of the sciences (that are offspring og the
different schools of philosophy).
Also implicit in this argument is that each version of these "primitive propositions"
reflects a philosophical worldview ("Weltanschauung"). Especially if Timon is correct
in that these "primitive propositions" are not agreed upon, and are impossible to prove.
In the context of logics, this would mean that one logic would be selected instead of
others because its "absurdities" (or "paradoxes") are held to be less problematic than
the "absurdities" (or "paradoxes") of other logics. Such is the case currently with the
popularity of the "classical logic" of Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica,
despite the problems arising from its material implication and ECQ.
However, there are several problems with Wittgenstein’s approach. First, it assumes
that science is based on deductive reasoning, which starts with philosophy and ends
with science. But for the most part, this is not the case. Instead, most areas of science
are primarily based on inductive reasoning. Mathematics is the exception, because it
does involve a great deal of deductive reasoning. But even mathematics requires other
types of reasoning (e.g. inductive, abductive, and analogical). What type of reasoning
304See Wikipedia [335], citing Klagge et al. [157] p.332, citing Nedo et al. [201] p.89.
65
led to Riemann to propose his famous hypothesis? Surely not deductive reasoning.
Moreover, if Wittgenstein’s definition of philosophy is true, which subset(s) of the
entire body of logic form(s) the foundation of math? Today, there are many logics
(classical and non-classical) that contradict one another by least one axiom. 305 Also,
certain "primitive propositions" are impermissible in certain logics (e.g. "paradoxes"
in classical logic, due to LNC), but are permissible in other logics (e.g. paradoxes in
MVLs, due to the absence of LNC). So which "primitive propositions" are included, for
example, in the foundations of mathematics? Is LNC itself included in the foundations
of mathematics?
More specifically, regarding the Riemann Hypothesis (RH), which logic is assumed
to be in its foundation? This paper shows that in logics that have the LNC and ECQ
as axioms (e.g. classical and intuitionistic logics) 306 the Riemann Zeta Function ζ(s)
violates the LNC, so ECQ renders "trivially true" any proof that assumes Riemann’s
ζ(s) is true. So ζ(s) is defined by its Dirichlet series, which has no zeros, which means
that the Riemann Hypothesis (RH) is directed to an empty set, so both the RH and its
negation are both "vacuously true". So RH is an unresolvable paradox in these logics.
In contrast, Priest’s "Logic of Paradox" (LP ), which is Kleene’s three-valued logic
(3VL) with the third truth-value assigned to paradoxes. 307 LP enables the RH to be
used in logical argument (thanks to LP ’s rejection of the LEM and the LNC).
This result is consistent with Wittgenstein’s argument, because by selecting a foun-
dation logic for the derivation of Riemann’s ζ(s), and for the use of the RH, we are
selecting foundation propositions that are assumed to be true.
Moreover, the use of LP as the underlying logic of the RH shows that paradoxes
(such as RH) are not "a triviality unworthy of serious consideration", 308 or a source of
catastrophes (according to ECQ), but instead are an important element in logic and in
mathematics.
305See Priest [230].
306See, e.g. Kleene [159], p.101. according to which both classical and intuitionistic logics have ECQ
(A,¬A ` B) as a theorem.
307See e.g. the following articles on "Logic of Paradox": Priest [226], Priest [227], and Hazen et al.
[133].
308See Priest, [226], p.219
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17.3 LNC and Bivalence are Assumed by Gödel’s and Tarski’s
Theorems
17.3.1 Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem
This use of LP as the underlying logic of RH also renders Gödel’s first incompleteness
theorem irrelevant. 309 Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem is:
First Incompleteness Theorem: "Any consistent formal system F
within which a certain amount of elementary arithmetic can be carried out
is incomplete; i.e., there are statements of the language of F which can
neither be proved nor disproved in F." 310
Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem has been called a "restatement of the Liar
paradox", 311 and of course the Liar Paradox is neither true nor false (or it is both).
This is problematic in classical logic, due t LNC and ECQ. In contrast, in LP , a third
truth-value is assigned to the Liar Paradox (and to all other paradoxes).
So one interpretation of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem is that it is merely a
tautology: that paradoxes exist, and that classical logic cannot cope with paradoxes
(due to the LNC and ECQ, and the lack of a third truth-value). In LP , Gödel’s
first incompleteness theorem can be interpreted as another tautology: that there exist
propositions that have a third truth-value (neither true nor false).
17.3.2 Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem
The use of LP as the underlying logic also provides a new interpretation of Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem. Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem is:
Second Incompleteness Theorem: "Assume F is a consistent formal-
ized system which contains elementary arithmetic. Then F 6` Cons(F )." 312
In Priest’s "Logic of Paradox" (LP ), Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem can be
interpreted as a tautology: the canonical consistency statement Cons(LP ) is not prov-
able in LP , because LP rejects the LNC, and tolerates inconsistency (i.e. statements
with the third truth-value).
309See Kripke [165], p.714: "The proof by Gödel and Tarski that a language cannot contain its own
semantics applied only to languages without truth gaps.)"
310Wikipedia [315], citing Raatikainen [236].
311See also Wikipedia [320] (citing Crossley et al. [69], pp. 52–53): "Roughly speaking, in proving
the first incompleteness theorem, Gödel used a modified version of the liar paradox".
312Wikipedia [315], citing Raatikainen [236].
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Moreover, if LP is indeed the foundational logic underlying the RH problem, does
applying the axioms of LP to solve the RH correspond to "adding new rules from
’outside’ of number theory in order to solve RH"? No, because the axioms of LP are
inherited into the axioms of the RH problem.
17.3.3 Tarski’s Undefinability Theorem
Tarski’s undefinability theorem states that arithmetical truth cannot be defined in arith-
metic, and more generally that truth in any sufficiently strong formal system cannot be
defined within the system. 313 But the theorem does not prevent truth in that system
from being defined in a stronger system. 314 The results of this paper, which state that
RH (a conjecture in number theory) is false in intutitionistic logic, but is a paradox that
triggers ECQ in classical logic, and a pararadox that does not cause ECQ in certain
3VLs, is entirely consistent with Tarski’s undefinability theorem. The truth-value of
the RH is defined by the logical context in which it resides.
As disclosed in Tarski’s The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages, 315 Tarski
uses the Liar paradox in the proof of his Undefinability Theorem, just like Gödel used
it in his first incompleteness theorem. The LNC is "Theorem 1" of Tarski’s theorem
(and the LNC is presented without proof). 316 Instead, it is described as "an almost
immediate consequence of [Definitions] 22 and 23." 317 318
Therefore, Tarski’s Undefinability Theorem is inapplicable in a logic without the
LNC, such as a 3VL with truth-value gaps. 319 McGee [186] states this, and goes
further:
Tarski’s analysis leaves open the prospect that we can develop a fully
satisfactory theory of truth for a substantial fragment of English; also the
prospect that we can develop a theory of truth for English as a whole which,
while not fully satisfying our intuitions, is none the less useful and illumi-
nating. Both prospects have been substantially advanced by Saul Kripke’s
313See Wikipedia, [332].
314See Wikipedia, [332]: "For example, the set of (codes for) formulas of first-order Peano arithmetic
that are true in N is definable by a formula in second order arithmetic. Similarly, the set of true
formulas of the standard model of second order arithmetic (or n-th order arithmetic for any n) can be
defined by a formula in first-order Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (both ZF and ZFC)."
315See Tarski, [273], p.158, 162.
316See Tarski, [273], p.197.
317See Tarski, [273], p.193 and 195, respectively.
318The fact that LNC is a theorem in Tarski’s model, rather than an axiom, is not particularly
important.
319See Kripke [165], p.714: "The proof by Gödel and Tarski that a language cannot contain its own
semantics applied only to languages without truth gaps.)"
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[165] Outline of a Theory of Truth, which exploits the idea that there are
truth-value gaps. 320 321
Tarski’s reliance on the LNC is reiterated in Some Observations on the Concepts of
ω-Consistency and ω-Completeness [274], where Tarski expressly constructs a symbol-
ical language which, "[i]n spite of its great simplicity ... suffices for the expression of
every idea which can be formulated in [Whitehead and Russell’s] Principia Mathemat-
ica." 322
Kremer [164] adds:
We had to wait until the work of Kripke [165] and of Martin & Woodruff
[184] for a systematic formal proposal of a semantics for languages with
their own truth predicates. The basic thought is simple: take the offending
sentences, such as [the liar paradox], to be neither true nor false. Kripke,
in particular, shows how to implement this thought for a wide variety of
languages, in effect employing a semantics with three values, true, false
and neither. 323 It is safe to say that Kripkean approaches have replaced
Tarskian pessimism as the new orthodoxy concerning languages with their
own truth predicates.
17.4 The Variety of Non-Classical Logics
Each non-classical logic is non-classical because it rejects at least one of the axioms of
classical logic. 324 325 For example, intuitionistic logics reject the Law of the Excluded
320See McGee [186], which cites Kripke [165]. Kripke’s [165], p.700 states: "One appropriate scheme
for handing connectives is Kleene’s strong three-valued logic". Footnote 18 on Kripke’s [165], p.700
cites Kleene’s [159] (1952 ed.) description of 3VL in pp.332-340. In the footnote, Kripke states:
"’Undefined’ is not an extra truth-value". So Kripke’s use of Kleene’s 3VL is similar to Frege’s "truth-
value gaps", and different from Priest’s use of Kleene’s 3VL for "truth-value gluts" in LP.
321See also Kripke [165], p.711: "So far we have assumed that truth gaps are to handled according
to the methods of Kleene. It is by no means necessary to do so. Just about any scheme for handling
truth-value gaps is usable, provided that the basic property of the monotonicity of φ is preserved; that
is, provided that extending the interpretation of T (x) never changes the truth-value of any sentence
of L, but at most gives truth-values to previously undefined cases."
322See Tarski [274], p.279 and footnote 3.
323Kremer’s footnote: "Kripke prefers to treat neither not as a third truth value but as the absence
of a truth value." [Author’s supplemental footnote: Note that this is Frege’s interpretation as well].
324See Wikipedia [309]: "Classical logic (or standard logic) is an intensively studied and widely used
class of formal logics. Each logical system in this class shares characteristic properties", citing Gabbay,
[105], Chapter 2.6.
325See Priest [230]. See also Sadegh-Zadeh [249], p.1030: "Consequently, a large number of such
non-classical logics have developed. ... Each of them effectively dismantles the classical logic in a
particular way."
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Middle (LEM), Double Negation (DN), and part of De Morgan’s laws. 326 327 328
Multi-valued logics reject bivalence, allowing for additional truth-values (not just
"true" and "false"). Examples of multi-valued logics include three-valued logics (3VL),
329 and infinitely-valued logics ("fuzzy logic") 330
Paraconsistent logics (e.g., relevance logic) reject the Principle of Explosion (ECQ).
331 Relevance logic, linear logic, and non-monotonic logic reject monotonicity of entail-
ment; 332 Non-reflexive logic (i.e. "Schrödinger logic") rejects or restricts the law of
identity. 333
The non-classical logics that reject the LEM include intuitionistic logics (e.g., as
formalized by Kleene), multi-valued logics (e.g., 3VL), and Frege’s Begriffsschrift (when
applied to "non-judgable content") 334. Higher-order logics that are based on these non-
classical logics also reject the LEM. 335 336 337
18 Paraconsistency and Dialetheism
18.1 Dialetheism Rejects the LNC (for Paradoxes)
Aristotle introduced the LNC as “the most certain of all principles" ("firmissimum
omnium principiorum", according to the Medieval theologians). 338 "The LNC has
been an (often unstated) assumption, felt to be so fundamental to rationality that
326See Wikipedia [309], citing Gabbay, [105], Chapter 2.6.
327See also Bezhanishvili et al. [27] p.4: "From [intuitionistic propositional calculus] IPC one obtains
a system equivalent to the classical propositional calculus (CPC) used in Principia by adding any of
the following axioms:
p ∨ ¬p (excluded middle);
¬¬¬p→ p (double negation elimination);
((p→ q)→ p)→ p (Peirce’s law)."
328See also Bezhanishvili et al. [27] p.4, fn. 3: "According to Mints [197], p. 701: “Russell anticipated
intuitionistic logic by clearly distinguishing propositional principles implying the law of the excluded
middle from remaining valid principles. In fact, he states what was later called Peirce’s law."
329Id. Initially developed by Jan Łukasiewicz. Another 3VL, with a slightly different truth table, was
developed by Kleene. See the Wikipedia entry on 3VL [333].
330Id. "Fuzzy logic" permits truth-values to be any Real number between 0 and 1.
331Id.
332Id.
333Id., citing da Costa et al. [72].
334See Lotter [176], §3a
335See Sakharov [250]: "The set of axiom schemata of first-order predicate calculus is comprised of
the axiom schemata of propositional calculus together with the two following axiom schemata".
336See also Andrews [6] p.201: "So far we have been concerned with first-order logic, and its subsystem
propositional calculus, which we might regard as zeroth-order logic."
337See also Kleene [158], p.74: "The predicate calculus includes the propositional calculus".
338See Priest et al. [234], citing Book Γ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1005b24).
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some claim it cannot be defended." 339
Yet "[f]rom the very dawn of Greek thought ... these principles [of LNC] have been
contested, first by some rhetoricians and sophists, later on by certain metaphysicists,
and recently even by several logicians and mathematicians." 340 Dialetheism is this view
that rejects the LNC, by holding that there exist propositions that are simultaneously
true and false (i.e. paradoxes / antinomies). 341
"As a challenge to the LNC, therefore, dialetheism assails what most philosophers
take to be unassailable common sense, calling into question the rules for what can
be called into question". 342 One of the first logicians to question the status of the
logical version of the LNC was Jan Łukasiewicz, father of the Polish school of logic. 343
In Łukasiewicz’s article On the Principle of Consistency in Aristotle [346] [349] [348],
"Łukasiewicz endorsed only the ethical version of the principle of non-contradiction".
344
Dialetheism argues that some propositions are true, some are false, and some are
paradoxes that have a third truth-value. Therefore, dialetheism does not reject the
LNC for all propositions. 345
18.2 Paraconsistent Logics Accept LNC But Reject ECQ
A paraconsistent logic rejects "explosion" (ECQ). 346 Paraconsistency must be dis-
tinguished from dialetheism. 347 "In the literature, especially in the part of it that
contains objections to paraconsistent logic, there has been some tendency to confuse
paraconsistency with dialetheism (the philosophy that contradictions exist)." 348
Paraconsistent logic (logic that rejects ECQ) does not entail dialetheism. "Para-
consistency is a property of a consequence relation, whereas dialetheism is a view about
339See Priest et al. [234], citing Lewis [174].
340See Perzawoski [215], p.22, para.5.
341See Priest et al. [234].
342See Priest et al. [234], citing Woods [344], Woods [345], and Dutilh-Novaes [86].
343See Perzawoski [215], p.23, para.7.
344See Perzawoski [215], p.23, para.7.
345But see Beziau [28]. His "trivial dialetheism" argument is based on the false assumption that
dialetheism rejects the LNC for all propositions, which would indeed reduce 3VL to a single valued
logic (i.e. a triviality equivalent to ECQ).
346See da Costa et al. [71], p.1: "It is natural then to put the question whether it is possible to
develop a logic in which contradictions can be mastered, in which there are inoffensive or, at least,
not dangerous contradictions. The creation of paraconsistent logic by the first author of the present
paper (da Costa), more than thirty years ago, brought an affirmative answer to this question. We shall
retrace here the history of this invention that has contributed to the subversion of the usual conception
of logic."
347But see Priest et al. [235], citing Asmus [15].
348Priest et al. [235]
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truth ... The fact that one can construct a model where a contradiction holds but not
every sentence of the language holds (or where this is the case at some world) does not
mean that the contradiction is true per se. " 349
The following quotes provide the rationale for paraconsistent logic: 350
Suppose I have proved that the Russell set is and is not a member of
itself. Why should it follow from this that there is a donkey braying loudly
in my bedroom? ...
The question of relevance (just what has a donkey to do with set theory?)
is one that has plagued classical logic for a long time, and is one that makes
classical logic a hard pill to swallow to first-time students of logic, who are
often told that ’this is the way it is’ in logic. Fortunately for those students,
paraconsistency provides an alternative.
Stanisław Jaśkowski (Łukasiewicz’s pupil) produced a paraconsistent logic which
"accommodates" paradoxes, and allows for their investigation, without "explosion"
(ECQ). 351 352 353 "Jaśkowski’s point of departure was a discourse, the situation of a
discussion. When one asks: Is it the case that A?, and does not know the answer, one
often considers both possibilities at once. Likewise, when defending A, one respects, at
least during a honest discussion, an opponent who claims not-A. Which logic applies
here?" 354
"Firstly, [Jaśkowski] created a discursive calculus D2, which fulfilled all the formal
criteria we tend to impose on interesting paraconsistent logics. Secondly, his construc-
tion in its deep structure enables us to consider inconsistencies [paradoxes] occurring
in a theory T as contingent statements in a related modal theory M(T) playing the
role of its metatheory. Thirdly, it often allows for the consistent examination of a given
349Priest et al. [235]
350 See McKubre-Jordens [188].
351See Jaśkowski [152], p.1: "Examples of convincing reasonings which nevertheless yield two contra-
dictory conclusions were the reason why others sometimes disagreed with the Stagirite’s [Aristotle’s]
firm stand. That was why Aristotle’s opinion was not in the least universally shared in antiquity. His
opponents included Heraclitus of Ephesus, Antisthenes the Cynic, and others (cf. Łukasiewicz [346]
[349] [348], p. 1). In the early l9th century Heraclitus’ idea was taken up by Hegel, who opposed
to classical logic a new logic, termed by him dialectics, in which co-existence of two contradictory
statements is possible."
352See also Perzanowski [216], p.1: "Any educated person knows, or at least should know, that
most cases of incoherences, impossibilities and — in a theoretical framework — paradoxes are rather
suspicious members of a domain", and also p.1, fn. 1: "With exceptions of Hegel, Hegelians, etc." See
also Perzanowski’s further unflattering comments regarding "Inconsistency believers" in [216], p.19.
353See also Perzanowski [215], p.23, para.8.
354See Perzawoski [215], p.23, para.10.
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inconsistency [paradox]. Sometimes even for the understanding of its mechanism and
sources" 355
According to paraconsistent logics (because they reject ECQ), theorems that assume
that Riemann’s ζ(s) is true (e.g. the RH) do not result in "trivial truth".
One notable subset of paraconsistent logics is that of relevance logics. In relevance
logics, "a conditional with a contradictory antecedent that does not share any proposi-
tional or predicate letters with the consequent cannot be true (or derivable)." 356
Therefore, according to relevance logics (because they assume the LNC), Riemann’s
ζ(s) violates the LNC and does not trigger ECQ for propositions that do not recite,
and are unrelated to, the Riemann ζ(s).
19 Intuitionistic Logics
19.1 Intuitionistic Logics Reject the LEM (in Regards to Proof)
Classical logics assume both the LEM and the LEC, os in these logics, exactly one of (P )
and (¬P ) can be true. 357 This use of LEM together with LNC enables the technique
of proving that (P ) is true, by instead proving that (¬P ) is false. This technique is
called "proof by contradiction". According to classical logic, which has the LEM as an
axiom, proof by contradiction is a valid form of proof.
However, in logics that reject LEM (e.g. intuitionistic logics and multi-valued logics),
proof by contradiction is not a valid form of proof. 358
Some non-classical logics reject the LEM, and thus also reject proof by contradiction.
The intuitionistic school of logic, founded by Brouwer, and formalized by Heyting, 359
360 is one of the non-classical schools of logic that reject the LEM in certain instances.
355See Perzanowski [215], p.24, para.13:
356See Wikipedia [330], citing Routley et al. [240] and Mares [182].
357See Plisko [221]; and Stanford [8].
358See Bauer [19], p.482, §1.2: "Proof by contradiction, or reductio ad absurdum in Latin, is the
reasoning principle:
If a proposition P is not false, then it is true.
In symbolic form it states that ¬¬P ⇒ P for all propositions P , and is equivalent to excluded middle."
(Note that ¬¬P ⇒ P in classical logic is Double Negation Elimination, which like the LEM is rejected
by intuitionist logic).
359See Haack, [120], pp.216-220, citing Brouwer [45] and Heyting [139]: "Because he regarded math-
ematics as essentially mental, and hence thought of mathematical and, a fortiori, logical formalism as
relatively unimportant, Brouwer didn’t give a formal system of the logical principles which are intu-
itionistically valid. However, intuitionistic logic was formailzed by Heyting, who gives these axioms
...", wherein axiom (10) is ECQ: ¬p→ (p→ q). Also, axiom (11) is ((p→ q)&(p→ ¬q)→ ¬p).
360So in intuitionistic logic, the problem of "vacuous subjects" and other similar paradoxes do not
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According to Moschovakis [199]:
Intuitionistic logic can be succinctly described as classical logic with-
out the Aristotelian law of excluded middle (LEM) (A ∨ ¬A) or the clas-
sical law of double negation elimination (¬¬A → A), but with the law
of contradiction (A → B) → ((A → ¬B) → ¬A) and ex falso quodlibet
(¬A→ (A→ B))
Kleene [159], p.120, *51, Remark 1 agrees, proving that "either of ¬¬A ⊃ A [Prin-
ciple of Double Negation] or A∨¬A [LEM] can be chosen as the one non-intuitionistic
postulate of the classical system." 361 362 363 (Kleene [159] also states that the LNC is
valid in intuitionistic logic). 364 365 366
However, the Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation of intuitionistic
logic does assume the LEM, in the following circumstance: (1) either a proof of propo-
sition (P ) exists, or (2) an impossibility proof exists for (P ). 367 According to Iemhoff
[146]:
The BHK-interpretation is not a formal definition because the notion of
construction is not defined and therefore open to different interpretations.
Nevertheless, already on this informal level one is forced to reject one of
the logical principles ever-present in classical logic: the principle of the
exist, because the propositions that create them are held to be false. In intuitionistic logic, RH is false,
because the zeros are proven to not exist.
361See Kleene [159], p.82, Postulate 8 of the "Postulates for the propositional calculus" and the
comment regarding "◦" on p.82, the discussion surrounding Postulate 8I on p.101, and Remark 1 on
p.120.
362See also Haack [120], p.218: "Heyting’s logic lacks some classical theorems; notably, neither ′p∨¬p′,
nor ′¬¬p → p′, are theorems. However, the double negation of all classical theorems are valid in
intuitionistic logic."
363But see also Bezhanishvili et al. [27] p.4: "From [intuitionistic propositional calculus] IPC one
obtains a system equivalent to the classical propositional calculus (CPC) used in Principia by adding
any of the following axioms:
p ∨ ¬p (excluded middle);
¬¬¬p→ p (double negation elimination);
((p→ q)→ p)→ p (Peirce’s law)."
364See Kleene [159], p.119, law *50. ` ¬(A ∧ ¬A), which is not marked with "◦". See also Kleene
[159], p., p.101, discussing that ECQ is valid in intuitionistic logics.
365See also Haack [120], p.218, axiom (10), which is ECQ: "¬p→ (p→ q)". Also, axiom (10) shows
that Heyting’s intuitionism has the LNC, because there is no ECQ without the LNC.
366But see Haack [120], p.218: "Heyting’s is not the only, although it is the best entrenched, system
of intuitionistic logic: in fact, Johansson’s logic [citing [154]], which lacks the tenth axiom [ECQ], has,
arguably, a better claim properly to represent the logical principles which are acceptable by intuitionist
standards."
367See the discussion of the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation in Iemhoff [146], §3.1.
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excluded middle (A ∨ ¬A). According to the BHK-interpretation[,] this
statement holds intuitionistically if the creating subject knows a proof of
A[,] or a proof that A cannot be proved. In the case that neither for A nor
for its negation a proof is known, the statement (A ∨ ¬A) does not hold.
Further according to Iemhoff [146]:
Indeed, there are propositions, such as the Riemann hypothesis, for
which there exists currently neither a proof of the statement nor of its
negation. Since knowing the negation of a statement in intuitionism means
that one can prove that the statement is not true, this implies that both A
and ¬A do not hold intuitionistically, at least not at this moment.
As for the relationship between the LEM and the Riemann hypothesis, the situation
is more interesting than as described in the quote above. Chapter 13.2 of this paper
discusses the relationship between the LEM and the Riemann hypothesis in greater
detail.
19.2 Minimal Logic Rejects Both LEM and ECQ
One variant of intuitionistic logic is minimal logic. Minimal logic rejects not only LEM,
but also ECQ (⊥ ` B). 368 369 (However, minimal logic does derive a special case
of ECQ (⊥ ` ¬B)). Adding ECQ to minimal logic results in intuitionistic logic, and
adding the Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM), Double Negation (DN), or Pierce’s
Law to intuitionistic logic results in classical logic. 370 371
368See Bezhanishvili et al. [27], pp.3-4: "An alternative tradition to the formalization of intuitionistic
logic, starting with Kolmogorov [162], leads to a weaker logical calculus, now known asminimal calculus
[Johansson, [154]]. The distinguishing feature of the minimal calculus is that the formula ¬p→ (p→ q),
corresponding to the principle ex falso quodlibet, is not a theorem. Though the historical debate over
the intuitionistic acceptability of ex falso quodlibet is interesting, here we focus only on Heyting’s
formalization of intuitionistic propositional logic as IPC."
369See also Bezhanishvili et al. [27], p.3, fn.2: "Kolmogorov’s [162] propositional calculus is in fact
equivalent to the implication-negation fragment of minimal calculus (see Plisko [222])."
370See Wikipedia [324], citing Johansson [154] and Troelstra et al. [286], p.37.
371See also Bezhanishvili et al. [27] p.4: "From [intuitionistic propositional calculus] IPC one obtains
a system equivalent to the classical propositional calculus (CPC) used in Principia by adding any of
the following axioms:
p ∨ ¬p (excluded middle);
¬¬¬p→ p (double negation elimination);
((p→ q)→ p)→ p (Peirce’s law)."
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20 The Derivation of Riemann’s Zeta Function is Not
Valid in Logics with LNC
20.1 As Predicted by LNC, the Derivation of Riemann’s Zeta
Contains Contradictions, and Thus is Invalid
Moreover, as predicted by the LNC’s holding that Riemann’s analytic continuation
of ζ(s) is false, the derivation of Riemann’s ζ(s) is invalid in logics with LNC. The
derivation uses Cauchy’s integral theorem, but contradicts the theorem’s prerequisites.
372
Riemann used Cauchy’s integral theorem to find the limit of the Hankel contour as
the Hankel contour approaches the branch cut of f(s) = log(−s) for s ∈ C.
But by definition, all of the points on the branch cut f(s) = log(−s) have no value
at non-negative Real values of s. Because they have no value, the function is also
non-holomorphic at these points on half-axis s ≥ 0. 373 374
Moreover, the Hankel contour is either open or closed. In both cases, the Hankel
contour violates prerequisites of Cauchy’s integral theorem. If it is open (at s = +∞),
then it violates the prerequisite of Cauchy’s integral theorem that there be two different
paths connecting two points (in other words, that the contour be closed). If, on the other
hand, it is closed (for example at at x =∞), 375 then it encircles the non-holomorphic
points of the branch cut, which contradicts another prerequisite of Cauchy’s integral
theorem (that all points within the contour be holomorphic).
Therefore, regardless of whether the Hankel contour is interpreted as open or closed,
372See Whittaker et al. [307], top of p.87: "If there are two paths z0AZ amd z0BZ from z0 to Z, and
if f(z) is a function of z analytic at all points on these curves and throughout the domain encircled by
these two paths, then
∫ Z
z0
f(z) dz has the same value of integration, whether the path of integration is
z0AZ or z0BZ."
373However, for s ∈ C, there exists a definition for the branch cut of f(s) = log(−s) that assigns
to it the values of f(s) = log(|s|) (and remains undefined at s = 0). This definition contradicts the
definition of logarithms of Real numbers. See Encyclopedia of Math [7]: "The single-valued branch of
this function defined by ln(z) = ln |z|+ i arg(z), where arg(z) is the principal value of the argument of
the complex number z, −pi < arg(z) ≤ pi, is called the principal value of the logarithmic function."
374See Whittaker et al. [307], p.244, which states that "by §5.2 corollary 1, the path of integration
may be deformed (without affecting the value of the integral) into the path of integration which starts
at ρ, proceeds along the Real axis to λ, describes a circle of radius λ counter-clockwise round the origin
and returns to ρ along the Real axis". The cited "§5.2 corollary 1" appears at the top of Whittaker
et al.’s p.87, and is the path equivalence corollary of Cauchy’s integral theorem, discussion of which
begins on Whittaker et al.’s p.85.
375See Whittaker et al. [307], p.245: "We shall write
∫ (0+)
∞ for
∫
C
, meaning thereby that the path
of integration starts at ’infinity’ on the Real axis, encircles the origin in the positive direction, and
returns to the starting point."
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it contradicts prerequisites of Cauchy’s integral theorem. 376 377 This is described in
greater detail in Chapter 20.
20.2 The Derivation of Riemann’s Zeta Function, Part 1
Riemann’s version of the Zeta function ζ(s), that he claims is an alternative "expression"
of the Dirichlet series ζ(s) that "remains valid for all s", is derived as follows. 378
First, Riemann begins with Euler’s factorial function (written here in Gauss’s no-
tation, as used in Edwards [90]): 379
∏
(s) =
∫ ∞
0
e−xxs dx (20.1)
The above equation is valid for s > −1. So, therefore for s > 0,
∏
(s− 1) =
∫ ∞
0
e−xxs−1 dx (20.2)
Substitution of nx for x in Euler’s integral expression for
∏
(s− 1) results in: : 380
∏
(s− 1) =
∫ ∞
0
e−nx(nx)s−1 dx (20.3)
Extracting the ns−1 term from the integral (because ns−1 is independent of x) results
in: ∏
(s− 1) = ns−1
∫ ∞
0
e−nxxs−1 dx (20.4)
Rearranging terms results in:∫ ∞
0
e−nxxs−1 dx =
∏
(s− 1)
ns−1
(20.5)
Only if we assume that ns ≈ ns−1 do we obtain the result used in Riemann’s paper: 381∫ ∞
0
e−nxxs−1 dx =
∏
(s− 1)
ns
(20.6)
wherein (s > 0, n = 1, 2, 3, . . .). This error in Riemann’s analytic continuation of the
376See Edwards [90], pp.10-11.
377See Whittaker et al. [307], pp.85-87, 244-45 and 266.
378See Riemann [241] pp.1-2; Edwards [90], pp.9-11; and Whittaker et al. [307], pp.265-266.
379See Edwards, [90], p.8, footnote, discussing Legendre’s notation.
380See Edwards, [90], p.9
381See Edwards, [90], p.9, and Riemann [241], p.1.
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Dirichlet series ζ(s) is minor compared to what is described next.
20.3 The Derivation of Riemann’s Zeta Function, Part 2
Next, Riemann takes the last equation of the preceding section, 382∫ ∞
0
e−nxxs−1 dx =
∏
(s− 1)
ns
(20.7)
On the left side of the equation, Riemann uses the equation 383
∑∞
n=1 r
−n = (r−1)−1 to
replace e−nx in the integral with 1/(ex−1). On the right side of the equation, Riemann
sums the term 1/ns, from n = 1 to ∞, thereby obtaining:∫ ∞
0
xs−1
ex − 1 dx =
∏
(s− 1) ·
∞∑
n=1
1
ns
(20.8)
By definition, ζ(s) =
∑
n−s, so the above equation can be rewritten as:∫ ∞
0
xs−1
ex − 1 dx =
∏
(s− 1) · ζ(s) (20.9)
Next, Riemann considers the following integral:∫ +∞
+∞
(−x)s
(ex − 1) ·
dx
x
(20.10)
Edwards [90] states: 384
The limits of integration are intended to indicate a path of integration
which begins at +∞ , moves to the left down the positive Real axis, circles
the origin once once in the positive (counterclockwise) direction, and returns
up the positive Real axis to +∞. The definition of (−x)s is (−x)s = exp[s ·
log(−x)], where the definition of log(−s) conforms to the usual definition
of log(z) for z not on the negative Real axis as the branch which is Real
for positive Real z; thus (−x)s is not defined on the positive Real axis and,
strictly speaking, the path of integration must be taken to be slightly above
the Real axis as it descends from +∞ to 0 and slightly below the Real axis
as it goes from 0 back to +∞.
382See Riemann [241], p.1.
383See Edwards [90], p.9, footnote, citing Abel and Chebyshev.
384See Edwards [90], p.10.
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This is the Hankel contour. 385 When written in three terms, with the first term
a slight distance above the Real axis as it descends from +∞ to δ, the middle term
representing the circle with radius δ around the origin, and the third term a slight
distance below the Real axis as it goes from δ back to +∞, it is: 386∫ δ
+∞
(−x)s
(ex − 1) ·
dx
x
+
∫
|z|=δ
(−x)s
(ex − 1) ·
dx
x
+
∫ +∞
δ
(−x)s
(ex − 1) ·
dx
x
(20.11)
In regards to the middle of these three terms (the circle), Edwards [90] states: 387
[T]he middle term is 2pii times the average value of (−x)s · (ex − 1)−1
on the circle |x| = δ [because on this circle i · dθ = (dx/x)]. Thus the
middle term approaches zero as δ → 0 provided s > 1 [because x(ex − 1)−1
is nonsingular near x = 0]. The other two terms can then be combined to
give[:]
∫ +∞
+∞
(−x)s
ex − 1 ·
dx
x
= lim
δ→0
[ ∫ δ
+∞
exp[s(log x− ipi)]
(ex − 1) ·
dx
x
+
∫ +∞
δ
exp[s(log x+ ipi)]
(ex − 1) ·
dx
x
]
(20.12)
resulting in ∫ +∞
+∞
(−x)s
ex − 1 ·
dx
x
= (eipis − e−ipis) ·
∫ ∞
0
xs−1 dx
ex − 1 (20.13)
Since (eipis − e−ipis) = 2i sin(pis), this can be rewritten as∫ +∞
+∞
(−x)s
ex − 1 ·
dx
x
= 2i sin(pis) ·
∫ ∞
0
xs−1 dx
ex − 1 (20.14)
Rearranging the terms results in:∫ ∞
0
xs−1 dx
ex − 1 =
1
2i sin(pis)
·
∫ +∞
+∞
(−x)s
ex − 1 ·
dx
x
(20.15)
The left sides of Equations 20.9 and 20.15 are identical, so Riemann equates the right
sides of Equations 20.9 and 20.15, resulting in Equation 20.16:∫ +∞
+∞
(−x)s
ex − 1 ·
dx
x
= 2i sin(pis) ·
∏
(s− 1) · ζ(s) (20.16)
385See Whittaker et al. [307], pp.244-45 and 266.
386See Edwards [90], p.10.
387See Edwards [90], p.10.
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Then, both sides of the equation are multiplied by
∏
(−s) · s/2piis, resulting in∏
(−s) · s
2piis
·
∫ +∞
+∞
(−x)s
ex − 1 ·
dx
x
=
∏
(−s) · s
2piis
· 2i sin(pis) ·
∏
(s− 1) · ζ(s) (20.17)
The s terms on the left side cancel out, as do the 2i terms on the right side, so∏
(−s)
2pii
·
∫ +∞
+∞
(−x)s
ex − 1 ·
dx
x
=
∏
(−s) ·∏(s− 1) · s
pis
· sin(pis) · ζ(s) (20.18)
Next, the identity 388
∏
(s) = s ·∏(s− 1) is substituted into Eq. 20.18, resulting in∏
(−s)
2pii
·
∫ +∞
+∞
(−x)s
ex − 1 ·
dx
x
=
∏
(−s) ·∏(s)
pis
· sin(pis) · ζ(s) (20.19)
Finally, the identity 389 sin(pis) = pis ·
[∏
(−s)∏(s)]−1 is substituted into the right
side of Eq. 20.19, resulting in
ζ(s) =
∏
(−s)
2pii
·
∫ +∞
+∞
(−x)s
ex − 1 ·
dx
x
(20.20)
This is the Riemann Zeta Function. 390
20.4 The Hankel Contour
In regards to Equation 20.11 above: 391∫ +∞
+∞
(−x)s
(ex − 1) ·
dx
x
=
∫ δ
+∞
(−x)s
(ex − 1) ·
dx
x
+
∫
|z|=δ
(−x)s
(ex − 1) ·
dx
x
+
∫ +∞
δ
(−x)s
(ex − 1) ·
dx
x
(20.21)
Edwards [90] states: 392
[T]hus (−x)s is not defined on the positive Real axis and, strictly speak-
ing, the path of integration must be taken to be slightly above the Real axis
388See Edwards, [90], p.8, Eq.5, citing "any book which deals with [the] factorial function or the
’Γ-function’, for example Edwards [89], pp.421-425."
389See Edwards [90], p.8, Eq. 6.
390See Edwards [90], pp.10-11. especially Eq.3.
391See Edwards [90], pp.10-11. See also Whittaker et al. [307], p.244.
392See Edwards [90], p.10.
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as it descends from +∞ to 0 and slightly below the Real axis as it goes from
0 back to +∞.
This is the Hankel contour. Riemann copied this solution directly from Hankel’s
derivation of the Gamma function Γ(s). 393 Riemann uses the Hankel contour in
Equation 20.16. But what is the basis for equating the branch cut of f(x) = log(−x)
to the limit of the Hankel Contour as the Hankel contour approaches the branch cut?
Remember that, by definition, all points on the branch cut have no defined value.
Equating the branch cut to the limit of the Hankel contour is a de facto assignment of
values to points that, by definition, have no value. Remember that in for x ∈ R, the
exponential function y = expx has no values of x which result in y being a non-positive
number.
Riemann [241] and Edwards [90] fail to provide any reason, much less a mathemat-
ically valid reason, for equating the "strictly speaking" interpretation of the "first
contour" on the left side of Eq. 20.21 (points that, by definition, have no value, and
thus are also non-holomorphic: points of the branch cut of f(x) = log(−x)), to the
"non-strictly speaking" interpretation of the "first contour" (the Hankel contour
that is "slightly above the Real axis as it descends from +∞ to 0 and slightly below
the Real axis as it goes from 0 back to +∞", on the right side of Eq. 20.21).
Unlike Riemann [241] and Edwards [90], Whittaker et al. [307] does provide a
reason: the path equivalence corollary of Cauchy’s integral theorem is given
as the basis for equating the Hankel contour to the branch cut. 394 However, this
basis is not mathematically valid. Both the Hankel contour and the branch cut
contradict the prerequisites of the Cauchy integral theorem, 395 and therefore also
contradict the prerequisites of its corollary. 396 These contradictions invalidate
the derivation of Riemann’s version of ζ(s) in logics with LNC.
393See Whittaker et al. [307], pp.244-245 and 266.
394See Whittaker et al. [307], p.244, which states that "by §5.2 corollary 1, the path of integration
may be deformed (without affecting the value of the integral) into the path of integration which starts
at ρ, proceeds along the Real axis to λ, describes a circle of radius λ counter-clockwise round the origin
and returns to ρ along the Real axis". The cited "§5.2 corollary 1" appears at the top of Whittaker
et al.’s p.87, and is the path equivalence corollary of Cauchy’s integral theorem, discussion of which
begins on Whittaker et al.’s p.85.
395See Whittaker et al. [307], p.85: "If f(z) is a function of z, analytic at all points ... inside a
contour C, then
∫
(C)
f(z) dz = 0.". The integrated function must be analytic (holomorphic) at all
points inside the contour of integration.
396See Whittaker et al. [307], top of p.87: "If there are two paths z0AZ amd z0BZ from z0 to Z, and
if f(z) is a function of z analytic at all points on these curves and throughout the domain encircled by
these two paths, then
∫ Z
z0
f(z) dz has the same value of integration, whether the path of integration is
z0AZ or z0BZ."
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20.5 Cauchy’s Integral Theorem and Its Path Equivalence Corol-
lary
20.5.1 Cauchy’s Integral Theorem
Cauchy’s integral theorem states that if function f(z) of complex variable z is holomor-
phic at all points on a simple closed curve ("contour") C, and if f(z) is holomorphic at
all points inside the contour, then the contour integral of f(z) is equal to zero: 397∫
(C)
f(z) · dz = 0 (20.22)
20.5.2 Path Equivalence Corollary
The path equivalence corollary of Cauchy’s integral theorem 398 states that:
(1) if there exist four points z0, Z, A, and B on the Cartesian plane representing
the complex domain, and the two points z0 and Z are connected by two distinct paths
z0AZ and z0BZ (one path going through A, the other path goin through B), and
(2) if function f(z) of complex variable z is holomorphic at all points on these two
distinct paths z0AZ and z0BZ, and f(z) is holomorphic at all points enclosed by these
two paths,
(3) then any line integral connecting the two points z0 and Z inside this region
(bounded by z0AZ and z0BZ) has the same value, regardless of whether the path of
integration is z0AZ, or z0BZ, or any other path disposed between z0AZ and z0BZ.
20.6 Prerequisites of Cauchy Integral Theorem are Contradicted
Riemann used Cauchy’s integral theorem to find the limit of the Hankel contour as
the Hankel contour approaches the branch cut of f(x) = log(−x) at x ∈ C. But by
definition, log(−x) has no value (and thus is non-holomorphic) on half-axis x ∈ R, x ≥
0. The Hankel contour is either open, or closed, at x = +∞ (the latter enclosing
non-holomorphic points). In both cases, the Hankel contour violates prerequisites of
Cauchy’s integral theorem.
If the Hankel contour is open, the Cauchy integral theorem (which only applies to
closed contours) cannot be used. In the alternative, if the Hankel contour is indeed
closed at +∞ on the branch cut, 399 then the Hankel contour still contradicts the
397See Whittaker et al. [307], p.85.
398See Whittaker et al. [307], p.87, Corollary 1.
399See Whittaker et al. [307], p.245: "We shall write
∫ (0+)
∞ for
∫
C
, meaning thereby that the path
of integration starts at ’infinity’ on the Real axis, encircles the origin in the positive direction, and
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requirements of the Cauchy integral theorem. This is because the closed Hankel contour
encloses the entire branch cut of f(z), and the branch cut consists entirely of non-
holomorphic points. Also, there would be a non-holomorphic point on the Hankel
contour itself, at the point where it intersects the branch cut at +∞ on the Real
axis. These reasons disqualify the use of the Cauchy integral theorem with the Hankel
contour.
For these reasons it is not valid to use the Cauchy integral theorem’s path equivalence
corollary to find the limit of the Hankel contour as the Hankel contour approaches the
branch cut of f(x) = log(−x) at x ∈ C. So the derivation of Riemann’s ζ(s) violates the
LNC. For the same reasons, Hankel’s derivation of the Gamma function Γ(s) violates
the LNC. 400
20.7 Strictly Speaking, the Points on the Hankel Contour Have
No Defined Value
Further in regards to the Hankel contour of Equation 20.11: 401∫ +∞
+∞
(−x)s
(ex − 1) ·
dx
x
=
∫ δ
+∞
(−x)s
(ex − 1) ·
dx
x
+
∫
|z|=δ
(−x)s
(ex − 1) ·
dx
x
+
∫ +∞
δ
(−x)s
(ex − 1) ·
dx
x
(20.23)
Edwards [90] states (emphasis added in bold font): 402
The limits of integration are intended to indicate a path of integration
which begins at +∞ , moves to the left down the positive Real axis, circles
the origin once once in the positive (counterclockwise) direction, and returns
up the positive Real axis to +∞. The definition of (−x)s is (−x)s = exp[s ·
log(−x)], where the definition of log(−x) conforms to the usual definition
of log(z) for z not on the negative Real axis as the branch which is Real for
positive Real z; thus (−x)s is not defined on the positive Real axis
and, strictly speaking, the path of integration must be taken to
returns to the starting point."
400See Whittaker et al. [307], pp.244-246, §12.22 "Hankel’s expression of Γ(z) as a contour integral",
citing Hankel [124], p.7.
401See also Whittaker et al. [307], p.266.
402See Edwards [90], p.10.
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be slightly above the Real axis as it descends from +∞ to 0 and
slightly below the Real axis as it goes from 0 back to +∞.
So as δ → 0 (provided s > 1), the middle (circular) term disappears, and the hankel
contour is represented by the two "linear" terms, as follows:∫ +∞
+∞
(−x)s
(ex − 1) ·
dx
x
=
∫ +0
∞
(−x)s
(ex − 1) ·
dx
x
+
∫ ∞
+0
(−x)s
(ex − 1) ·
dx
x
(20.24)
However, strictly speaking, the notation misleadingly indicates that both of the two
terms on the right side of the equation are located directly on the branch cut of log(−x)
(where by definition these two terms have no value).
Any assignment of a value to the right side of this equation (as written) contradicts
the definition of the logarithm f(x) = log(−x), which by definition has no value for all
non-negative Real values of x.
21 Multi-Valued Logics (Including Three-Valued Log-
ics)
21.1 Multi-Valued Logics Reject the LEM
Multi-valued logics reject the LEM, because they are not bivalent. They have at least
one truth-value in addition to the two bivalent truth-values ("true" and "false"). For
example, Frege’s Über Sinn und Bedeutung ("On Sense and Denotation") "claimed that
an utterance of a sentence containing a non-referring singular is neither true nor false."
403 More specifically, Frege states the following:
The sentence ‘Scylla has six heads’ is not true, but the sentence ‘Scylla
does not have six heads’ is not true either; for it to be true the proper name
‘Scylla’ would have to designate something. 404
Therefore, according to Frege’s logic, a proposition can have no truth-value, which
means that a proposition has three possible states: true, false, or neither. As Marques
[183] states (emphasis added): 405
403See Marques, [183] p.70, and Frege [99].
404See Marques, [183] p.71, citing Frege [100], p.127. "Scylla" refers to the creature from Greek
mythology.
405See Marques [183], p.71
84
This gives expression to two natural ideas: i) a sentence such as ‘Scylla
does not have six heads’ is the negation of ‘Scylla has six heads’; and ii)
‘Scylla has six heads’ is false if and only if its negation is true (that is, if
‘Scylla does not have six heads’ is true). When a sentence has no truth-
value, the result of embedding the sentence, for instance under the scope of
negation, also can have no truth-value.
See also Milne [195], who states: "Frege holds that any sentence containing a bear-
erless name in a direct/non-oblique context is neither true nor false." 406
Frege holds that any sentence containing a bearerless name in a direct/non-
oblique context is neither true nor false. ... He terms the thought expressed
by such a sentence ’fictitious’ and a ’mock thought’ (’Logic’, p.130); they
are such exactly and only in that they fail to be about actually existing
objects. In particular he says ’Scylla has six heads’ is not true, and ’Scylla
does not have six heads’ is not true. Lack of a bearer for a singular term
spreads lack of truth-value pervasively to logically complex sentences.
21.2 Priest’s Three-Valued Logic Rejects LNC and ECQ
One of the theorems in classical logics, and most non-classical logics (but not multi-
valued logics!) is the "Principle of Explosion". In Latin: Ex Contradictione (Sequitur)
Quodlibet (ECQ): "from contradiction, anything (follows)".
According to this theorem, the result of a contradiction (a violation of LNC) is that
any statement whatsoever can be proven. In other words, "a false proposition implies
any proposition". 407 So a single contradiction in a theorem results in an "explosion"
of false theorems that incorrectly assume the original contraction to be true.
21.3 Three-Valued Logics (3VLs) Bypass Aristote’s Three Laws
of Thought
Kleene describes Brouwer’s intuitionism as follows:
406See Milne [195], p.473, citing Frege’s "Logic". Milne’s [195] p.474 reproduces Smiley’s truth tables
for Frege’s three-valued logic (Citing Smiley [260], pp.125-35.). The "third value" in these truth
tables is an absence of any truth-value ("a truth-value gap"). Milne’s [195] p.474: "Beware! The bar
[symbol] is not a third truth-value, it signifies the absence of a truth-value. Where both A and B have
truth-values, the connectives behave classically."
407See Langer [171], p.284.
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In 1908, Brouwer, in a paper entitled ’The untrustworthiness of the
principles of logic’, challenged the belief that the rules of the classical logic,
which have come down to us essentially from Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) have
an absolute validity, independent of the subject matter to which they are
applied. 408
Brouwer’s intuitionism is skeptical of Aristotelian logic, for reasons similar to those
of Timon of Phlius, the Pyrrhonist philosopher. 409 However, it must be said that
Aristotle himself "expressed reservations about bivalence", 410 a core assumption of
Aristotelian logic. 411
Regarding three-valued logics (3VLs), which adopt trivalence instead of bivalence,
they satisfy both Aristotle’s and Brouwer’s rationales for a third truth-value. Regarding
Priest’s three-valued logic ("LP"), it satisfies yet another reason for a third truth-value:
the need to work with paradoxes such as the liar paradox. LP , like all 3VLs, rejects the
LEM, but it is unique in also rejecting the LNC and the LOI. This completely rejects
Aristote’s three laws of thought, satisfying Brouwer’s above-cited argument. 412
Also, this rejection of LNC and LEM exposes a fundamental flaw in the axiomatic
method advocated by Aristotle, according to which, "all deduction had to start, like
408See Kleene [159], p. 46.
409Therefore Heyting’s formalist version of intuitionism might be a misinterpretation of Brouwer’s
core argument.
410See Haack [120], p.204, citing Aristotle’s [13] De interpretatione §9, in Organon, which includes
the famous statement: "A sea-fight must either take place to-morrow or not, but it is not necessary
that it should take place to-morrow, neither is it necessary that it should not take place, yet it is
necessary that it either should or should not take place to-morrow." The propositions about the future
("it will take place tomorrow" and "it will not take place tomorrow") are best understood according
to probability theory (or 3VL, or fuzzy logic), not according to bivalent logic, which cannot assign
truth-values to these two propositions. Aristotle correctly states: "One may indeed be more likely to
be true than the other, but it cannot be either actually true or actually false."
411See also Pelletier [212], and Pelletier et al. [213]
412Note also that Heyting’s intuitionism, which completely (and mechanistically) removes the LEM
and Double Negation from classical logic, is not really an accurate representation of Brouwer’s above-
cited argument for opposing the LEM in regards to the truth-value of propositions that have not been
proven or disproven.
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Euclid, from general principles regarded as self-evident." 413 414 415 416 Rejection of
LNC and LEM validates the argument presented by Timon of Phlius, the Pyrrhonist
philosopher, that there are no "self-evident" general principles.
Haack [120] provides another famous example of axioms that were not "self-evident"
after further consideration:
Frege confidently supposed that the principles of his logical system were
self-evident, until Russell showed that they were inconsistent! 417
Frege’s response to the discovery of [Russell’s Paradox] was to concede
that he’d never really thought that the relevant axiom was quite as self-
evident as the others - a comment which may well induce a healthy skepti-
cism about the concept of self-evidence. 418
Which leads to the question: What does it mean to claim that some proposition is
self-evident? According to Haack [120] (who agrees with Timon of Phlius):
Presumably, something to the effect that it is obviously true. But once it
has been put like this, the difficulty with the concept of self-evidence cannot
be disguised. The fact that a proposition is obvious is, sadly, no guarantee
that it’s true. (It is pertinent that different people, and different ages, find
different and even incompatible propositions - that some men are naturally
slaves, that all men are equal... - ’obvious’.) 419
413See Russell [247], p.234.
414See also Mendell [189], §2: "Aristotle’s discussions on the best format for a deductive science in
the Posterior Analytics reflect the practice of contemporary mathematics as taught and practiced in
Plato’s Academy, discussions there about the nature of mathematical sciences, and Aristotle’s own
discoveries in logic. Aristotle has two separate concerns. One evolves from his argument that there
must be first, unprovable principles for any science, in order to avoid both circularity and infinite
regresses."
415See also Mendell [189], §2: "Aristotle distinguishes (Posterior Analytics i.2) Two sorts of starting
points for demonstration, axioms and posits. An axiom (axiôma) is a statement worthy of accep-
tance and is needed prior to learning anything. Aristotle’s list here includes the most general principles
such as non-contradiction and excluded middle, and principles more specific to mathematicals, e.g.,
when equals taken from equals the remainders are equal."
416See also Lemmon [173], pp.173-174: "The main burden of traditional logic is to distinguish, of
the 256 possible patterns, which are valid and which are invalid. Two quite separate approaches are
used, which yield the same result ... The second method, which is Aristotle’s own, is to accept as valid
certain ’self-evident’ patterns in the first figure and then, using principles as (1)-(9), to deduce the valid
patters of the remaining figures. This method is traditionally known as reduction to the first figure,
and is said to take two forms, direct and indirect reduction. Roughly speaking, in indirect reduction
the valid pattern is deduced by [Reductio ad absurdum] RAA ..."
417See Haack [120], p.153.
418See Haack [120], p.10.
419See Haack [120], pp.235-236.
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In addition, in regards to the specific example of "self-evident" axioms of Frege’s logi-
cisim:
Whether one says that Frege’s inconsistent axioms only seemed self-
evident, but couldn’t really have been, or that they were self-evident but
unfortunately weren’t true, self-evidence must fail to supply an epistemo-
logical guarantee; because either (on the latter assumption) a proposition
may be self-evident but false, or else (on the former assumption) though if
a proposition is self-evident then it is, indeed, true, one has no certain way
to tell when a proposition is really self-evident. 420
21.4 In 3VLs, Material Implication from Paradoxes Does Not
Result in ECQ
In contrast to classical logic, the three-valued logics (3VLs) created by Łukasiewicz, 421
Bochvar, 422 Kleene, 423 and Frege (in his Über Sinn und Bedeutung), 424 all reject LEM,
as does intuitionism (in a more limited manner), 425 thereby allowing propositions (e.g.
the RH) to be "neither true nor false". 426
Further in contrast, Priest’s "Logic of Paradox" (LP ) expressly rejects LNC by
allowing for paradoxes, thereby allowing propositions (e.g. the RH) to be both true and
false. 427 Moreover, it is proven that in Frege’s logic that the state of "neither true nor
420See Haack [120], p.236.
421See Łukasiewicz [347], which presents the first 3VL, that was "later on criticized by Suszko [270]"
but "later used by Asenjo, da Costa and D’Ottaviano and Priest, to develop paraconsistent systems
of logic." (See Béziau [29], p.25, last para.). A predecessor of paraconsistent and multi-valued logics
was Vasiliev. See da Costa et al. [71] and Bazhanov [20].
422See Bochvar [32], and see also Urquhart [293], pp.252-253, §1.6: "The work of the Russian logician
Bochvar [32] represents a new philosophical motivation for many-valued logic; its use as a means of
avoiding the logical paradoxes. His system introduces the intermediate value I in addition to the
classical values T and F. His idea is to avoid logical paradoxes such as Russell’s and Grelling’s by
declaring the crucial sentences involving them to be meaningless (having the value I )."
423See Kleene, [95].
424See Frege, [99]. It has a truth-value gap instead of a third truth-value.
425Specifically, in regards to proof and absence of proof.
426But see Woleński [343], §3.3, which states that 3VL rejects the LNC (emphasis added): "Sentences
about future contingent states of affairs are natural candidates for having the third value (1/2). For
example, the sentence “I will visit Warszawa next year”, is neither true nor false, it is merely possible
and has the value 1/2. Its negation has the same value. This idea led to three-valued logic ... This
means that the laws of contradiction and excluded middle do not hold in three-valued logic."
427See Priest [231]. These four possibilities (true, false, both, neither) form the "catuskoti" (or
"tetralemma") of early Buddhist logic, which rejects the LNC.
88
false" implies the state of "both true and false", and vice versa. 428 429
Also, according to the truth tables of Łukasiewicz, Kleene’s and Priest’s 3VLs, when
p has the 3rd truth-value, the material implication "if p, then q" is not always true. This
is a rejection of ECQ, because certain contradictions (those with the 3rd truth-value)
do not imply "trivial truth" for all other propositions.
21.5 Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems and Tarski’s Undefin-
ability Theorem Assume Bivalence and LNC, and Thus
are Irrelevant in 3VL
Further regarding Łukasiewicz’s 3VL, due to the third truth-value, both the LEM and
the LNC fail. 430 Priest’s LP goes further, by expressly defining the third truth-
value as "both true and false". So Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem and Tarski’s
undefinability theorem (both of which assume bivalence, and the LNC) are rendered
irrelevant in 3VL. Due to the absence of LNC, inconsistency is permitted in 3VL, and
due to the absence of ECQ, inconsistency does not lead to triviality. It is the axiom
LNC in classical logic (the foundational logic of math) that forces mathematics to be
either consistent or trivial.
21.6 Three Logical Frameworks for Dealing With Paradoxes
According to Perzanowski [216], there are "at least" three logical responses to inconsis-
tencies: 431 432
(1) Inconsistency "enemies": This is the approach of logics (e.g. classical and
intuitionistic logics) that accept both LNC and ECQ. Contradictions are not permitted
428See Milne’s [195], p.475 (citing Heidelberger [135]): "Putting that all together we get,
It’s not true that P and it’s not false that P only if it’s both true that P and false
that P .
In short, everywhere we think there’s a truth-value gap, there’s also a‘glut’ ! (And vice versa!)".
429See also Priest [231], p.27, which recites an explanation different from Heidelberger’s [135]: "No-
tably, assuming De Morgan’s laws, ... ¬(A ∨ ¬A) is equivalent to ... A ∧ ¬A".
430See Haack [122], p.5.
431See Perzanowski [216], p.11, para.19. Note that the fourth combination (rejecting LNC but ac-
cepting ECQ) is not possible, because a violation of LNC is a prerequisite for ECQ.
432Superficially, Perzanowski’s three responses to inconsistencies appear to be related to Lakatos’s
[168] three methods ("monster-barring", "monster-adjustment", and exception handling) to respond
to counter-examples to mathematical theorems. However, Lakatos’s three methods are relevant only
when the LNC is accepted as an axiom, and therefore do not map to Perzanowski’s three responses
to inconsistencies. But note that Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (both ZF and ZFC) has the LNC as an
axiom, and is both a "monster-barring" and an inconsistency "enemy" foundation for set theory.
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to exist. The existence of a contradiction is a sign of logical "disease" (according to
Tarski), so a single inconsistency trivializes everything. Therefore, every inconsistency
must be discovered and quarantined.
In regards to the RH, both RH and its negation ¬RH are paradoxes, and have either
a truth-value glut, or a truth-value gap. These results are impermissible in classical
logic, due to the LNC and LEM. So in classical logic, all theorems that assume that
RH is true are invalid ("trivially true" due to ECQ) and unsound (due to the false
assumption that AC of ζ(s) is true).
(2) Paradox "believers": This is the approach of logics (e.g. 3VL) that hold that
paradoxes exist, and must be accounted for. Therefore, these logics assign the third
truth-value to paradoxes, thereby bypassing both LNC and ECQ. 433
Therefore, in such logics, the fact that RH and its negation ¬RH are paradoxes is
not a catastrophe. In the case of 3VL, RH and its negation ¬RH are given the third
truth-value. The truth tables of three-valued logic are applied accordingly.
(3) Inconsistency "investigators": This is the approach of paraconsistent logics
that do not accept paradoxes, but do not want to trivialize the entire system due to the
discovery of a paradox. These logics accept LNC but reject ECQ. They believe that
“[i]n formal logic, a contradiction is the signal of a defeat; but in the evolution of real
knowledge it marks the first step in progress towards victory." 434
Therefore, in such logics. the fact that RH and its negation ¬RH are paradoxes is
not fatal (does not necessarily cause ECQ). In the case of relevance logic, for example,
RH and ¬RH only cause ECQ for propositions that are directly relevant to the RH and
¬RH. The truth tables of relevance logic are applied accordingly.
21.6.1 In Classical Logic, RH Violates the LNC and Triggers ECQ
In classical logic, because ζ(s) has no zeros, by material implication both RH ("all
zeros are on the critical line") and ¬RH ("not all zeros are on the critical line") are
"vacuously true". RH can be rephrased as "for all s, if ζ(s) = 0, then Re(s) = 0.5",
and ¬RH can rephrased as "not for all s, if ζ(s) = 0, then Re(s) = 0.5". Both are true,
because according to material implication in classical logic, a false proposition (in this
case, ζ(s) = 0) implies anything.
433See Perzanowski [216], p.11, par.19, footnote 8: "The position has rather a long tradition, start-
ing with the Sophists, Nicolas of Cusa, Hegel and Hegelians of several types (including the dialectic
philosophers). In our time the position is defended by several Australian philosophers, including the
late Richard Routley (later Sylvan), Chris Mortensen, and, under the name of dialethism, by Graham
Priest."
434See Whitehead [305], Ch.11, p.187.
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Also, RH and ¬RH are both false by conjunction, when for example, ¬RH is
rephrased as "there exists ζ(s) = 0 and Re(s) 6= 0.5", and RH is rephrased as "not
(there exists ζ(s) = 0 and Re(s) 6= 0.5)". However, the negations of these last two
propositions are true. Therefore, both RH and ¬RH are true, so RH is a semantic
paradox, and therefore is also a contradiction. 435 436 437
In classical logic, any conjecture that assumes the truth of a contradiction (such as
the RH ) is, due to LNC and ECQ, "trivially true".
21.6.2 In 3VL, There is Neither LNC Nor ECQ
Three-value logics (3VL) avoid some of the paradoxes of classical logic, such as the
paradoxes of implication. They do so by adding a third truth-value. As stated in
Haack [120]: "The proponent of a 3-valued logic ... seems to claim that there are valid
arguments/logical truths of classical logic[,] the informal analogues of which aren’t
valid/logically true, so that classical logic is actually incorrect", 438 and "This explains
in a more precise way the idea 439 ... that deviant logics pose a more serious challenge
than extended logics to classical logic."
In regards to the laws of classical logic, Haack is correct. All of 3VLs discussed
in this paper (Frege’s, Łukasiewicz’s, Post’s, Bochvar’s, Kleene’s, and Priest’s version
thereof) bypass the LEM of classical logic. 440 Priest’s and Bochvar’s 3VLs go further
and assign the 3rd truth-value to paradoxes, thereby rejecting the LNC. Haack argues
that also the other 3VLs (Łukasiewicz’s, Post’s, and Kleene’s non-Priest version) reject
the LNC. 441
However, when comparing the truth tables of different 3VLs (Frege’s, Łukasiewicz’s,
Post’s, Bochvar’s, Kleene’s, and Priest’s LP ) to those of classical logic, Haack is incor-
rect. The truth tables of classical logic are included, in their entirety, within the truth
tables of all of these 3VLs. The 3VLs "extend" the truth tables of classical logic to a
third truth-value. So Haack’s classification of "deviant logics" and "extended logics"
435See Haack [120], pp.137-138: "it is possible to classify the paradoxes in two distinct groups, those
which essentially involve set-theoretical concepts, such as ’∈’ and ’ordinal number’, and those which
essentially involve semantic concepts, such as ’false’, ’false of ...’, and ’definable’."
436See also Bolander [34], which adds a third group of paradoxes: "Epistemic paradoxes". These
are similar to semantic paradoxes, except that "the central concept involved is knowledge rather than
truth".
437In contrast, see See Haack [120], p.138: "Russell himself, however, didn’t think of the paradoxes
as falling into two distinct groups, because he thought that they all as the result of one fallacy, from
violations of the ’vicious circle principle’." (Emphasis in the original).
438See Haack [120], p.222
439Citing Haack [120], ch.9 §3.
440See, e.g., Haack [122], pp.4-7, and Hazen et al. [132], and Hazen et al. [131].
441See, e.g., Haack [122], pp.4-7.
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is misleading, because the truth tables of the so-called "deviant logics" are "extended"
versions of classical logic’s truth tables, and do not contradict any value in classical
logic’s truth tables.
In Frege’s 3VL, the third truth-value is "neither true nor false". But it is proven
in Frege’s logic that neither implies both, and vice versa. 442 443 444 According to the
truth tables of Kleene’s, Łukasiewicz’s, and Priest’s 3VLs, the proposition "if RH, then
p" is true by material implication, if p is true. This is consistent with ECQ, because
RH has the third truth-value. However, in these same 3VLs, the proposition "if RH,
then p" is false by material implication, if p is false. This is inconsistent with ECQ,
because according to ECQ, the result should be trivial truth.
In regards to the proposition "if RH, then p", there is a difference of opinion between
Łukasiewicz and Kleene/Priest regarding the value of material implication when p has
the third truth-value "neither/both". In Łukasiewicz’s 3VL, the proposition "if RH,
then p" is true when p has the third truth-value "neither/both". In Kleene/Priest,
the proposition has the third truth-value when p has the third truth-value. 445 446 447
Both interpretations are servicable for reasoning purposes since these rules at least have
the property that they will do not lead us from an assumption having a truth-value
of "true", or a truth-value glut (that includes the truth-value of "true") ... to a false
conclusion. 448 In other words, both Łukasiewicz’s and Kleene/Priest’s 3VL material
implication provide "truth preservation".
Priest’s "Logic of Paradox" (LP ) is Kleene’s 3VL, and therefore assigns the third
truth-value (both true and false) to paradoxes. In LP , the material implication "if RH,
442See Milne’s [195] p.475 (citing Heidelberger [135]): "In short, everywhere we think there’s a truth-
value gap, there’s also a‘glut’ ! (And vice versa !)".
443See also Priest [231], p.27, which recites an explanation for this phenomenon that is different from
Heidelberger’s [135]: "Notably, assuming De Morgan’s laws, ... ¬(A∨¬A) is equivalent to ... A∧¬A".
444See also Bolander [34], §3.2.2 "Extensions and Alternatives to Kripke’s Theory of Truth", which
states (emphasis in the original): "The choice is between truth-value gaps and truth-value gluts: A
truth-value gap is a statement with no truth-value, neither true or false (like undefined in Kleene’s
strong three-valued logic), and a truth-value glut is a statement with several truth-values, e.g. both
true and false (like in the paraconsistent logic LP). There are also arguments in favour of allowing
both gaps and gluts, e.g. by letting the set of truth-values form of a bilattice [citing Fitting [96] and
Odintsov et al. [204]]. The simplest non-trivial bilattice has exactly four values, which in the context
of truth-values are interpreted as: true, false, ⊥ (neither true nor false), and > (both true and false).
For a more extensive discussion of Kripke’s theory, its successors and rivals, see the entry on the liar
paradox [citing Beall et al. [21]]."
445See Kleene [159], p.335.
446See also Haack [120], pp.206-208.
447See Wikipedia [333]: "The Łukasiewicz Ł3 has the same tables for AND, OR, and NOT as the
Kleene logic given above, but differs in its definition of implication in that "unknown implies unknown"
is true. This section follows the presentation from [Malinowski [179]]."
448Paraphrasing the reasoning for accepting material implication in classical logic. See Lemmon [173],
p.60, citing Chapter 2, §4, pp.75-82.
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then p" has the third truth-value (the same truth-value as p).
But Priest’s version of Kleene’s three-valued logic (3VL) (which Priest calls "Logic
of Paradox" LP ), paradoxes such as the RH are assigned the third-truth-value (both
true and false). 449 According to LP ’s material implication, the truth-value of material
implication "if RH, then p" is the same as the truth-value of p.
So in classical logic, a paradox (e.g. RH) implies ECQ, and thus implies trivial
truth. But in LP , a paradox does not imply ECQ. Instead, a paradox can imply non-
trivial truth, falsity, or the third truth-value. Also, both Gödel’s second incompleteness
theorem and Tarski’s undefinability theorem are irrelevant in LP , because LP rejects
the LNC, but both of these theorems assume the LNC.
21.6.3 In Intuitionistic Logic, RH is False
Kleene states the following in regards to intuitionistic logic:
An existence statement there exists a natural number n having the prop-
erty P , or briefly there exists an n such that P (n), has its intuitionistic
meaning as a partial communication (or abstract) of a statement giving a
particular example of a natural number n which has the property P , or at
least giving a method by which in principle one could find such an example.
450
So, for example, prior to Wiles’s proof of Fermat’s last theorem ("FLT"), Intuition-
ists would reject any non-constructive existence proof (which is acceptable in classical
logic), such as: "If FLT is true, then the number 5013 has the property P (n), and if
FLT is false, then the number 10 has the property P (n)." 451
Kleene’s implementation of intuitionistic logic is based on that of Hilbert and Ack-
erman, Hilbert and Bernays, Gentzen, etc., 452 and is identical to classical logic, but
without both the Principle of Double Negation and the LEM. 453 However, Kleene’s
449But Haack [120], p. 211, and ch.8, §2, argues that "this kind of approach to the paradoxes is apt to
from the frying pan - the Liar paradox - to the fire - the Strengthened Liar (’this sentence is either false
or paradoxical’, true if false or paradoxical, false or paradoxical if true)." The counter-argument to
Haack is Priest’s concept of a "truth-value glut". If we assume the existence of a third-truth-value, and
therby bypass LEM and LNC, then both Haack’s argument and also Priest’s can be true. Otherwise
we have yet another paradox.
450See Kleene [159], p. 49.
451See e.g., Kleene [159], p. 50.
452See Kleene [159], pp. 69.
453See Kleene [159], p.120, *51, Remark 1 states that "either of ¬¬A ⊃ A [Principle of Double
Negation] or A ∨ ¬A [LEM] can be chosen as the one non-intuitionistic postulate of the classical
system."
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implementation of intuitionistic logic, which eliminates the LEM completely,is wrong.
Intuitionists do accept the LEM, but only if there is a constructive existence proof, or
disproof. Therefore, a more accurate implementation of intuitionistic logic is Kleene’s
3VL. Kleene states the following regarding his own 3VL:
We further conclude from the introductory discussion that, for the defi-
nitions of partial recursive operations, t, f, u must be susceptible of another
meaning besides (i) ’true’, ’false’, ’undefined’, namely (ii) ’true’, ’false’, ’un-
known (or value immaterial)’. Here ’unknown’ is a category into which we
can regard any proposition as falling, whose value we either do not know or
choose for the moment to disregard; and it does not then exclude the other
two possibilities ’true’ and ’false’." 454
In other words, this interpretation of 3VL implements what the intuitionists argued:
that in the absence of a constructive proof or disproof, a proposition has an ’unknown’
truth-value. The LEM becomes relevant after a classical truth-value is obtained, there-
fore of a constructive proof (or disproof).
22 The 3rd Truth-Value, Truth-Value Gluts, and Truth-
Value Gaps
22.1 Truth-Value Glut: RH is Both True and False
22.1.1 Classical Logic: Russell’s "On Denoting"
Russell’s On Denoting [244] (which like axiomatic set theory, has the LEM as an axiom)
holds that a proposition with a vacuous subject (e.g. the Riemann hypothesis) is
ambiguous, because it can be interpreted in two ways. Therefore, depending on how
such a statement (e.g. the RH) is interpreted, it can be either true or false. (In its
ambiguous state, it has both meanings).
In contrast, the negation ("the present King of France is not bald") can be inter-
preted as the conjunction of the following three propositions: 455
i. There is at least one King of France. ∃x(Kx)
ii. There is at most one King of France. (x)(y)(Kx ∧Ky → x = y)
iii. Whatever is King of France is not bald. (x)(Kx→ ¬Bx)
454See Kleene [159], p.335.
455See Batty [18], "1. Russell Recap".
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When these three propositions are conjoined, we get: "There is one and only one
present King of France and he is not bald." In standard logical notation, this first
sentence is: 456
∃x
(
Kx ∧ (∀y)
(
(Ky → x = y
)
∧ ¬Bx
)
This sentence is false, because it quantifies over a non-existent entity. ("There is one
and only one present King of France" is false).
A second interpretation of the sentence is: "It is not the case that that there exists
a present King of France and he is bald". The second interpretation is true, because
it is indeed not the case that that there exists a present King of France. In standard
logical notation, this second sentence is: 457
¬∃x
(
Kx ∧ (∀y)
(
(Ky → x = y
)
∧Bx
)
If the RH is interpreted according to Russell’s first interpretation, as "there exist
zeros of ζ(s) and they are not located off of the critical line Re(s) = 0.5", then the RH
is false, because it quantifies over non-existent entities (the non-existent zeros of ζ(s)).
However, if the RH is interpreted according to Russell’s second interpretation, as
"it is not the case that there exist zeros of ζ(s) and they are located off of the critical
line Re(s) = 0.5", then it is true, because indeed it is not the case that there exist zeros
of ζ(s). (Note: Both axiomatic set theory and Russell’s On Denoting assume that the
LEM is true).
Moreover, if we apply Russell’s first interpretation to the RH, and to its negation
¬RH ("not all zeros of ζ(s) are on the critical line Re(s) = 0.5"), then paradoxically
both are false.
22.2 Truth-Value Gap: RH is Neither True Nor False
In the alternative, some logics that reject the LEM hold the Riemann hypothesis to
be neither true nor false, because in these logics, some propositions are not assigned a
(classical) truth-value.
In those systems that embrace truth-value gaps (Strawson, Frege) or non-classically-
valued systems (Łukasiewicz, Bochvar, Kleene), some sentences or statements are not
assigned a (classical) truth-value. However, in the specific case of Strawson’s On Re-
ferring, its reasoning is inapplicable to the Riemann hypothesis, for reasons that will
be discussed later in this paper.
456See Russell [244], p.490, and Jacquette [150], pp.5-6.
457See Russell [244], p.490, and Jacquette [150], pp.5-6.
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22.2.1 Intuitionistic Logic
Brouwer presented his theory of intuitionism, a philosophy of the foundations of math-
ematics, in Intuitionism and Formalism (1913). 458 As Davis [74] explains:
For Brouwer, some propositions can neither be said to be true or to be
false; these are propositions for which no method is currently known by
means of which this can be decided one way or the other. Hilbert’s original
proof of Gordon’s conjecture used the law of the excluded middle in the way
mathematicians usually do: he showed that denying the conjecture would
lead to a contradiction. To Brouwer such a proof was unacceptable. 459
This summary is repeated by Iemhoff [146]:
According to the BHK-interpretation[,] this statement [LEM] holds in-
tuitionistically if the creating subject knows a proof of A[,] or a proof that
A cannot be proved. In the case that neither for A nor for its negation a
proof is known, the statement (A ∨ ¬A) does not hold.
Brouwer did not object to the LNC, and thus the LNC is included in intuitionistic
logic. The LNC, in combination with the proof that the Dirichlet series ζ(s) is divergent
in the half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 means that ζ(s) has no zeros. In light of these facts,
according to intuitionism, the LEM does hold for both of the propositions "ζ(s) has
zeros" and "ζ(s) has no zeros".
However, because ζ(s) has no zeros, the RH is directed to "vacuous subjects".
Therefore, no proof is possible for either RH or for its negation ¬RH. So according to
intuitionism, the LEM does not hold for either the RH or for its negation ¬RH. And
therefore, according to intuitionism, the RH has no truth-value. (It is a "truth-value
gap").
The RH being a paradox provides a stronger argument than Brouwer’s against the
LEM: the LEM cannot be used to hold that theorems are either true or false, because
some theorems are paradoxes (and thus require a 3rd truth -value).
22.2.2 Russell’s Argument
Russell’s On Denoting (1905) preceded L.E.J. Brouwer’s intuitionism by a few years,
and presents ideas that are shared with intuitionism in regards to "vacuous subjects":
458See Brouwer [44].
459See Davis [74], p.95.
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(1) requiring a proof of existence in order to use LEM, and (2) in the absence of proof of
existence, abandoning the LEM and assigning a "truth-value gap" to the proposition.
According to Russell’s "Theory of Descriptions", a proposition with a vacuous sub-
ject "’C has the property φ’ is false for all values of φ". 460 So, according to Russell,
"the present King of France is bald" is "certainly false", and "the present King of France
is not bald" is also false if it means "There is an entity which is now King of France
and is not bald", but true if it means "It is false that there is now an entity which is
now King of France and is not bald". 461
However, it is important to note that according to Venn’s "Modern" Square of
Opposition, these results of Russell’s "Theory of Descriptions" creates a paradox (which
violates the LNC, one of the theorems in Whitehead and Russell’s classical logic).
According to Venn’s "Modern" Square of Opposition, if both "the present King of
France is bald" is false, and "the present King of France is not bald" is also false, then
both of the propositions "all Kings of France are bald" and "all Kings of France are
not bald" are true. 462
In addition, Russell unknowingly also presents an alternative argument in favor of
abandoning the LEM, but in which a proposition with a vacuous subject (e.g. "the
present King of France is bald") is assigned a third truth-value (a "truth-value gap")
instead of the truth-value of "false": 463
By the law of the excluded middle [LEM], either ’A is B’ or ’A is not
B’ must be true. Hence either "the present King of France is bald" or "the
present King of France is not bald" must be true. Yet if we enumerated the
things that are bald, and then the things that are not bald, we should not
find the present King of France in either list.
(Russell fails to mention the obvious conclusion: that because we do not find the
present King of France in either list, it means that both propositions are neither true
nor false).
22.2.3 Frege’s Argument
Speranza et al.’s [265] quotation of Christoph Sigwart presents the essence of Frege’s
argument regarding truth-value gaps: 464
460See Russell [244] p.490.
461See Russell [244] p.490. See also Pelletier et al. [211], and Haack [122], p.15.
462See Parsons [210].
463See Russell [244] p.485.
464See Speranza et al. [265], p.148.
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For Strawson, as for his intellectual predecessor Frege [1892], the notion
of presupposition has semantic status as a necessary condition on true or
false assertion ... In fact, the earliest pragmatic treatments of the failure of
existential presupposition predate Frege’s analysis by two decades. Here is
Christoph Sigwart [1873] on the problem of vacuous subjects:
"As a rule, the judgement A is not B presupposes the existence of A in
all cases when it would be presupposed in the judgement A is B ... ’Socrates
is not ill’ presupposes in the first place the existence of Socrates, because
only on the presupposition [Voraussetuzung] of his existence can there be
any question of his being ill." (Sigwart [1873/1895: 122], ...)
22.2.4 Strawson’s "On Referring"
Accordingly, Aristotle’s and Russell’s logics (which assume the LEM) hold the RH to
be false, but Frege’s and Strawson’s logics hold that the RH cannot be used to make a
true or false assertion (thereby rejecting the LEM). 465 More specifically, according to
Horn:
In those systems that do embrace truth-value gaps (Strawson, arguably
Frege) or non-classically-valued systems (Łukasiewicz, Bochvar, Kleene),
some sentences or statements are not assigned a (classical) truth-value; in
Strawson’s famous dictum, the question of the truth-value of “The king of
France is wise”, in a world in which France is a republic, simply fails to arise.
The negative form of such vacuous statements, e.g. “The king of France is
not wise”, is similarly neither true nor false. This amounts to a rejection of
LEM, as noted by Russell [in "On Denoting"].
In contrast to Russell’s On Denoting [244], Strawson’s On Referring [269] states
that a statement with a vacuous subject (a subject term that has no referent, e.g. "the
present King of France") is not false. Instead, it is "absurd" and therefore not asked.
So, it is neither true nor false (and thus belongs in a third category, whose existence is
a rejection of LEM). Strawson provides the following example:
A literal-minded and childless man asked whether all his children are
asleep will certainly not answer "Yes" on the ground that he has none; but
nor will he answer "No" on this ground. Since he has no children, the
question does not arise.
465See Horn [144], "4. Gaps and Gluts: LNC and Its Discontents".
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However, Strawson assumes that the potential questioner knows that the question
has a vacuous subject. The 160 year history of the RH shows that this is not always
the case.
In the context of the Riemann Hypothesis, Strawson’s argument is clearly wrong.
Over the course of the past 160 years, many mathematicians have asked if all of the zeros
of ζ(s) indeed are on the critical line Re(s) = 0.5. The question has arisen, because
in contrast to Strawson’s examples ("the present King of France", the children of a
man well-known to be childless), it has not been common knowledge that Riemann’s
ζ(s) violates LNC (or that ζ(s) thus has no zeros). Instead, Riemann’s ζ(s) was widely
assumed to indeed have zeros. So an axiom of Strawson’s logic (common knowledge
that subject of the question is vacuous) is clearly false in the context of the Riemann
Hypothesis.
22.3 Comparison of Truth-Value Gluts to Truth-Value Gaps
22.3.1 Comparison of Truth Tables
The Three-Valued Logic Truth Tables shown below are those of Frege, Kleene, Bochvar,
and Łukasiewicz. There are others, but a full discussion is beyond the scope of this
paper. 466
Remember that the "third value" in the Frege truth tables is the absence of any
truth-value ("a truth-value gap"). As Milne [195] states: "Beware! The bar [ - ] is not a
third truth-value, it signifies the absence of a truth-value. Where both [variables] have
truth-values, the connectives behave classically. " 467 468
The "Kleene" and "Łukasiewicz" tables are "essentially those of Kleene’s and Łukasiewicz’s
three valued logics", respectively. 469 470 The "Bochvar" tables are those of yet another
3VL, which (unlike Kleene’s and Łukasiewicz’s) was originally intended as a solution to
semantic paradoxes. 471 Bochvar adds an "assertion operator" (presented here as "T"),
which means something like "It is true that:". The "external connectives are defined
as follows: ¬A = ¬TA, A&B = TA&TB, A ∨B = TA ∨ TB, A→ B = TA→ TB.
The values in all of the truth tables presented here are:  = True (only), # = False
(only), and 4 = Both (True and False). The conditional →, follows Kleene’s three
466See e.g. Ciucci et al. [59].
467See Milne [195], p.473, citing Frege’s "Logic". Milne’s [195] p.474 reproduces Smiley’s truth tables
for Frege’s three-valued logic (Citing Smiley [260], pp.125-35.).
468See also Haack [120], p.212.
469See Priest et al. [235], §3.6.
470See also Haack [120], pp.206-208.
471See Haack [120], pp.206-208, citing Bochvar [32].
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¬ #
- -#  
∧  - #  - #
- - - -# # - #
∨  - #  -  
- - - -#  - #
→  - #  - #
- - - -#  -  
↔  - #  - #
- - - -# # -  
Table 1: Frege’s Truth Tables (Truth-Value Gaps)
¬ #4 4#  
∧  4 #  4 #4 4 4 ## # # #
∨  4 #    4  4 4#  4 #
→  4 #  4 #4  4 4#    
↔  4 #  # #4 #  ## # #  
Table 2: Kleene’s Truth Tables (Truth-Value Gluts)
¬ #4 4#  
∧  4 #  4 #4 4 4 4# # 4 #
∨  4 #  4  4 4 4 4#  4 #
→  4 #  4 #4 4 4 4#  4  
T  4 ## #
Table 3: Bochvar’s Truth Tables (Truth-Value Gluts)
→  4 #  4 #4   4#    
Table 4: "Łukasiewicz" Material Implication (Other Operators are Same as Kleene’s)
valued logic, 472 473 474 and material equivalence ↔, is defined as "means the same as".
22.3.2 Every Truth-Value Gap Implies a Glut
The following natural deduction rules in classical logic fail in Frege’s Truth-value gap
logic: v-introduction, →-introduction (conditional proof), reductio ad absurdum, ex
falso quodlibet (ECQ), the law of the excluded middle (LEM) 475
However, enough of classical logic remains valid to prove the following: 476
It’s not true that P and it’s not false that P only if it’s both true that
P and false that P .
472See Priest et al. [235], §3.6.
473See Kleene [159], p.335.
474See also Wikipedia [333]: "The Łukasiewicz Ł3 has the same tables for AND, OR, and NOT as the
Kleene logic given above, but differs in its definition of implication in that ’unknown implies unknown’
is true", citing Malinowski [179]
475See Milne’s [195] p.474.
476See Milne’s [195] p.475 (citing Heidelberger [135]): "In short, everywhere we think there’s a truth-
value gap, there’s also a‘glut’ ! (And vice versa !)".
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So in Frege’s logic, whenever there is a truth-value gap, there is also a truth-value
glut (and vice versa). 477 This is a paradox, because there is a contradiction here. 478
479 480 But according to another interpretation, this is a not a paradox, because the
difference lies in the definition of tautologies. 481 482 483
However, if this is indeed a paradox, then we should always apply logic based on
truth-value gluts (e.g. Kleene’s three-valued logic) instead of logic based on truth-value
gaps (e.g. Frege’s logic), because the former is "truth preserving". 484 485
Perhaps the most interesting result in the "Kleene" three-valued truth tables is that
of material implication, (A→ B). In classical logic, the material implication A→ B is
equivalent to ¬A ∨ B (this can be seen in the "Frege" truth tables). So it is true if A
is false, regardless of whether B is true or false.
In a three-valued logic, the material implication A → B remains equivalent to
(¬A ∨ B). So if A is "both true and false", then the material implication is not false,
regardless of the value of B. This can be seen in the "Kleene" (But Not "Frege") truth
477See also Priest [231], p.27, which recites an explanation for this phenomenon that is different from
Heidelberger’s [135]: "Notably, assuming De Morgan’s laws, ... ¬(A∨¬A) is equivalent to ... A∧¬A".
478See Heis [136]: "Frege, of course, would resolve this paradox by prescribing that a logically perfected
language have no bearerless names. Milne [195] advocates instead adopting a semantic (as opposed
to Frege’s functional) theory of negation. He rejects Frege’s solution because it precludes a plausible
semantics for ordinary language, and because the set-theoretic paradoxes show that even a scientific
language such as Frege’s own needs to allow for the possibility of singular terms (like "the extension
of x /∈ x") that are nevertheless bearerless."
479See also Scruton [253], p.63: "Frege argued that there are just two ’truth-values’ as he called them:
the true and the false. He therefore suggested that a sentence will refer to one or other of two things:
truth (the true) or falsehood (the false)."
480See also Scruton [253], p.72: "Just as ’the golden mountain’ lacks a reference, therefore, the
sentence ’the golden mountain is hidden’ lacks a truth-value."
481See Wikipedia [333], citing Look [175]: "In these truth tables, the unknown state can be thought
of as neither true nor false in Kleene logic, or thought of as both true and false in Priest logic. The
difference lies in the definition of tautologies. Where Kleene logic’s only designated truth-value is T ,
Priest logic’s designated truth-values are both T and U . In Kleene logic, the knowledge of whether
any particular unknown state secretly represents true or false at any moment in time is not available.
However, certain logical operations can yield an unambiguous result, even if they involve at least one
unknown operand."
482See Wikipedia [333], citing Look [175]: "Kleene logic has no tautologies (valid formulas) because
whenever all of the atomic components of a well-formed formula are assigned the value Unknown, the
formula itself must also have the value Unknown."
483See Wikipedia [333], citing Look [175]: "[Priest’s] Logic of Paradox (LP ) has the same truth tables
as Kleene logic, but it has two designated truth-values instead of one; these are: True and Both (the
analogue of Unknown), so that LP does have tautologies but it has fewer valid inference rules."
484See Priest et al. [235], §3.6: "Let t [true] and b [both] be the designated values. These are the
values that are preserved in valid inferences. If we define a consequence relation in terms of preservation
of these designated values, then we have the paraconsistent logic LP . In LP . ECQ is invalid", citing
Priest [226].
485See also MacFarlane [177], p.14: "The idea is to keep the classical idea that validity is truth
preservation, but give up the classical assumption that the same sentence cannot be both true and
false."
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tables.
So if the RH has the third truth-value ("both true and false"), then in classical logic
all theorems that assume RH is true cannot be proven true (or proven false). But in
three-valued logic, material implication holds that they might be proven true.
23 State Table of ζ(s) and Truth Tables of RH
23.1 The State Table of the Zeta Function
It is said that a picture is worth a thousand words, so we begin our discussion by
filling out the state table of ζ(s), as a function of: the truth/falsity of the Law of
Non-Contradiction (LNC), and the truth/falsity of the analytic continuation of ζ(s).
{LNC}
True False
True Divergent & Convergent Divergent & Convergent
{Analytic (Paradox)* (Paradox)†
Contin. of ζ(s)} False Divergent Divergent
Table 5: State Table of ζ(s) in Half-Plane Re(s) ≤ 1
.
(* = Violates LNC. In logics that have ECQ as a theorem, this triggers ECQ.)
(† = In certain Multi-Valued Logics, paradoxes are assigned a 3rd truth-value.)
The Dirichlet series ζ(s) is proven to be divergent throughout the half-plane Re(s) ≤
1. So if the analytic continuation ("AC") of ζ(s) to half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 is true, then
the function ζ(s) is a paradox in that half-plane, because it is both convergent and
divergent at every value of s in that half-plane (except at the pole at s = 1). 486
If the analytic continuation (AC) of ζ(s) is true, then the state-value of ζ(s) in half-
plane Re(s) ≤ 1 is "paradox". In a logic with both LNC and ECQ, this violation of
LNC triggers ECQ. In contrast, in a certain 3VLs and 4VLs, the LNC can be bypassed,
by assigning a third truth-value to paradoxes.
But if the AC of ζ(s) is false, 487 then ζ(s) is exclusively defined by its Dirichlet
series, which is divergent throughout the half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1, and has no zeros and
no poles, both in logics where the LNC holds, and in logics where the LNC fails.
486In contrast, Weierstrass’s analytic continuation lacks such a direct contradiction. See Chapter 11
of this paper for more details.
487Due to, for example, Riemann’s analytic continuation of ζ(s) being invalid. See Chapters 10 and
20.
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23.2 The Truth Table of the Riemann Hypothesis
As shown in the preceding state table, the state of ζ(s) depends on whether the analytic
continuation of ζ(s) is true or false. If the analytic continuation is true, ζ(s) is a paradox
in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1. If false, ζ(s) is exclusively defined by the Dirichlet series, and
thus is divergent in said half-plane.
Next we discuss the truth table of the Riemann hypothesis, as a function of the
state of ζ(s) in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1, and of three different classes of logic (classical,
intuitionistic, and 3VLs that assign a 3rd truth-value to paradoxes).
{Logics}
Classical Intutionistic 3VLs That Assign
a 3rd Truth-Value
to Paradoxes
Paradox ζ(s) Trivially True Trivially True 3rd Truth-Value†
(Convergent & Divergent) (due to ECQ) (due to ECQ) (due to ζ(s))
Dirichlet Series ζ(s) Paradox* & ECQ False** 3rd Truth-Value ‡
(due to no Zeros) (due to no Zeros) (due to no Zeros)
Table 6: Truth Table of the Riemann Hypothesis (RH)
.
(* = Both RH and anti-RH ("All zeros are off the critical line") are true, due to "vacuous
zeros". This violates LNC and triggers ECQ.)
(** = RH’s zeros are proven to be unconstructable.)
(† = In Bochvar’s 3VL, material implication has the 3rd truth-value if it is from a
paradox to any other proposition. In Priest’s LP , there is no material implication for
paradoxes.)
(‡ = In all 3VLs, the material implication of a false 1st proposition to any 2nd propo-
sition (and to the negation of the 2nd proposition) is true, resulting in a paradox.)
23.2.1 If Analytic Continuation of ζ(s) is False
If analytic continuation (AC) of ζ(s) is false, 488 then ζ(s) is exclusively defined by its
Dirichlet series, which is divergent throughout half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1, and has neither
zeros nor poles. In this scenario, the RH refers to "vacuous zeros" that do not exist.
In classical logic, both material implication and Venn’s "Modern" Square of Op-
position hold that in the case of "vacuous zeros", both the RH and its negation the
488We show in this paper that Riemann’s alleged proof of the analytic continuation of ζ(s) is false.
There are other alleged proofs, so unfortunately this result is not dispositive by itself. See e.g. Titch-
marsh et al. [280], §2.1 to §2.10, pp.13-27, which lists seven such proofs.
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anti-RH ("All zeros of ζ(s) are off the critical line") are true, which means that RH is
a paradox that violates the LNC, and triggers ECQ.
In intuitionistic logic, in the case of "vacuous zeros", the RH is false, because Dirich-
let series ζ(s) is proven to have no zeros. So the zeros of RH are proven to be uncon-
structable.
In contrast, in the 3VLs discussed in this paper, in the case of "vacuous zeros", both
the RH and its negation the anti-RH ("All zeros of ζ(s) are off the critical line") are
true, which means that RH is a paradox that is assigned the third truth-value.
23.2.2 If Analytic Continuation of ζ(s) is True and LNC is True
If the analytic continuation of ζ(s) is true, it creates the paradox of ζ(s) being both
convergent and divergent throughout half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1. All paradoxes violate the
LNC, so the analytic continuation of ζ(s) and the LNC cannotboth hold true simulata-
neously. 489 In any logic that has both LNC and ECQ (e.g. classical and intuitionistic
logics), this violation of the LNC triggers ECQ, which in turn renders any other propo-
sition "trivially true". Here, it is the Riemann hypothesis which is rendered "trivially
true" by ECQ. In fact, even in the stricter "relevance logics", which require that the
antecedent and consequent of an implication to be "relevantly" related, 490 the RH is
"trivially true" due to ECQ, because the RH is directly related to the function ζ(s).
23.2.3 If Analytic Continuation of ζ(s) is True and LNC is False
The upper right-most entry of RH’s truth table is where the analytic continuation of
ζ(s) is true, and the LNC is false. In this scenario, neither classical nor intuitionistic
logic be used, because both logics have LNC.
What is needed is a logic that permits paradoxes, such as the example 3VLs dis-
cussed in this paper: Bochvar’s 3VL and Priest’s LP . However, even in these two 3VLs,
the RH is an unprovable paradox. In Bochvar’s 3VL, material implication has the 3rd
truth-value if it is from a paradox to any other proposition.
489Intuitionism rejects this use of the LEM. See Brouwer [47], p.23: "The axiom of the solvability
of all problems as formulated by Hilbert in 1900 [141] is equivalent to the logical Principle of the
Excluded Middle; therefore, since there are no sufficient grounds for this axiom and since logic is
based on mathematics - and not vice versa - the use of the Principle of the Excluded Middle is not
permissible as part of a mathematical proof", and p.27, fn.4: "However, in his more recent lecture
Axiomatic Thinking [142], (p.412), Hilbert qualifies the question of the solvability of all mathematical
problems by calling it a question still to be solved."
490See Wikipedia [330], citing Routley et al. [240] and Mares [182]: "Relevance logic aims to cap-
ture aspects of implication that are ignored by the ’material implication’ operator in classical truth-
functional logic, namely the notion of relevance between antecedent and conditional of a true implica-
tion."
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So in Bochvar’s 3VL, if (ζ(s) = 0) has the 3rd truth-value, then its material impli-
cation to any other proposition has the 3rd truth -value ("paradox"). So the result is
always the 3rd truth -value ("paradox").
In Priest’s LP , there is no material implication for paradoxes. More specifically, if
(ζ(s) = 0) has the 3rd truth-value, then its material implication to a true proposition is
a "quasi-valid" truth - but only if there are no paradoxical statements involved. Which
is the case here, because the AC of ζ(s) renders ζ(s) = 0 a paradox. 491 But here
there is a paradoxical statement involved. So again we are stuck with a truth-value of
"paradox".
In contrast, if (ζ(s) = 0) is a false proposition, then it materially implies anything,
which incldes both (Re(s) = 1/2) and (Re(s) 6= 1/2). Again, a paradox. See the two
tables immediately below, Table 23.2.3 of RH, and Table 23.2.3 of Anti-RH ("All zeros
of ζ(s) are off the critical line.").
Re(s) = 1/2
True False
Paradox (Convergent No Implication (Priest’s LP ) No Implication (Priest’s LP )
ζ(s) = 0 to Zero, & Divergent) Paradox (Bochvar’s 3VL) Paradox (Bochvar’s 3VL)
False (Convergent to True True
Not Zero, & Divergent)
Table 7: RH as Material Implication, if AC of ζ(s) is True and LNC is False
Re(s) 6= 1/2
True False
Paradox (Convergent No Implication (Priest’s LP ) No Implication (Priest’s LP )
ζ(s) = 0 to Zero, & Divergent) Paradox (Bochvar’s 3VL) Paradox (Bochvar’s 3VL)
False (Convergent to True True
Not Zero, & Divergent)
Table 8: Anti-RH as Material Implication, if AC of ζ(s) is True and LNC is
False
491See Priest, [226], p.235, §IV.8: "The proposal is that we allow ourselves quasi-valid inferences
even though they are not generally valid. We do know that quasi-valid inferences are truth preserving
provided that there are no paradoxical sentences involved (see Section IV.1). Hence, if we were certain
that we were not dealing with paradoxical sentences, we could use quasi-valid rules with a clear
conscience. "
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24 Some Implications in Mathematics
The falsity of analytic continuation of ζ(s), such that ζ(s) is exclusively defined by
Dirichlet series ζ(s), has far-reaching implications. Some of these implications are
discussed below.
24.1 Prime Number Theorem
Borwein et al. [217] states: "The proof of the prime number theorem relies on showing
that ζ(s) has no zeros of the form 1 + it for t ∈ R", 492 and also states:
In fact, this statement is equivalent to the prime number theorem, namely
pi(x) ∼ x
log x
, x→∞ (24.1)
(a problem that required a century of mathematics to solve). 493
and further states:
[W]e present part of de la Vallée Poussin’s proof of the prime number
theorem (see Section 12.4); in particular, we prove that ζ(1 + it) 6= 0 for
t ∈ R. 494
Edwards [90] concurs:
Since Reρ ≤ 1 for all ρ (by the Euler product formula - see Section 1.9),
this amounts to proving that there are no roots ρ [of Riemann’s ζ(s)] on
the line Re(s) = 1. Thus, given von Mangoldt’s 1894 formula for ψ(x), the
proof of the prime number theorem can be reduced to proving that there
are no roots ρ on the line Re(s) = 1 and to proving that the above limit
can be evaluated termwise. 495
Edwards [90] also states that:
Hadamard’s proof that there are no roots ρ on Re(s) = 1 is given in
Section 4.2. De la Vallée Poussin admitted that Hadamard’s proof was
the simpler of the two, and although simpler proofs have since been found
492See Borwein et al. [217], p.61
493See Borwein et al. [217], p.16.
494See Borwein et al. [217], p.9.
495See Edwards [90], p.68.
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(see Section 5.2), Hadamard’s is perhaps still the most straightforward and
natural proof of this fact. 496
Borwein et al. [217] concludes with: "Thus [the prime number theorem] follows from
the truth of the Riemann hypothesis." 497 Unfortunately, Borwein is wrong. There is
no such relationship. (It appears that Borwein arrives at this conclusion because de la
Vallée Poussin’s proof assumes that Riemann’s analytic continuation of ζ(s) is true.)
When ζ(s) is defined as Riemann’s ζ(s), the proof that ζ(1 + it) 6= 0 for all t ∈ R
is "nontrivial" (according to Borwein). 498 But when ζ(s) is defined as the Dirichlet
series ζ(s), the proof of this theorem is trivial : The Dirichlet series of ζ(s) has no zeros,
so ζ(1 + it) 6= 0 for all t ∈ R.
24.2 Analogues of the RH
There exist analogues of the RH that (allegedly) have been proven to be true. These
proofs need to be revisited, due to the invalidity of Riemann’s AC of ζ(s). These
analogues are invalid due to violating the LNC (for the same reasons that Riemann’s
AC of ζ(s) violates the LNC), and they are also unsound, due to falsely assuming that
Riemann’s AC of ζ(s) is true. See, for example:
1. Hasse’s proof of the RH for elliptic curves of genus 1, 499
2. Weil’s proof of the RH for elliptic curves of arbitrary genus g, 500 and
3. Deligne’s proof of the Weil conjecture III (which is the function field analogue of
the Grand Riemann Hypothesis). 501
496See Edwards [90], p.69.
497Id.
498See Borwein et al. [217], p.16: "However, the proof that the zero-free region includes the vertical
line Re(s) = 1 (i.e., ζ(1 + it) 6= 0 for all t ∈ R) is already nontrivial."
499See Milne [194], p.3.
500See also Jannsen [151], pp.4-5: "More generally one can show the following result which goes back
to E. Artin and F.K. Schmidt: for a smooth projective (geometrically irreducible) curve X of genus g
over Fq one has:
Z(X,T ) =
P (T )
(1− T )(1− qT ) (24.2)
where P (T ) is a polynomial of degree 2g in Z[T ], with constant coefficient 1. Furthermore Hasse (for
g = 1, as well as for elliptic curves) and Weil (for arbitrary g) proved that the zeros of P (q−s) lie on
the line Re(s) = 1/2. Applied to ζ(X, s) = Z(X, q−s) this proves the analogoue (conjectured by Artin)
of the Riemann hypothesis in the case of function fields."
501See Milne [194], p.49.
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All of these alleged proofs include a violation of the LNC, caused by the analytic
continuation of the Zeta function, and the consequently false determinations that the
Zeta function has a pole and zeros, that its functional equation is valid, etc.
For example, the Weil-conjecture expressly assumes that analytic continuation of
ζ(s) is valid: 502
Weil-conjecture (proved by Deligne in 1973): Let X be a geometric
irreducible smooth projective varietyFq. Define
Z(X,T ) = exp(
∞∑
n=1
|X(Fqn)|T
n
n
) ∈ Q[[T ]] (24.3)
Then the following holds
I: Z(X,T ) is rational, i.e., in Q(T ). (In particular, this implies the
existence of a meromorphic continuation of the zeta-function ζ(X, s) =
Z(X, q−s), for which the series initially only converges for Re(s) >> 0).
This "meromorphic continuation" of the zeta-function ζ(X, s) violates the LNC for
the same reason that the "meromorphic continuation" of ζ(s) violates the LNC: The
series ζ(X, s) is "initially" convergent only for Re(s) >> 0 (and thus "initially" must
be divergent for all other values of s). The series ζ(X, s) cannot be both divergent and
convergent for Re(s) << 0
Therefore, the zeros of the "meromorphic continuation" of ζ(X, s) do not exist, and
the ζ(X, s) analogue of the RH is false in intuitionistic logic, a paradox that triggers
ECQ in classical logic, and has a third truth-value in a 3VL. The author conjectures
that the same applies to all other allegedly proven analogues of the RH.
24.3 L-Functions, the Modularity Theorem, and the Hasse-Weil
Theorem
24.3.1 L-Functions
Katz et al. [156] states: 503
The Riemann Zeta Function is but the first of a zoo of zeta and L-
functions for which we can ask similar questions. There are the Dirichlet
L-functions L(s, χ) defined as follows: q ≥ 1 is an integer, χ : (Z/qZ)∗ → C∗
502See Jannsen [151], p.5.
503See Katz et al. [156], pp.3-4.
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a (primitive) character and we extend χ to Z by making it periodic, and
χ(m) = 0 if (m, q) 6= 1. Then
L(s, χ) =
∞∑
n=1
χ(n)n−s =
∏
p
(1− χ(p)p−s)−1. (24.4)
Dirichlet L-functions are generalizations of Riemann’s ζ(s): 504
By analytic continuation, [the Dirichlet L-series, L(s, χ) =
∑
χ(s)/ns]
can be extended to a meromorphic function on the whole complex plane,
and is then called a Dirichlet L-function and also denoted L(s, χ). 505
Also, note that:
Just as the Riemann zeta function is conjectured to obey the Riemann
hypothesis, so the Dirichlet L-functions are conjectured to obey the gener-
alized Riemann hypothesis. 506
In logics that have LNC and ECQ, the analytic continuation of ζ(s) violates the
LNC, and triggers ECQ. Riemann’s ζ(s) is merely one example of a Dirichlet L-function.
Therefore, generalizations of Riemann’s ζ(s) (such as L-functions) are unsound, because
they falsely assume that Riemann’s analytic continuation of ζ(s) is valid.
24.3.2 Modularity Theorem
Sutherland [271] concisely describes the Modularity theorem (previously called the
Taniyama-Shimura conjecture), as follows:
Every elliptic curve E/Q is modular. 507
Weisstein [301] provides a more detailed description of the Modularity theorem:
In effect, the conjecture says that every rational elliptic curve is a mod-
ular form in disguise. Or, more formally, the conjecture suggests that, for
every elliptic curve y2 = Ax3 +Bx2 +Cx+D over the rationals, there exist
nonconstant modular functions f(z) and g(z) of the same level N such that
[f(z)]2 = A[g(z)]2 + Cg(z) +D. (24.5)
504See Ash et al. [14], p.200: "Dirichlet’s L-functions can be thought of as a generalization of the
Riemann zeta-function ζ(s). In the next section, we will describe a monster generalization of ζ(s)
called the Hasse-Weil zeta-function."
505See Wikipedia [311].
506Id.
507See Sutherland [271], p.13, Theorem 25.33.
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Equivalently, for every elliptic curve, there is a modular form with the same
Dirichlet L-series. 508 509
The above-cited quote from Weisstein [301] expressly refers to "Dirichlet L-series" (not
"Dirichlet L-functions"). 510 As long as the L-series are not analytically continued
to become L-functions, they do not violate the LNC. Bruin [49] states the following
regarding the relationship between the Modularity theorem and analytic continuation
of L-functions of elliptic curves:
The modularity theorem implies that L-functions of elliptic curves over
Q admit an analytic continuation to all of C. This is not at all obvious and
there is no known direct way to prove it.
However, according to material implication, a true proposition cannot materially imply
a false proposition. So if the Modularity theorem is indeed true, it cannot imply that
L-functions of elliptic curves over Q admit an analytic continuation to all of C. (In
fact, the existence of L-functions in general remains an unproven conjecture). 511 512
24.3.3 Hasse-Weil Theorem (a Corollary of the Modularity Theorem)
Wiles [340] states the following in regards to analytic continuation of L-functions, and
the Hasse-Weil conjecture:
Then we can define the incomplete L-series of C (incomplete because we
omit the Euler factors for primes p|2∆) by
L(C, s) :=
∏
p|2∆
(1− app−s + p1−2s)−1 (24.6)
We view this as a function of the complex variable s and this Euler product
is then known to converge for Re(s) > 3/2. A conjecture going back to
508See Weisstein [301].
509See also Frey [103], §5.2, p.19: "Theorem 5.1 - Tanayama’s and the Hasse-Weil conjecture is
equivalent with the existence of a non-trivial map φ : X0(NE)→ E defined over Q. We call an elliptic
curve E over Q modular if a map φ like in the theorem exists. With this notation we can reformulate
Taniyama‘s conjecture: Conjecture 4 (Taniyama-Shimura-Weil) — Every elliptic curve defined over Q
is modular."
510See also Sutherland [271], §25.8: "Although we defined the L-function of an elliptic curve using
an Euler product, we can always expand this product to obtain a Dirichlet series".
511See Wikipedia [319]: "It is this (conjectural) meromorphic continuation to the complex plane
which is called an L-function."
512See e.g. the statement in Bombieri [35], p.5: "Not a single example of validity or failure of a
Riemann hypothesis for an L-function is known up to this date."
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Hasse (see the commentary on 1952(d) in [Weil [299]]) predicted that L(C, s)
should have a holomorphic continuation as a function of s to the whole
complex plane. This has now been proved [citing Wiles [341], Taylor et al.
[279], and Breuill et al. [57].] 513
In fact, the first sentences of Wiles [341] state the following:
An elliptic curve over Q is said to be modular if it has a finite covering
by a modular curve of the form X0(N). Any such elliptic curve has the
property that its Hasse-Weil zeta function has an analytic continuation and
satisfies a functional equation of the standard type.
But this cannot be true. The analytic continuation of the Hasse-Weil zeta function
violates the LNC, and the "functional equation of the standard type" is not valid.
Sutherland [271] also discloses the relationship between the Modularity theorem and
the Hasse-Weil conjecture:
When E is modular, the L-function of E is necessarily the L-function of
a modular form, and this implies that LE(s) has an analytic continuation
and satisfies a functional equation, since this holds for the L-function of a
modular form ... 514 Prior to the proof of the Modularity theorem, this was
an open question known as the Hasse-Weil conjecture; we record it here as
a corollary to the Modularity Theorem. 515
The Hasse-Weil theorem is a "corollary of the Modularity theorem" (according to
Sutherland [271]). 516 When an elliptic curve E is modular, the Modularity theorem
implies that the Hasse-Weil conjecture is true. 517 Moreover, Wiles’s proof of Fermat’s
last theorem assumes that the properties of modular elliptic curves (including the Hasse-
Weil conjecture) are true. 518
But the Hasse-Weil theorem is unsound, because it falsely assumes that the analytic
continuation used to create Dirichlet L-functions is valid. Also, material implication
513See Wiles [340], p.2. This result violates the LNC, for the same reasons that analytic continuation
of ζ(s) violates the LNC.
514See Sutherland [271], p.9: "Theorem 25.25 (Hecke). Let f ∈ Sk(Γ0(N)). The L-function
Lf (s) extends analytically to a holomorphic function on C, and the normalized L-function Lf (s) =
Ns/2(2pi)−sΓ(s)Lf (s) satisfies the functional equation Lf (s) = ±Lf (k − s)."
515See also Sutherland [271], §25.9
516See also Frey [103], p.17: "Conjecture 2 (Hasse-Weil) — LE(s) has an analytic continuation to C
satisfying the following functional equation..."; and p.19: "Taniyama stated the following conjecture:
Conjecture 3. — Assume that the Hasse-Weil conjecture is true for the L-series LE(s) =
∑∞
n=1 bnn
−s.
Then fE(z) :=
∑∞
n=1 bne
2piinz is a cusp form."
517See also Frey [103], p.20, Theorem 5.3.
518See Frey [103], pp.20-22, Theorem 5.3, §6, and §7.
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in classical in intuitionistic logics holds that a true proposition cannot imply a false
proposition.
Therefore, if the Modularity theorem is true, it cannot materially imply a false
Hasse-Weil theorem. According material implication, if the Hasse-Weil theorem is false,
the Modularity theorem must be false as well. So the Modularity theorem must be false,
and its progeny (e.g. Wiles’s "proof" of Fermat’s last theorem) must also be false.
These "theorems" should never have been called theorems, because they are built upon
unproven conjectures (i.e. Dirichlet L-functions).
24.4 The Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer Conjecture
As discussed above, analytic continuation of the Dirichlet series ζ(s) to half-plane
Re(s) ≤ 1 violates the LNC, because the Dirichlet series ζ(s) is proven to be diver-
gent throughout half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1. Riemann’s ζ(s) violates not only the LNC in
said half-plane, but also the Law of Identity (LOI) and the definition of a "function"
in set theory (due to the one-to-two relationship of domain to range).
The Dirichlet series exclusively defines ζ(s), so at s = 1, ζ(s) is the "harmonic
series", which is proven to be divergent by the "Integral test for convergence". 519
This confirms that ζ(1) 6= 0. Also, the invalidity of analytic continuation of ζ(s) (in
logics with LNC), and thus of analytic continuation of L-functions, disposes of the
Landau-Siegel zero, "which no one believes exists". 520
According to Clay Mathematics Institute [61], this resolves the Birch and Swinnerton-
Dyer (BSD) Conjecture in favor of finiteness:
[T]his amazing conjecture asserts that if ζ(1) is equal to 0, then there
are an infinite number of rational points (solutions), and conversely, if ζ(1)
is not equal to 0, then there is only a finite number of such points.
However, the BSD conjecture is unsound, because it falsely assumes that the analytic
continuation used to create Dirichlet L-functions is valid.
24.4.1 Hasse–Weil Zeta Function - 1st Example
Further in regards to the BSD Conjecture, one example of the Hasse–Weil zeta func-
tion is for a nonsingular plane projective curve C, given by a homogeneous equation
519See, e.g., Guichard et al.’s [116], discussion of the Integral test for convergence, at Theorems 13.3.3
and 13.3.4 and their proofs.
520See Conrey [66], p.351: "The ineffectivity comes about from the assumption that some L-function
actually has a real zero near 1. Such a hypothetical zero of some L-function, which no one believes
exists, is called a Landau-Siegel zero."
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F (x, y, z) = 0 with integer coefficients of degree d. 521
Let’s continue our example with C = P 1, a projective line. To get the
Hasse-Weil zeta function [we solve:] 522
Z(P 1, s) =
∏
p
(1− 1
ps
)−1 · (1− p
ps
)−1 (24.7)
The Euler product of the Riemann zeta-function is: 523
ζ(s) =
∏
p
(1− 1
ps
)−1 (24.8)
When the Euler product (Eq. 24.8) is substituted into the Hasse-Weil zeta function
(Eq. 24.7), the result is: 524
Z(P 1, s) = ζ(s) · ζ(s− 1) (24.9)
Given that given that analytic continuation of ζ(s) violates the LNC, ζ(s) is defined
exclusively by the Dirichlet series ζ(s), which has no zeros. Neither ζ(s) nor ζ(s − 1)
can equal zero. Therefore, the Hasse-Weil zeta function Z(P 1, s), which is the product
of ζ(s) and ζ(s− 1), is non-zero for all s ∈ C.
24.4.2 Hasse–Weil Zeta Function - 2nd Example
Another version of the Hasse–Weil zeta function holds that the zeta function ZE,Q(s)
of elliptic curve E over rational number field Q of conductor N is: 525
ZE,Q(s) =
ζ(s) · ζ(s− 1)
L(E, s)
(24.10)
Again, given that analytic continuation of ζ(s) violates the LNC, ζ(s) is defined
exclusively by the Dirichlet series ζ(s), which has no zeros. So neither ζ(s) nor ζ(s− 1)
can equal zero, and therefore their product, which is this version of the Hasse-Weil zeta
function ZE,Q(s), is non-zero for all values of s ∈ C.
521See Ash et al. [14], p.201.
522See Ash et al. [14], p.204.
523See Ash et al. [14], p.175, Eq. 11.13.
524See Ash et al. [14], p.204.
525See Wikipedia [316], citing Silverman [259] §C.16, and Serre [254].
113
Moreover, rearranging the terms of this Hasse–Weil zeta function produces:
L(E, s) =
ζ(s) · ζ(s− 1)
ZE,Q(s)
(24.11)
Since neither ζ(s) nor ζ(s − 1) can equal zero, L(E, s) 6= 0 for all s ∈ C. So at
s = 1, the function L(E, 1) 6= 0. Given this result, all modular elliptic curves E have
rank 0, and thus are finite. Thus resolving the BSD conjecture to finiteness. 526
However, L-functions are generalizations of Riemann’s ζ(s), whose analytic contin-
uation violates the LNC. Likewise, L-functions are divergent throughout a half-plane,
and their "analytic continuation" to this half-plane is invalid, because it violates the
LNC. This result is inconsistent with Wiles’s [340] proof of analytic continuation of
L(C, s). That proof is invalid, because the analytic continuation of L-functions violate
the LNC. 527
24.5 Finiteness of the Tate–Shafarevich Group and the Brauer
Group
According to Totaro [284] and [285], the resolution of the BSD Conjecture also resolves
equivalent conjectures. Totaro [285] lists a few: 528
To spell out the relations between the Tate conjecture and finiteness
problems, let X be a smooth projective surface over a finite field k, and let
f be a morphism with connected fibers from X onto a smooth projective
curve C. Assume that the generic fiber F of f , which is a curve over the
function field k(C), is smooth over k(C). Let J be the Jacobian of F ; thus
J is an abelian variety over the global field k(C). Then the following are
equivalent: 529
• the Tate conjecture holds for divisors on X;
• the Brauer group of X is finite;
• the Tate–Shafarevich group of J is finite;
• the Birch–Swinnerton-Dyer conjecture holds for J .
526See Wiles [340] (citing Kolyvagin [163]): "Kolyvagin showed in 1990 that for modular elliptic
curves, if L(C, 1) 6= 0 then r = 0 and if L(C, 1) = 0 but L′(C, 1) 6= 0 then r = 1".
527See Wiles [340], p.2: "A conjecture going back to Hasse ... predicted that L(C, s) should have a
holomorphic continuation as a function of s to the whole complex plane. This has now been proved",
citing, inter alia, Wiles’s [341] proof of Fermat’s last theorem.
528See Totaro [285], page 578.
529Citing Ulmer [291], Proposition 5.1.2 and Theorem 6.3.1.
114
As discussed in the preceding section, the BSD conjecture is unsound, because it
falsely assumes that the analytic continuation of ζ(s) is true. Moreover, as discussed in
the following section(s), the Tate conjecture is unsound, due to same false assumption.
Therefore, the equivalence between the BSD conjecture and the Tate conjecture, as
described by Totaro, is correct.
Moreover, Wiles’s [340] official Clay Foundation description of the BSD conjecture
states the following:
There is an analogous conjecture for elliptic curves over function fields.
It has been proved in this case by Artin and Tate [277] that the L-series has
a zero of order at least r, but the conjecture itself remains unproved. In the
function field case it is now known to be equivalent to the finiteness of the
Tate–Shafarevich group. 530
If these conjectures are indeed equivalent to the BSD conjecture, 531 then they too are
unsound. The analytic continuation of L-series that takes place in the cited Tate [277]
reference violates the LNC. 532 The other finiteness conjectures are "inspired" by the
BSD conjecture. 533
24.6 The Tate Conjecture
24.6.1 The Tate conjecture, Argument 1
Regarding the Tate conjecture, Totaro [284] states:
Tate and Milne proved the equivalence of two problems, the Tate conjec-
ture for elliptic surfaces over finite fields and the Birch-Swinnerton-Dyer con-
jecture for elliptic curves over global fields of positive characteristic. Both
problems remain open. See for example Ulmer’s notes [290] on elliptic curves
over function fields.
Ulmer [290], p.6, §3, discloses the following regarding Zeta functions over a finite
field:
530Wiles’s [340] p.2, citing Tate [277], and citing Milne’s [192] Corollary 9.7.
531As stated by Totaro [285], page 578.
532See Tate [277], p.416: "It is generally conjectured that LS has an analytic continuation throughout
the s-plane. This general conjecture, which in principle underlies those of Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer,
has been verified in some special cases, notably for A of C.M.-type (Weil, Deuring, Shimura), in which
case LS can be identified as a product of Hecke L-series, and for some elliptic curves related to modular
function fields, when LS can be related to modular forms (Eichler, Shimura)."
533See Tate [277], p.426: "Inspired by the work of Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer, in the way explained
below, Mike Artin and I conjecture ... The Brauer group Br(X) is finite "
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Let χ be a variety over the finite field Fq.
It follows that ζ(χ, s) has a meromorphic continuation to the whole s
plane, with poles on the lines Re(s) ∈ {0, . . . , dimχ} and zeroes on the
lines Re(s) ∈ {1/2, . . . , dim − 1/2}. This is the analogue of the Riemann
hypothesis for ζ(χ, s).
... Thus ζ(C, s) has simple poles for s ∈ 2pii
log q
Z and s ∈ 1 + 2pii
log q
Z and its
zeroes lie on the line Re(s) = 1/2.
This "meromorphic continuation" of ζ(χ, s) is analogous to that of the Dirichlet
series ζ(s) in the original Riemann hypothesis. The simple poles are analogous to
the simple pole of Riemann’s ζ(s), and of course the "zeroes on the lines Re(s) ∈
{1/2, . . . , dim− 1/2}" are analogous to the RH’s zeros on the line Re(s) = 1/2.
Ulmer [290], pp.31-32, then discloses Tate’s first and second conjectures, as follows
(emphasis added):
Conjecture 9.2 (T2(χ)). We have
Rank NS(χ) = −ords=1ζ(χ, s) (24.12)
Note that by the Riemann hypothesis, the poles of ζ(χ, s) at
s = 1 come from P2(χ, q−s). More precisely, using the cohomological
formula (4.1) of Lecture 0 for P2, we have that the order of pole of ζ(χ, s) at
s = 1 is equal to the multiplicity of q as an eigenvalue of Frq on H2(χ,Q`).
Thus we have a string of inequalities:
Rank NS(χ) ≤ dimQ`H2(χ,Q`)Frq=q ≤ −ords=1ζ(χ, s) (24.13)
[Tate’s first conjecture] T1(χ) is that the first inequality is an equality
and [Tate’s second] conjecture T2(χ) is that the leftmost and rightmost
integers are equal. It follows trivially that T2(χ) implies T1(χ). Tate proved
the reverse implication.
Prior to the "meromorphic continuation" discussed in Ulmer [290], either ζ(χ, s) is
divergent at the values of s covered by said "continuation", or ζ(χ, s) has no value at
these "pre-continuation" values of s. In both scenarios, the "meromorphic continuation"
results in two conflicting definitions for certain values of s, thereby violating LNC and
triggering ECQ.
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Therefore, as discussed regarding the original Riemann Hypothesis pertaining to
ζ(s), "the meromorphic continuation" of ζ(s) violates the LNC, and is invalid in logics
with LNC, so ζ(χ, s) has neither zeros nor poles.
Moreover, Tate’s conjectures are unsound, because they falsely assume that Rie-
mann’s "meromorphic continuation" of ζ(s) is valid.
In intuitionistic logic, the proof that the poles and zeros of Riemann’s ζ(s) are non-
existent is sufficient to render the Tate conjecture false. In contrast, in classical logic, a
material implication with a "vacuous subject" (such as a proposition regarding a non-
existent pole) is both true and false, resulting in an undecidable paradox that violates
LNC and triggers ECQ. In certain 3VLs (e.g. Priest’s LP ), such a paradox does not
violate LNC, and does not cause ECQ.
24.6.2 The Tate conjecture, Argument 2
Milne [193] states the following (emphasis added): 534
THEOREM 1.4. Let X be a variety over F of dimension d, and let
r ∈ N . The following statements are equivalent:
(a) T r(X, l) and Er(X, l) are true for a single l.
(b) T r(X, l), Sr(X, l), and T d−r(X, l) are true for a single l.
(c) T r(X, l), Er(X, l), Sr(X, l), Ed−r(X, l), and T d−r(X, l) are true for
all l, and the Q-subspace Arl (X) of T rl (X) generated by the algebraic classes
is a Q-structure on T rl (X), i.e. Arl (X)
⊗
QQl ' T rl (X)
(d) the order of the pole of the zeta function Z(X, t) at t = q−r
is equal to the rank of the group of numerical equivalence classes
of algebraic cycles of codimension r.
However, the original Riemann ζ(s) is not valid in logics with LNC in the half-plane
of the analytic continuation. The resulting exclusive definition of ζ(s), the Dirichlet
series ζ(s), is convergent in one half-plane, divergent in the other half-plane, and has
neither zeros nor poles. 535 536 This applies to the generalizations of ζ(s), as well.
Therefore, clause (d) of Milne’s [193] Theorem 1.4, which Milne calls "the full Tate
conjecture" 537 applies to a pole that does not exist.
534See Milne [193], p.3.
535See Rowland et al. [242]: "The word ’pole’ is used prominently in a number of very different
branches of mathematics. Perhaps the most important and widespread usage is to denote a singularity
of a complex function."
536See also Wikipedia [337], "Definitions": "The characterization of zeros and poles implies that zeros
and poles are isolated, that is, every zero or pole has a neighbourhood that does not contain any other
zero and pole.".
537See Milne [193], p.3, discussion of Theorem 1.4, last line.
117
In intuitionistic logic, the proof that the pole is non-existent is sufficient to render
the Tate conjecture false. In contrast, in classical logic, a material implication with a
"vacuous subject" (such as a proposition regarding a non-existent pole) is both true
and false, resulting in an undecidable paradox that violates LNC and triggers ECQ. In
certain 3VLs, such a paradox does not violate LNC, and does not cause ECQ.
The above analysis also applies to clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Milne’s [193] Theorem
1.4.
24.7 The Hodge conjecture
Several references expressly state that the Tate conjecture is equivalent to the Hodge
conjecture in the case of abelian varieties of CM -type.
As discussed above, the Tate conjecture is unsound due to its false assumption that
the analytic continuation of the Zeta function Z(X, t) is true, and that consequently to
ζ(s) has a pole. This falsity of the Tate conjecture results in the falsity of the Hodge
conjecture too, because the two are equivalent in the case of abelian varieties of CM -
type. The invalidity of the Hodge conjecture in this one specific case is sufficient to
invalidate it in general.
Gordon [109] states at page 364, §11.2:
The main result of Pohlmann [223] is that for abelian varieties of CM -
type, the Hodge and Tate conjectures are equivalent. Then that the va-
lidity of the Tate conjecture for an abelian variety A implies the validity
of the Hodge conjecture for A has been proved by Piatetskii-Shapiro [219],
Deligne (unpublished) and Deligne [77]. Borovoi [38] extends the result of
Piatetskii-Shapiro [219], and Borovoi [39] contains a weaker version of the
main theorem of Deligne [77], from which Tate implies Hodge for abelian
varieties follows as a corollary.
Year Author Topic
1968 Pohlmann [223] Hodge if and only if Tate for CM -type
1971 Piatetskii-Shapiro [219] Tate implies Hodge
1974 Borovoi [38] Tate implies Hodge
1977 Serre [255] Connections between Hodge and Tate conj.
1982 Deligne [77] Absolute Hodge cycles, Tate implies Hodge
Table 9: Chronological listing of work on the Hodge conjecture for abelian
varieties. (See Gordon [109], p.366.)
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The cited Deligne [77] reference discloses the following:
COROLLARY 6.2. Let A be an abelian variety over C. If Tate’s con-
jecture is true for A, then so also is the Hodge conjecture. 538
REMARK 6.3. The last result was first proved independently by Piatetskii-
Shapiro [219] and Deligne (unpublished) by an argument similar to that
which concluded the proof of the main theorem. (Corollary 6.2 is easy
to prove for abelian varieties of CM-type; in fact, Pohlmann [223]
shows that the two conjectures are equivalent in that case.) 539
Shioda [257] provides more details (emphasis added in bold:
Abelian varieties of CM type ([Pohlmann [223], §2]). In this case,
Pohlmann gave a combinatorial description of the Hodge ring B∗(A) in
terms of the action of the CM field on the complex cohomology H∗(A,C),
and proved the equivalence of the Hodge Conjecture and the Tate
Conjecture for this type of abelian varieties. There is given an ex-
plicit example (due to Mumford) of a 4-dimensional abelian variety of CM
type such that B2(A) 6= D2(A), for which Hodge (A, 2) is still unknown.
According to Mumford [200], an abelian variety A is of CM type in the
extended sense (i.e. isogenous to a product of abelian varieties of CM type
in the usual sense) if and only if its Hodge group Hg(A) is an algebraic torus.
We have dim Hg(A) ≤ dimA, and A is called non-degenerate if equality
holds (Kubota [166], Ribet [239]). For an abelian variety A of CM type, the
two conditions (i) A is non-degenerate and (ii) B2(A) = D2(A) seem closely
related. A recent result of Ribet and Lenstra (private communication in
May 1981) shows that (i) and (ii) are indeed equivalent if A is an abelian
variety with the CM field which is an abelian extension of Q. Hazama [130]
shows that if A is simple, then (i) implies (ii) in general. 540
Moreover, Beauville [22] discloses that:
For most abelian varieties, the Hodge conjecture holds for trivial reasons:
the algebra of Hodge classes is generated in degree one. 541 This is the case
in particular:
538See Deligne [77], p.43.
539See Deligne [77], p.43.
540See Shioda [257], page 60.
541See Beauville [22], p. 12, Corollary 5.5: If the algebra Hdg∗(X) is generated by Hdg1(X), the
Hodge conjecture holds for X.
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* for a general abelian variety [Mattuck [185]];
* for a product of elliptic curves [Tate [278]];
* for a simple 542 abelian variety of dimension p, where p is a prime
number [Tankeev [272]]. 543
Note that Beauville’s [22] statement that "for most abelian varieties, the Hodge
conjecture holds for trivial reasons", was not originally intended to refer to "trivial
truth" (as per ECQ). Yet ironically, the Hodge conjecture is indeed "trivially true" as
per ECQ. The analytic continuation of the Zeta function violates the LNC, and triggers
ECQ. This renders unsound any conjecture that assumes that the analytic continuation
of the Zeta function is true, and consequently that the Zeta function has poles and zeros.
Tate [278], whose title is "Algebraic cycles and poles of zeta functions", does precisely
this. Therefore, the Tate conjecture is unsound, due to false assumptions.
Given that the Tate and Hodge conjectures are equivalent for the "trivial case" dis-
cussed in Tate [278], and also for "abelian varieties of CM type", the Hodge conjecture
is unsound, because it is equivalent to the unsound Tate conjecture in these instances.
So the result in classical and intuitionistic logics is that the Tate and Hodge con-
jectures violate LNC and trigger ECQ, even if this can only be proven for the specific
instances of "a product of elliptic curves" and "abelian varieties of CM type". The
unsoundness of the Hodge conjecture in these specific instances is sufficient to invalidate
it in all other instances (in logics with LNC).
24.8 Other Number Theory Conjectures
24.8.1 The Generalized Riemann Hypothesis (GRH), Extended Riemann
Hypothesis (ERH), and Grand Lindelöf Hypothesis (GLH)
According to the Wikipedia entry on the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis (GRH) [314]:
Various geometrical and arithmetical objects can be described by so-
called global L-functions, which are formally similar to the Riemann zeta-
function. One can then ask the same question about the zeros of these
L-functions, yielding various generalizations of the Riemann hypothesis. ...
Global L-functions can be associated to elliptic curves, number fields
(in which case they are called Dedekind zeta-functions), Maass forms, and
Dirichlet characters (in which case they are called Dirichlet L-functions).
542A complex torus T is simple if the only complex subtori it contains are (0) and T .
543See Beauville [22], p.14.
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When the Riemann hypothesis is formulated for Dedekind zeta-functions,
it is known as the extended Riemann hypothesis (ERH) 544 and when it is
formulated for Dirichlet L-functions, it is known as the generalized Riemann
hypothesis (GRH). 545
There exist additional hypothesis derived from the RH, such as the Lindelöf Hy-
pothesis, 546 and the Grand Lindelöf Hypothesis (GLH), which is a generalization of
the Lindelöf hypothesis. 547
All of these hypotheses are generalizations of the RH, and like the RH, they too
falsely assume the truth of analytic continuation, and assume the existence of non-
existent zeros. Their truth-values correspond to those of the RH, according to the logic
applied (classical, intuitionistic, 3VL, etc.).
24.8.2 The Bloch-Kato Conjecture
According to Boston [40], "the Bloch-Kato conjecture [is] a vast generalization of the
Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer conjecture": 548
In this way we can restate the desired inequality in terms of the order of
a Selmer group being bounded by a special value of an L-function, and we
have a case of the Bloch-Kato conjecture, a vast generalization of the Birch
and Swinnerton-Dyer conjecture.
Furthermore, according to Bellaïche [25]:
In the case where V = Vp(E), the Bloch-Kato conjecture is closely re-
lated to the Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer conjecture, so all results about the
Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer conjecture give a result for the Bloch-Kato con-
jecture. For example, the combination of results of Gross-Zagier and Koly-
vagin shows that for if ords=0L
(
Vp(E), s
) ≤ 1, the Bloch-Kato conjecture is
known for V = Vp(E). 549
544See also Chandrasekharan [56], p.4: "If, on the other hand, one assumes the ’extended Riemann
hypothesis’, that not only the Riemann zeta-function but all the L-functions, modulo q, of Dirichlet,
have all their zeros in the critical strip on the critical line, one would get ..."
545See discussions of the GRH in Iwaniec et al. [148] and Sarnak [251].
546See the Wikipedia entry on the Lindelöf Hypothesis [321].
547See discussions of the GLH in Iwaniec et al. [148] and Sarnak [251].
548See Boston [40], page cxvii.
549See Bellaïche [25], p. 50.
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The Bloch-Kato conjecture falsely assumes that the analytic continuation of L-
functions is valid, that they have zeros, etc. So the Bloch-Kato conjecture is unsound
in logics that have the LNC.
Bellaïche [25] states that there is no direct relation between the Grand Riemann
Hypothesis and the Bloch-Kato conjectures for special values (the "Tamagawa number
conjecture"):
However, be aware that there is no direct relation between the Grand
Riemann Hypothesis, which is interested in the zeros of L(V, s) on (w +
1)/2 < Re(s) < w/2 + 1 and the Bloch-Kato conjecture, which is concerned
by the zeros of L(V, s) at integers. 550
Bellaïche overlooks the fact that L-functions are generalizations of Riemann’s ζ(s).
In logics that have the LNC, the analytic continuation of Riemann’s ζ(s) is invalid, as
is the "meromorphic continuation" of L-functions. 551 Bellaïche refers to analytical
continuation as a "mysterious process", 552 when in fact it is an invalid process in any
logic that has the LNC. As with the RH and the BSD conjecture, the Bloch-Kato
conjecture refers to non-existent zeros. Both the Grand Riemann Hypothesis and the
Bloch-Kato conjecture are unsound.
24.9 P vs. NP
Venn’s "Modern" Square of Opposition (see Figure 3 below) resolves the P vs. NP
question, by showing that P 6= NP . The author has not found any reference that
applies this technique of logic to solve this specific problem.
First, we assume classical logic as the foundational logic. The definition of "equiv-
alence" in Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica [306] is: "two propositions
are equivalent when, and only when, both are true or both are false" 553 PM is a
bivalent logic, and thus has no third truth-value such as "indeterminate" or "paradox".
Next, we accept the conventional definitions of "P" as "the set of problems solvable
in polynomial time", and "NP" as "the set of problems verifiable in polynomial time".
Furthermore, "P -complete" is defined as the set of problems proven to be in P , and
"NP -complete" is defined as the set of problems proven to be in NP .
550See Bellaïche [25], p.39.
551See Bellaïche [25], p. 38, Conjecture 3.1: "Then the function L(V, s) admits a meromorphic
continuation on all the complex plane." See also Bellaïche [25], p. 44: "We assume that the L-function
L(V, s) has a meromorphic continuation to the entire plane, in accordance to Conjecture 3.1."
552See Bellaïche [25], p. 44.
553See Whitehead and Russell’s [306], p.115, discussion of equivalence and Th. *4.01.
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Figure 3: Venn’s "Modern" Square of Opposition
So based on the definition of "equivalence" in Principia Mathematica [306], P = NP
only if both of the following propositions A1 and A2 are true:
Proposition A1: P → NP
Proposition A2: NP → P
Moreover, in classical logic P = NP is the same as ¬P = ¬NP , and ¬P = ¬NP is
the same as both of the following propositions A3 and A4 being true:
Proposition A3: ¬P → ¬NP
Proposition A4: ¬NP → ¬P
We analyze these four propositions (A1, A2, A3, and A4), and show that neither
of the pairs (A1 and A2) or (A3 and A4) consists of two true propositions. Therefore,
P 6= NP .
24.9.1 Proposition A1: "Every P is NP"
This is proposition A1 and its related propositions, according to Venn’s "Modern"
Square of Contradiction: 554
554Compare Aristotle’s and Venn’s "Modern" Square of Contradiction (SoC) at Parsons [210].
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Proposition A1: Every P is NP : ∀x(Px→ NPx)
Proposition E1: No P is NP : ∀x(Px→ ¬NPx)
Proposition I1: Some P is NP : ∃x(Px&NPx)
Proposition O1: Some P is not NP : ∃x(Px&¬NPx)
Proposition I1: There exists a problem that is solvable in polynomial time (P ) AND
is verifiable in polynomial time (NP ). This proposition is TRUE (e.g. any P -complete
problem. One example is the Circuit Value Problem (CVP). In fact, all P problems are
NP ).
Proposition O1: There exists a problem that is solvable in polynomial time (P )
AND is not verifiable in polynomial time (¬NP). This proposition is FALSE. (All P
problems are NP . All problems are verifiable in polynomial time, due to the existence
of polynomial time sorting algorithms).
Therefore, because "A" contradicts "O", and "E" contradicts "I", we can determine
the following:
Proposition A1: For all problems, IF a problem is solvable in polynomial time
(P ) THEN it is verifiable in polynomial time (NP ). This proposition is TRUE. (The
confirmation is that all P problems are NP ).
Proposition E1: For all problems, IF a problem is solvable in polynomial time (P )
THEN it is NOT verifiable in polynomial time (¬NP). This proposition is FALSE. (The
confirmation is that all P problems are NP . All problems are verifiable in polynomial
time, due to the existence of polynomial time sorting algorithms).
So A1 is TRUE.
24.9.2 Proposition A2: "Every NP is P"
For proposition A2, which is a material implication in the opposite direction of propo-
sition A1, Venn’s "Modern" Square of Opposition is:
Proposition A2: Every NP is P : ∀x(NPx→ Px)
Proposition E2: No NP is P : ∀x(NPx→ ¬Px)
Proposition I2: Some NP is P : ∃x(NPx&Px)
Proposition O2: Some NP is not P : ∃x(NPx&¬Px)
Proposition I2: There exists a problem that is verifiable in polynomial time (NP )
AND is solvable in polynomial time (P ). This proposition is TRUE (e.g. a P -complete
problem. All P problems are NP ).
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Proposition O2: There exists a problem that is verifiable in polynomial time (NP )
AND is not solvable in polynomial time (¬P). This proposition is TRUE (e.g. an NP -
complete problem, such as Travelling Salesman Problem, which grows exponentially).
Therefore, because "A" contradicts "O", and "E" contradicts "I", we can determine
the following:
Proposition A2: For all problems, IF a problem is verifiable in polynomial time
(NP ) THEN it is solvable in polynomial time (P ). This proposition is FALSE.
Proposition E2: For all problems, IF a problem is verifiable in polynomial time
(NP ) THEN it is NOT solvable in polynomial time (¬P). This proposition is FALSE.
So both of the propositions A2 and E2 are FALSE. Some problems are verifiable
in polynomial time (NP ) and solvable in polynomial time (P ). Other problems are
verifiable in polynomial time (NP ) BUT NOT solvable in polynomial time (¬P ).
This result, that proposition A2 is FALSE, is sufficient to show that P 6= NP .
24.9.3 Proposition A3: "Every ’not P’ is ’not NP’"
For the sake of completeness, we also we also evaluate the pair of propositions A3 and
A4, in order to show that ¬P 6= ¬NP . According to Venn’s "Modern" Square of
Contradiction, this is Proposition A3 and its related propositions:
Proposition A3: Every ¬P is ¬NP : ∀x(¬Px→ ¬NPx)
Proposition E3: No ¬P is ¬NP : ∀x(¬Px→ NPx)
Proposition I3: Some ¬P is ¬NP : ∃x(¬Px&¬NPx)
Proposition O3: Some ¬P is NP : ∃x(¬Px&NPx)
Proposition I3: There exists a problem that is NOT solvable in polynomial time
(¬P ) AND is NOT verifiable in polynomial time (¬NP ). This proposition is FALSE
(e.g. All problems are verifiable in polynomial time, due to the existence of polynomial
time sorting algorithms.)
Proposition O3: There exists a problem that is NOT solvable in polynomial time
(¬P ) AND is verifiable in polynomial time (NP ). This proposition is TRUE (e.g. Due
to sorting algorithms being in polynomial time)
Therefore, because "A" contradicts "O", and "E" contradicts "I", we can determine
the following:
Proposition A3: For all problems, IF a problem is NOT solvable in polynomial time
(¬P ) THEN it is NOT verifiable in polynomial time (¬NP ). This proposition is FALSE
(All problems are verifiable in polynomial time, due to the existence of polynomial time
sorting algorithms).
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Proposition E3: For all problems, IF a problem is NOT solvable in polynomial
time (¬P ) THEN it is verifiable in polynomial time (¬NP). This proposition is TRUE
(confirmed, due to sorting algorithms being in polynomial time).
So A3 is FALSE. This is sufficient to show that ¬P 6= ¬NP .
24.9.4 Proposition A4: "Every ’not NP’ is ’not P’"
For proposition A4, which is a proposition in the opposite direction of proposition A3,
Venn’s "Modern" Square of Opposition is:
Proposition A4: Every ¬NP is ¬P : ∀x(¬NPx→ ¬Px)
Proposition E4: No ¬NP is ¬P : ∀x(¬NPx→ Px)
Proposition I4: Some ¬NP is ¬P : ∃x(¬NPx&¬Px)
Proposition O4: Some ¬NP is P : ∃x(¬NPx&Px)
Proposition I4: There exists a problem that is NOT verifiable in polynomial time
(¬NP ) AND is NOT solvable in polynomial time (¬P ). This proposition is FALSE.
(All problems are verifiable in polynomial time, due to the existence of polynomial time
sorting algorithms).
Proposition O4: There exists a problem that is NOT verifiable in polynomial time
(¬NP ) AND is solvable in polynomial time (¬P). This proposition is FALSE. (All
problems are verifiable in polynomial time, due to the existence of polynomial time
sorting algorithms).
Therefore, because "A" contradicts "O", and "E" contradicts "I", we can determine
the following:
Proposition A4: For all problems, IF a problem is NOT verifiable in polynomial
time (¬NP ) THEN it is NOT solvable in polynomial time (¬P ) . This proposition is
TRUE, because "O" is FALSE, and also due to material implication, which is always
true if the antecedent is a "vacuous subject" (as it is in this proposition).
Proposition E4: For all problems, IF a problem is NOT verifiable in polynomial
time (¬NP ) THEN it is solvable in polynomial time (¬P). This proposition is TRUE,
because "I" is FALSE, and also due to material implication, which is always true if the
antecedent is a "vacuous subject" (as it is in this proposition).
So A4 and E4 together form a PARADOX.
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24.9.5 P 6= NP , Because A2 is False and A4 is a Paradox
In classical logic, in order for P = NP , both A1 and A2 must be true, or both A3 and
A4 must be true. 555 But that is not the case. Out of the pair A1 and A2, A2 is FALSE,
so only A1 is TRUE. Out of the pair A3 and A4, A4 is a PARADOX, so only A3 is
exclusively TRUE. So P 6= NP .
25 Some Implications in Physics
The invalidity of analytic continuation of ζ(s) in logics with LNC means that in physics,
"Zeta Function Regularization" violates the LNC and triggers ECQ, thereby rendering
"trivially true" every physics model that uses it.
This paper points out a few articles in the physics literature where this "regulariza-
tion" (it actually is a "contradiction") is used, in models pertaining to Yang-Mills the-
ory, the Casimir Effect, Quantum Electrodynamics (QED), Chromodynamics (QCD),
Supersymmetry (SUSY), Quantum Field Theory (QFT), and Bosonic String Theory.
25.1 Riemann Zeta Function Regularization
Physicists have a procedure they call "Riemann zeta function regularization", that
replaces the Dirichlet series ζ(s) with Riemann’s ζ(s), whenever the former produces
divergent values. This "regularization" introduces a contradiction whenever it is used,
thus violating the LNC, and rendering the relevant mathematical proof "trivially true"
in any logic with both LNC and ECQ. 556 557
In addition, all physics arguments (e.g. two-dimensional Yang-Mills theory) that
falsely assume that ζ(s) is convergent for values of s in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1, 558 even
without explicit reference to "Riemann zeta function regularization", are unsound, and
thus "trivially true" due to LNC and ECQ.
Hawking [129] describes the use of Riemann Zeta function regularization as:
555See Whitehead and Russell’s [306] discussion of equivalence and Th. *4.01 on p.115 ("It is obvious
that two propositions are equivalent when, and only when, both are true or both are false.").
556See Bell [24], p.33, citing Dirac [80]: "[Dirac] divided the difficulties of quantum mechanics into two
classes, those of the first class and those of the second. The second-class difficulties were essentially
the infinities of relativistic quantum field theory. Dirac was very disturbed by these, and was not
impressed by the ’renormalisation’ procedures by which they are circumvented. Dirac tried hard to
eliminate these second-class difficulties, and urged others to do likewise."
557See Dirac [80]: "I am inclined to suspect that the renormalization theory is something that will not
survive in the future, and that the remarkable agreement between its results and experiment should
be looked on as a fluke."
558See, e.g. Witten [342]: Eq. 2.20, Eq.2.32, and Eq.3.22, etc.
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... a technique for obtaining finite values to path integrals for fields
(including the gravitational field) on a curved spacetime background or,
equivalently, for evaluating the determinants of differential operators such
as the four-dimensional Laplacian or D’Alembertian. 559
According to Dittrich [81]:
[In] many local relativistic quantum field theory models of elementary
particles, ... Riemann’s results are of utmost importance for handling in-
finities with the aid of his zeta-function regularization. 560
Moreover, according to Bilal et al. [30]:
We emphasize the close relationship between zeta function methods and
arbitrary spectral cutoff regularizations in curved spacetime. This yields, on
the one hand, a physically sound and mathematically rigorous justification
of the standard zeta function regularization at one loop and, on the other
hand, a natural generalization of this method to higher loops. In particu-
lar, to any Feynman diagram is associated a generalized meromorphic zeta
function. 561
This despite the following:
In spite of its power and elegance, the zeta function approach suffers from
two important drawbacks. The first drawback, shared with dimensional
regularization, is the absence of any obvious reason for why precisely it
works. Even though replacing sums like
∑
n>0 n by ζR(−1) = −1/12 is a
perfectly well-defined procedure in the mathematical sense, it is abstract
and unphysical. 562 It is clear that the analytic continuation subtracts the
divergence, as required, but it is very unclear how it does so explicitly and
why the remaining finite part is the actual correct physical value. 563
25.2 Yang-Mills Theory
Witten [342] describes two-dimensional quantum Yang-Mills Theory (YMT) from three
different "points of view":
559See Hawking [129], p.133, §1 Introduction, 1st para.
560See Dittrich [81], p.3.
561See Bilal et al. [30], Abstract.
562Note: It is not "well-defined procedure in the mathematical sense", and in fact is illogical.
563See Bilal et al. [30], 4th page.
128
1. Standard physical methods,
2. Relating YMT to the large k limit of three-dimensional Chern-Simons theory, and
two-dimensional conformal field theory, and
3. Relating the weak coupling limit of YMT to the theory of Reidmeister-Ray-Singer
Torsion.
The abstract of Witten [342] states that the results obtained from these three points
of view are in agreement, and "give formulas for the volumes of the moduli spaces of
representations of fundamental groups of two dimensional surfaces." However, each of
these three points of view use Riemann’s version of ζ(s), which is invalid for values of
s in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1. So all three "points of view" of 2D YMT are "trivially true"
in logics with LNC and ECQ. 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571
Moreover, Aguilera-Damia et al. [2] applies Zeta-function regularization to N = 4
super-Yang-Mills theory:
Using ζ-function regularization, we study the one-loop effective action of
fundamental strings in AdS5 × S5 dual to the latitude 14 -BPS Wilson loop
in N = 4 super-Yang-Mills theory. To avoid certain ambiguities inherent
to string theory on curved backgrounds we subtract the effective action of
the holographic 1
2
-BPS Wilson loop. We find agreement with the expected
564See Witten [342], p.154, description of Eq. 1.2: "... and Σ [is] a Riemann surface of genus g, one
finds V ol(M) = 2 · (2pi2)1−g · ζ(2g− 2), where ζ(s) is the Riemann zeta function". But Riemann’s ζ(s)
violates LNC, so V ol(M) is divergent at g=0 and g=1.
565Witten’s [342], p.154, description of Eq. 1.2 also refers (in regards to Eq. 3.18) to the Hurwitz
zeta function and Dirichlet L-functions. These generalizations of Riemann’s ζ(s) inherit Riemann’s
ζ(s) falsity in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1.
566Witten’s [342], p.174 (last para.) states: "We will formulate this in a way that exhibits the relation
to IRF models - which also appear, after a much more difficult analysis, in computing Wilson line
expectation values in three dimensional Chern-Simons theory [25]. For convenience, we will consider
first the case that Σ has genus zero." However, Eq.1.2 with g = 0 produces a divergent V ol(M).
567Witten’s [342], p.159, description of Eq. 2.20: "With an explicit choice (such as zeta function
regularization) for defining the determinants that appear in evaluating the left and right-hand sides
of (2.20), an a priori computation of ∆v can be given." The so-called "Zeta function regularization"
replaces the Dirichlet series ζ(s) with the false Riemann ζ(s), for values of s in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1.
568See also Witten’s [342], p.161, description of Eq. 2.28: "We will ensure this by using the zeta
function definition of determinants [3]". But the Dirichlet series ζ(s) is divergent at s = 0.
569See also Witten’s [342], p.178, Eq. 3.8, which includes Riemann’s ζ(s). Eq. 3.8 is divergent at
g = 0 and g = 1.
570See also Witten’s [342], p.180, Eq.3.22: "The Hurwitz zeta function ... is then continued holomor-
phically throughout the complex z plane, except for a pole at z = 1". This is false.
571See also Witten’s [342], p.201, Eq. 4.95: "with ζ(s) the Riemann zeta function". This is divergent
if Re(s) ≤ 1.
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field theory result at first order in the small latitude angle expansion but
discrepancies at higher order. 572
So because of zeta-function regularization, N = 4 super-Yang-Mills theory is "triv-
ially true" in logics with LNC and ECQ.
25.3 Casimir Effect, QED, and QCD
Dittrich [81] states that "Riemann Zeta Function Regularization" is used to derive the
Casimir effect. 573 Tong [282] confirms that this is the case for "Casimir Energy". 574
Dittrich [81] also states that: "The same procedure finds application in QED and
QCD." 575 If true, then the Casimir effect, Quantum Electrodynamics (QED), and
Quantum Chromodynamics (QCD) are all "trivially true" in logics with LNC and
ECQ.
25.4 Supersymmetry (SUSY)
According to Elizalde [91], Supersymmetry (SUSY) incorporates Riemann Zeta Func-
tion Regularization:
Regularization and renormalization procedures are essential issues in
contemporary physics — without which it would simply not exist, at least
in the form known today (2000). They are also essential in supersymmetry
calculations. Among the different methods, zeta-function regularization —
which is obtained by analytic continuation in the complex plane of the zeta-
function of the relevant physical operator in each case — might well be the
most beautiful of all. Use of this method yields, for instance, the vacuum
energy corresponding to a quantum physical system (with constraints of any
kind, in principle). 576
Therefore, due to the use of zeta-function regularization, Supersymmetry (SUSY)
is "trivially true" in logics with LNC and ECQ.
572See Aguilera-Damia et al. [2], abstract.
573See Dittrich [81], pp.30-34.
574See Tong [282], pp.38-40. Tong’s discussion on Casimir Energy begins on p.38 with the following
quote attributed to Ramanujan, in a letter to G.H.Hardy: "“I told him that the sum of an infinite no.
of terms of the series: 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + ... = 1/12 under my theory. If I tell you this you will at once
point out to me the lunatic asylum as my goal." Ramanujan was aware that this equation violates the
rules of arithmetic.
575See Dittrich [81], p.34.
576See Elizalde [91], 1st para. It appears that "with constraints" should be "without constraints".
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25.5 Quantum Field Theory (QFT)
According to Elizalde [91], Riemann Zeta Function Regularization is also used in Quan-
tum Field Theory (QFT):
These mathematically simple-looking relations involve very deep physi-
cal concepts (no wonder that understanding them took several decades in
the recent history of quantum field theory, QFT). The zeta-function method
is unchallenged at the one-loop level, where it is rigorously defined and where
many calculations of QFT reduce basically (from a mathematical point of
view) to the computation of determinants of elliptic pseudo-differential op-
erators ... 577
Penrose [214] goes further, saying that:
Whatever philosophical position is taken on this issue, renormalization
is an essential feature of modern QFT. Indeed, as things stand, there is no
accepted way of obtaining finite answers without such an ’infinite rescaling’
procedure applied not necessarily only to charge, or mass, but to other
quantities also. Theories in which this kind of procedure works are called
renormalizable. In a renormalizable QFT, it is possible to collect together all
the divergent parts of the Feynman graphs into a finite number of ’parcels’
which can be ’scaled away’ by renormalization, any remaining divergent
expressions being deemed to cancel out with each other 578
However, if QFT uses "zeta-function normalization", then it is "trivially true" in
logics with LNC and ECQ. Moreover, it is clear that physicists care neither about
this specific logical problem (violation of LNC and ECQ), nor about the more general
problem of the logical foundations of mathematics. Here is Penrose [214] again:
It is a common standpoint, among particle physicists, to take renor-
malization as a selection principle for proposed theories. Accordingly any
non-renormalization theory would be automatically rejected as inappropri-
ate to Nature. 579
577See Elizalde [91], 2nd para.
578See Penrose [214], §26.9, p.678.
579See Penrose [214], §26.9, p.678.
131
So any particle physics theory without a glaring logical contradiction is "inappropriate
to Nature"? 580 Penrose also states:
Many (and perhaps even most) physicists would take the view that the
framework of QFT is ’here to stay’, and that the blame for any inconsisten-
cies (these being usually from infinities coming from divergent integrals, or
from divergent sums, or both) lies in the particular scheme to which QFT
is being applied, rather than in the framework of QFT itself. 581
So in summary: according to many physicists, any particle physics theory without the
contradiction inherent in "renormalization" is automatically rejected, but the blame for
any inconsistencies in accepted theories does not lie in the framework of QFT itself.
This is madness. (Especially because vacuous subjects generate paradoxes. It is entirely
possible that certain hypothesized particles do not exist, and hence generate paradoxes).
25.6 Bosonic String Theory
There are several examples in Bosonic string theory of the use of Riemann’s ζ(s), and
the functional equation of a relationship between ζ(s) and ζ(1− s).
The He et al. [134] reference links Riemann’s ζ(s) to expressions of the Veneziano
amplitude 582 that describe the scattering of four bosonic open strings with tachyonic
masses. This is based on work by Freund et al. [102], whose abstract states:
We show that the Veneziano and Virasoro-Shapiro four-particle scat-
tering amplitudes can be factored in terms of an infinite product of non-
archimedean string amplitudes. This factorization is equivalent to the func-
tional equation for the Riemann zeta function.
Toppan [283] provides a description of the heat-kernel method and of generalized
Riemann’s zeta-functions associated to elliptic operators. (These generalized zeta-
functions violate the LNC in half of their respective domains, just as the original Rie-
mann ζ(s) does). Toppan [283] then defines their role in defining one-loop partition
functions for Euclidean Field Theories.
Toppan [283] then applies these results to the Polyakov functional quantization
of the closed bosonic string, to derive its critical dimensionality of D = 26. Núñez
580Note that Niels Bohr held that violation of LNC is a core principle of quantum physics. He chose
the motto "Contraria Sunt Complementa" ("Opposites are Complementary") for his coat of arms,
when inducted into the Danish Order of the Elephant in 1947. See Wikipedia [326], citing Wheeler
[304].
581See Penrose [214], §26.1, p.656.
582See Wikipedia [334], citing Veneziano [296]. See also Turco et al. [287] (unpublished).
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[203] confirms the use of Zeta function regularization in obtaining the "trivially true"
dimensionality of D = 26 . 583 Therefore, Bosonic String theory is "trivially true" in
logics with LNC and ECQ.
Moreover, in Bosonic string theory, the mass of states in lightcone gauge is: 584
M2 =
4
α′
[ ∞∑
n=1
αi−nα
i
n +
D − 2
2
( ∞∑
n=1
n
)]
(25.1)
The Dirichlet series ζ(s) is divergent at s = −1, but Riemann’s ζ(s) at s = −1 is: 585
ζ(−1) = −1/12 (25.2)
If the value of Riemann’s ζ(s) at s = −1 is substituted for the divergent Dirichlet series
ζ(s) at s = −1 (thereby violating the LNC, and triggering ECQ), the mass of states is:
586
M2 =
4
α′
(
N − (D − 2)
24
)
(25.3)
At the ground state N = 0, the formula simplifies to: 587
M2 =
−(D − 2)
6 · α′ (25.4)
which corresponds to a particle with an imaginary mass, known as a tachyon. Moreover,
at the first excited state (N = 1), the Equation 25.1 is massless (M2 = 0) at D = 26.
These results are "trivially true" in logics with LNC and ECQ. If ζ(s) is defined
by the Dirichlet series, then the mass of states in lightcone gauge (Equation 25.1) is as
follows: At D = 2,
M2 =
4 ·N
α′
(25.5)
At all other values of D, the value of M2 is divergent. Moreover, Equation 25.1 is
massless (i.e. M2 = 0) only if both D = 2 and N = 0, or if D = 2 and α′ is
infinitesimal. Moreover, at D 6= 2 and α′ is infinitesimal, the value of M2 is divergent.
583See Núñez [203], Eq.105, bottom of p.17 to top of p.18.
584See PhysicsOverflow [218], citing Tong [282], Eq. at top of p.39.
585See PhysicsOverflow [218], citing Tong [282], Eq. at middle of p.39.
586See PhysicsOverflow [218], citing Tong [282], Eq.2.26, p.39.
587See PhysicsOverflow [218], citing Tong [282], Eq.2.27, p.40.
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25.7 Riemann’s Zeta Function and the Failure of LOI in Quan-
tum Physics
As stated in a previous section of the present paper, the convergent Riemann’s ζ(s))
in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 (except at s = 1), where the Dirichlet series ζ(s) is proven
divergent, is a violation of the Law of Identity (LOI) for the function ζ(s). In this
scenario, ζ(s) is not equal to itself in half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1 (except at s = 1).
Given that quantum physics extensively uses Riemann’s ζ(s) in "zeta-function reg-
ularization", it is not surprising to see published articles that state that LOI fails in
quantum physics (emphasis added): 588
However, it has also been argued that quantum physics is in fact com-
patible with a metaphysics of individual objects, but that such objects are
indistinguishable in a sense which leads to the violation of Leibniz’s famous
Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. This last claim has recently been
contested in a way that has reinvigorated the debate over the impact of the
theory.
This leads to the questions: what remains of quantum physics if "renormalization"
(e.g. use of Riemann’s ζ(s)) is no longer permitted? Will LOI hold true in whatever
remains? An additional question: will whatever remains be able to explain experimental
results?
25.8 3VL in Physics
25.8.1 Schrödinger’s Cat
Classical logic is the assumed logical foundation of the "Schrödinger Cat" illustration of
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, as evidenced by concerns about
its violation of the LNC. As Baggott [17] states:
On the surface, it really seems as though we ought to be able to resolve
this paradox with ease. But we can’t. There is obviously no evidence for
peculiar superposition states of live-and-dead things or of ’classical’ macro-
scopic objects of any description. 589
588See French, [101].
589See Baggott [17], pp.133-134.
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In classical logic, the contradictory statements of "the cat is alive" and "the cat is dead"
would violate the LNC, and trigger ECQ, if both were true simultaneously. 590
A more appropriate logical foundation for the "Schrödinger Cat" scenario is a 3VL.
For example, Łukasiewicz’s 3VL has a third truth-value of "unknown", which is relevant
for the state where it is unknown if the cat is alive or dead. 591 Moreover, in a 3VL
such as Łukasiewicz’, a logical proposition having the 3rd state does not result in
the entire model being "trivially true" due to LNC and ECQ. It is due to LNC and
ECQ that "Schrödinger’s Cat" is usually discussed in the context of probability theory
(which has no truth-values) rather than logic (which does). 592 593 3VLs provide a
truth-functional way of addressing the paradox, without "trivial truth", and without
resorting to probability theory.
Other logics that are appropriate for the "Schrödinger Cat" scenario are intuition-
istic logic (that rejects LEM) and its variants, such as minimal logic (that rejects both
LEM and ECQ). 594 Intuitionistic logic is applicable here because while the chamber
containing the cat is sealed, outside observers cannot prove either that the cat is dead,
or that it is alive. In other words, we have no "proof" for the cat being alive or dead.
These logics acknowledge that there exist instances when neither proposition A nor its
negation ¬A can be proven, which in classical logic would violate the LEM. As with
Aristotle’s "future contingents", and probability theory, intuitionistic logic acknowl-
edges that there exist conditions of uncertainty, due to the limits of human knowledge.
So in intuitionistic logic, we must acknowledge the limits of our knowledge, and concede
that we do not know the status of the cat. This is an Epistemological issue.
25.8.2 Particle/Wave Duality
Another example of contradiction in physics is the particle/wave duality. In classical
physics, which pertains to "large scale" phenomena, particles and waves are mutually
exclusive categories. So in classical logic, "quantum scale" assumptions such as the
dual nature of matter (and light) are paradoxes that, due to LNC and ECQ, would
cause the "trivial truth" of classical physics theories. (Note that particle/wave duality
590See Griffiths [114], §10.1 "Schrödinger’s Cat", citing Schrödinger [252]. See also da Costa et al.
[72], abstract, which argues that "Schrödinger logics" (Non-reflexive logics) are "logical systems in
which [Leibniz’s] principle of identity is not true in general." See also Penrose [214], §29, especially
§29.7 - §29.9, pp.804-812, which discusses the "paradox of Schrödinger’s Cat", but only in the context
of a 2VL.
591Arguably, so do the "future contingents" discussed in Aristotle’s De interpretatione §9, in Organon.
592See Fronhöfer [104], p.2.
593Also see Baggott [17], pp.131-135, which discusses the paradox of "Schrödinger’s Cat", but fails
to consider non-classical logics.
594See Wikipedia [324], citing Johansson [154] and Troelstra et al. [286], p.37.
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also violates the LEM).
As Penrose [214] states:
These kinds of consideration led to the conclusion that an ordinary par-
ticle displays wavelike behavior, this having a universal relationship to the
particle’s rest-mass as determined by the Planck and de Broglie formulae.
But, in the previous two decades, a converse to this had already been estab-
lished, demonstrating that entities previously thought of as purely wavelike
- basically Maxwell’s oscillating electric and magnetic fields as the con-
stituents of light 595 - had also to be viewed as having a particulate nature,
again consistent with Planck and de Broglie formulae. The most convincing
evidence for this was in the photoelectric effect ... 596
Given that particle/wave duality is observed at the "quantum scale" but not at the
"large scale", the logical foundation of the math used at the large scale can be classical
logic. But at the "quantum scale", phenomena such as particle/wave duality must be
described in a logic that rejects the LNC and ECQ (i.e. a non-classical logic).
As with the paradox of "Schrödinger’s Cat", a 3VL with a third truth-value is a
good candidate. One obvious candidate is Priest’s 3VL, which has a 3rd truth-value
corresponding to "truth-value gluts". This is appropriate because light is both particle
and wave, simultaneously. In such a 3VL, the dual nature of light is assigned to a third
truth-value, instead of to a contradiction that causes the entire model to be "trivially
true" due to LNC and ECQ.
25.8.3 Galilean Relativity and Special Relativity
Cohen [62] discloses the following issue raised by Immanuel Kant:
Kant’s early work is characterized by an attempt to identify internal
contradictions in abstract metaphysical theories derived from pure logic.
For example, Kant is concerned that although in logic either A or not-A is
true, in reality, something can be both A and not-A. A physical object like
a table on a train, for instance, can be both in motion and motionless since
it depends on the position of the observer. 597
However, Galileo preceeded Kant by over a century in raising this issue:
595Citing Penrose [214], §19.2
596Penrose [214],§21.4, p.501. See also §21.5, pp.505-507, and §21.7, pp.511-515.
597See Cohen [62], pp.76, and 238-239, citing Kant [155], pp.203-242.
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Galilean invariance or Galilean relativity states that the laws of motion
are the same in all inertial frames. Galileo Galilei first described this princi-
ple in 1632 in his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems using
the example of a ship travelling at constant velocity, without rocking, on a
smooth sea; any observer below the deck would not be able to tell whether
the ship was moving or stationary. 598
Kant’s example has two independent "frames of reference", with each "frame of
reference" having its own observer who is unaware of the other. Kant’s example presents
several problems regarding the LNC:
(1) The below-deck observer would determine that an object (such as a table) fixed to
the ship is motionless. Physical experiment would confirm this result. But an observer
outside the ship would determine that the ship (and thus the table attached to it) is
in motion relative to some other point. The table is both in motion and motionless -
but not to the same observer. Each of the answers is subjectively true to its respective
observer. To resolve the dilemma, either the two observers need to communicate with
one another. or a third observer is needed to objectively determine that only the outside
observer is correct.
(2) Also there is a possibility that the outside observer is in agreement with the
below-deck observer, and both are wrong. For example, if the outside observer is on a
spaceship travelling parallel to the below-deck observer’s spaceship, in a featureless area
of outer space, both observers will determine that the table is motionless (the wrong
answer). Again a third observer is needed, with access to additional information (e.g.
a reference point), in order to determine that the first two observers are wrong.
Therefore, the question is not "whether or not the table is in motion", but rather
"whether or not the table is in motion in relation to point x in space". So if no observer
can observe "point x", and all observers are in an inertial state, 599 this necessitates a
3rd truth-value (e.g. "indeterminate") for the question "whether or not the table is in
motion in relation to point x." This 3rd truth-value renders LNC and ECQ irrelevant.
As with with the paradox of "Schrödinger’s Cat", the 3rd truth-value in Galilean
Relativity is necessitated by the observer’s lack of critical information, not by some
other characteristic of reality.
Norton [202] adds the following, in regards to "relativity of simultaneity" in Ein-
stein’s special theory of relativity: 600
598See Wikipedia [313]. See also Penrose [214], §17.2 "Spacetime for Galilean relativity", pp.385-387.
599Both constant speed and stillness are "inertial states".
600See also Wikipedia [339].
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The relativity of simultaneity adds to the repertoire of quantities that are
relative and not absolute. There is no absolute fact to whether a spaceship
is moving uniformly or is at rest. It can only be said to be at rest relative
to another body. There is no absolute fact as to whether a rod is a foot
long or a process lasts for one minute. They can only true with respect an
observer with a definite state of motion. To this list we add that there is no
absolute fact to whether two spatially separated events are simultaneous; or
whether two spatially separated clocks are synchronous. These can only be
true relative to an observer with a definite state of motion.
So the truth value of statements pertaining to simultaneity also should be assigned the
3rd truth value (unless a specific frame of reference is specified).
25.8.4 Popper, Bohr, Einstein, and Bell
Moreover, some propositions with the 3rd truth-value fail Popper’s "falsifiability" test
for scientific conjectures, because they are paradoxes that are both true and false (or
neither). 601 One example of this is the Riemann Hypothesis.
Moreover, if Niels Bohr is correct regarding contradiction being an inherent char-
acteristic of quantum physics, 602 then its underlying logic must be able to cope with
paradoxes, and thus must be non-classical. The classical logic that underlies mathe-
matics (and thus classical physics too) is unable to cope with paradoxes, due to LNC
and ECQ. If there is to be a unification of classical and quantum physics, it can only
happen if the foundational logic is a non-classical logic (that accepts the paradoxes of
quantum physics).
It is also noted that the paradoxes of both (a) value of the Schrödinger wave function
prior to "collapse" (according to the Copenhagen interpretation), and (b) whether
events are simultaneous in Einstein’s special theory of relativity, are due to limits of
what can be known. Another example is Heisenberg’s uncertainly principle. In all of
these cases, observers are barred from knowing the truth-value of a proposition.
Einstein "wanted things out there to have properties, whether or not they were
measured". 603 But there are limits to observer knowledge, even after measurement,
601See Wikipedia [318]: "To say that a given statement (e.g., the statement of a law of some scientific
theory)—call it "T"—is "falsifiable" does not mean that "T" is false. Rather, it means that, if "T" is
false, then (in principle), "T" could be shown to be false, by observation or by experiment. Popper’s
account of the logical asymmetry between verification and falsifiability lies at the heart of his philosophy
of science."
602See Wikipedia [326], citing Wheeler [304].
603See Mermin [190], p.38, citing Pais [208]: "We often discussed his notions on objective reality.
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as Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle clearly shows. This in turn raises another issue:
What truth-value do we assign to unknowable propositions? Classical logic does not
have an answer for this. So a non-classical logic (such as a 3VL) must be used instead.
Another famous philosophical question raised by quantum physics is: "If a tree
falls in the forest, and there’s nobody around to hear, does it make a sound?" 604 The
physicist John Bell asked it in the following form:
What exactly qualifies some physical systems to play the role of ’mea-
surer’? Was the wavefunction of the world waiting to jump for thousands of
years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or did it have to wait
a little longer, for some better qualified system ... with a PhD? 605
As Karl Popper would have gladly explained, Bell’s questions are "unfalsifiable" philo-
sophical questions that fall outside of the purview of science. 606
26 Conclusion
Analytic continuation of ζ(s) violates the LNC, because it contradicts the proven diver-
gence of the Dirichlet series ζ(s) in the half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1. According to Aristotle’s
LOI, LEM, and LNC, any "analytic continuation" of ζ(s) to the half-plane Re(s) ≤ 1
is false. Therefore, in logics that include LNC and ECQ, the falsity of analytic continu-
ation of ζ(s) renders "trivially true" all arguments that falsely assume the truth of the
"analytic continuation" of ζ(s).
Moreover, because the analytic continuation of ζ(s) is false, the Dirichlet series
exclusively defines ζ(s), and therefore ζ(s) has no zeros. Thus, both the Riemann
Hypothesis (RH) and anti-RH ("All zeros of ζ(s)" are off the critical line") are true
propositions, due to their "vacuous subjects": the non-existent zeros of Dirichlet series
ζ(s). This paradoxical result violates the LNC. So in classical and intuitionistic logics,
ECQ renders "trivially true" all "proofs" that assume RH is true. In 3VLs that assign
the 3rd truth -value to paradoxes (e.g. Buchavar’s 3VL and Priest’s "LP ), the RH has
the 3rd truth-value.
The result that RH is a paradox causes all conjectures that assume it is true to be
"trivially true" in logics with LNC and ECQ. This result, and also the result in 3VLs
I recall that during one walk Einstein suddenly stopped, turned to me and asked whether I really
believed that the moon exists only when I look at it." The best response to this question is to invoke
David Hume’s arguments regarding the “problem of induction”. See Henderson [137].
604See Baggott [16], and Wikipedia [317].
605See Baggott [17], p.134, citing Bell [24], p.34.
606See, for example, debates pertaining to "consciousness" in Van Gulick [295].
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that RH has the third truth-value, is inconsistent with "proofs" of analogues of the RH,
which claim to prove that the analogues of RH are "exclusively true" (not paradoxes).
See e.g. (1) Hasse’s proof of the RH for elliptic curves of genus 1, 607 (2) Deligne’s
proof of the Weil conjecture III, 608 and (3) Weil’s proof of the RH for elliptic curves of
arbitrary genus g. 609
All of these alleged proofs include a violation of the LNC, caused by the analytic
continuation of an analogue of ζ(s), and the consequently false determinations that:
the analogue of ζ(s) has a pole and zeros, that its functional equation is valid, etc.
Moreover, as stated in Chapter 15.4, Langer’s [171] statement that "[c]ontradictory
theorems cannot follow from consistent postulates" 610 is wrong. Contradictory the-
orems do follow from consistent postulates, if the theorems are directed to "vacuous
subjects", or if the postulates result in self-reference. Therefore, MacFarlane’s [177]
quote citing Meyer [191] on this topic requires clarification:
There’s no good reason to assume that mathematics must be consistent.
If math is about a supersensible realm of objects, why should we assume
they’re like ordinary empirical objects with respect to consistency? But if
math is a free human creation, why can’t it be inconsistent?
... for certain purposes an inconsistent system might be more
useful, more beautiful, and even—at the furthest metaphysical
limits—as the case may be, more accurate. 611
Classical logic forces math to be consistent or trivial. 612
However, it is not classical logic per se that forces math to be consistent or trivial,
rather it is ECQ and its prerequisite LNC that do so. Any logic that has LNC and
ECQ (e.g. Intuitionistic logic) would, if assumed to be the foundation logic of math,
force math to be consistent or trivially true. Moreover, Intuitionistic logic would do so
in a more restrictively than classical logic, due to an insistence on constructive proof.
In regards to a 3VL or 4VL as a possible foundation logic instead of classical logic,
Hazen et al. [131] (citing Dunn [85]), states that if one tries to formulate a second-
order logic of a 3VL or 4VL, the resultant system collapses to its classical counterpart.
607See Milne [194], p.3.
608See Milne [194], p.49.
609See also Jannsen [151], pp.4-5.
610See Langer [171], p.202.
611MacFarlane [177], p.1, citing Meyer [191], p.814.
612See MacFarlane [177], p.1.
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613 614 Moreover, another Hazen et al. article ([133]) states: "it will be extremely
difficult to appeal to [Priest’s] second-order LP for the purposes that its proponents
advocate, until some deep, intricate, and hitherto unarticulated metaphysical advances
are made." 615
Note also that the most important "cost" of having classical logic as the foundational
logic of math is that LNC and ECQ force math to be incomplete, as formally proven
by Gödel in his first incompleteness theorem (that utilizes the Liar paradox). If a
multi-valued logic (e.g. 3VLs and 4VLs) were able to be the foundational logic of
mathematics, and thus could assign a 3rd or 4th truth-value to paradoxes, this would
make mathematics complete (at the cost of being inconsistent).
On an unrelated note: In his The History of Modern Philosophy, Bertrand Russell
states the following: 616
Throughout modern times, practically every advance in science, in logic,
or in philosophy has had to be made in the teeth of the opposition from
Aristotle’s disciples.
Ironically, Russell’s Principia Mathematica includes Aristotle’s "Laws of Thought"
(LOI, LEM, and LNC) as theorems, which de facto makes Russell a disciple of Aristo-
tle. So Russell’s statement can be interpreted as the liar’s paradox. Also, Łukasiewicz’s
3VL was derived from Aristotle’s future contingents, was an advance in logic, and was
not made "in the teeth of opposition from Aristotle’s disciples."
On another unrelated note, the RH has been described as "[e]legant, crisp, falsifiable,
and far-reaching" and "the epitome of what a conjecture should be". 617 In fact, the
613See Hazen et al. [131], p.507: "We are not sure what general morals to draw from all this. An
obvious one to draw from the negative results of Sects. 6 and 7 is that many non-classical logics do
not have well-behaved Second Order versions: something already shown, in a different way and for
different logics in [Dunn [85]]."
614See Dunn [85], p.261: "In Dunn [84] it was shown (among other things) that if one tries to formulate
second-order quantum logic with a certain minimal principle of extensionality, one is doomed to failure
in the sense that the resultant system collapses to its classical counterpart. It was remarked in In
Dunn [84] that this result is generalizable to a large class of non-classical logics, and this is the point
of the present paper."
615See Hazen et al. [133], abstract: "The logic of paradox, LP , is a first-order, three-valued logic
that has been advocated by Graham Priest as an appropriate way to represent the possibility of
acceptable contradictory statements. Second-order LP is that logic augmented with quantification
over predicates. As with classical second-order logic, there are different ways to give the semantic
interpretation of sentences of the logic. The different ways give rise to different logical advantages
and disadvantages, and we canvass several of these, concluding that it will be extremely difficult to
appeal to second-order LP for the purposes that its proponents advocate, until some deep, intricate,
and hitherto unarticulated metaphysical advances are made."
616See Russell [247], p.202.
617See Sarnak [251], first page; and Iwaniec et al. [148], p.712.
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RH is a paradox, and thus not falsifiable. So according to Karl Popper’s philosophy
of science, RH is not a "scientific question". This highlights an implicit assumption of
Karl Popper’s philosophy of science: paradoxes do not exist.
Finally, we note that in the twenty years since the initial announcement of the
Millenium Problems, none of the official descriptions of the problems have ever listed
"paradox" as a possible answer, nor has the mathematical community argued that
it should be listed as a possible answer. This demonstrates that the mathematical
community has still not internalized the results of Gödel’s famous work.
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